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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
J.,tb-.: I~1 19 J'l
Becember 1, 1978 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2(;
Cert to CA 3 (Adams,
Garth, Lacey, dj)
No. 78-572-CFH
U.S. PAROLE COMM.

v.
GERAG~Y

(former prisoner)

Federal/Civil (habeas)

Timely (w/ 2 extns

SUMMARY: The Government seeks r-eview of a decision of the
CA 3 holding (1) that the claim of a former prisoner concerning his eligibility for parole was ·n ot moot even though his
~A~ ~ entence had expired and the DC had .refused to certify the suit

.

'~. [ a~

and (2)-

tha~

the Parole Con;;;;ission' s-;:;::ole

release guidelines (a) violate the Parole Act by failing to give
consideration· to the length of a prisoner 1 s sentence and (b) constitute
an unconstitutional ex post facto enhancement of the sentence.
C F R -r $CN\M""'L~ ~-

J

?J

FACTS: Resp. Geraghty is a former Chicago policeman who
(

was convicted of demanding shake down payments, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and of making false declarations concerning
his involvement in the extortion scheme, in violation of
18

u.s.c.

1623. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment.

The conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Braasch,
505 F.2d 139 (CA 7), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
Resp. was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a), which makes
a prisoner eligible for parole after service of one-third of
the sentence.
the

s~~tence

He. was sentenced in the Summer of 1973. Just after
was imposed, the Parole Commission issued its new

parole release guidelines, indicating that the nature of the
crime committed, as well as institutional behavior and liklihood
of recidivism, would be taken into account in fixing the date
of parole. The guidelines suggested that resp. should serve
between 26 to 26 months in prison, substantially more than
1/
he would become eligible for parole.- After

the 16 months when
his

conviction _ w~s

affirmed, resp. moved to have his sentence reduced

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim P. 35. The motion was granted, the DJ
finding that his expectations had been frustrated by the new
guidelines. Resp. 's sentence was accordingly reduced to 30
months' imprisonment.
Resp. twice sought release on parole, and was twice denied.

On his second attempt, the Parole Commission indicated that he

________.

would be continued without further consideration of parole
until the expiration of his term of imprisonment.
Resp. then filed this civil action in the District Court

!/ As indicated in the pool memo in United States v. Addonizio,
cert. pending, No. 78-156, there was apparently a widespread expectation among sentencing judges before the new guidelines were published that prisoners with good institutional records would be
released as soon as they became eligible for parole.

for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The complaint alleged that the guidelines were invalid
under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, and that
they violated the

~

post facto provision of the Constitution.

Resp. sought certification of the case as a class action on
behalf of "all federal prisoners who have been or will become
eligible for release on parole."
The action was transferred to the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, where resp. was incarcerated; on the theory that
it was in reality a petn for a writ of habeas corpus. The
DC (Herman) rejected resp. 's motion for class action certifica~ion.

The court found that the issues raised by - res_p . were

not applicable to all members of the proposed class, and that
not all members had the same interest as resp. The court also
rejected the argument that the suit should be certified as a
class action because of the possibility of mootness on appeal.
Petn. 82a. On the merits, the DC found that the parole guidelines
were entirely lawful and it denied the relief requested.
Resp. appealed. While the appeal was pending, resp.'s
term of imprisonment expired and he was released from prison.
The Parole Commission moved to dismiss the appeal as moot, and
the CA deferred consideration of the motion pending considera-

,.

tion of the case on the merits •

~

DECISION BELOW: In a lengthy opinion by Judge
reversed and remanded. The court held

A~,

the CA 3

(1) that the suit

was properly brought as an action for a declaratory judgment

c

under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Parole Act; (2) that
although the suit was moot as to resp., if the DC should have certified
the case as a class action, the suit was not moot; (3) that the

DC erred in failing to consider,
(

~

sponte, the possibility

of certifying a narrower subclass out of the heterogeneous
class specified by resp.

The court also indicated (4) that

if resp. 's averments about the operation of the parole system
were correct, then "the parole guidelines as administered may
well be inconsistent with the [Parole Act]," and the parole
guidelines "as applied to certain prisoners may violate the
~post

facto

prohibition." Petn. 65a-66a. Accordingly, the

case was remanded for the DC to evaluate the possibility of
certifying a subclass and to take evidence on the nature of
the parole system. The court left little doubt, however, as
to how these issues should be resolved.
With respect to the mootness question, the court
accepted
~

that there was no longer a live controversy between

resp. and the Parole Commission. The question, therefore, was
whether the case fell within one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Resp. suggested two possibilities: that the action
was capable of repetition yet evading review, and that the
action should be certified as a class action, with the certification "relating back" to the date when the suit was filed.
The court found that the case shared "many characteristics"
with actions capable of repetition yet evading review. Admittedly,
prisoners with longer sentences would retain their grievances
long enough to achieve appellate review. But since prisoners
with shorter sentences were particularly impacted by the refusal
of the Parole Commission to take sentencing length into account,
the court found that "the limited probability of review for a
prisoner with a short sentence [was] particularly pertinent." Petn.

27a.

,.
~-

The central thrust of theCA's ruling, however, related

to the exception for properly certified ,class actions. See
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975). The court rejected
the Parole Board's argument, based on Board of School Commissioners
of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975 (per curium),
that the exception could not apply because the DC had expressly
refused to certify the proceeding as a class action. This
reading of Jacobs, according to the court, was incompatible
with other decisions. In particular, the court referred to two
lines of cases·: those where the grievance is of such short duration that, by the time the district court has been able to rule
on the motion to certify the suit as a class action,. the grievance
has already lapsed,

~,

Gerstein v. Pugh 2 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11

(1975); and those where the trial court has not certified the
case as a class action, but individual complainants with a live
controversy have been allowed to intervene in the proceeding,
~,Baxter

v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 n. 1 (1976). In

light of these authorities, the court suggested that "certifiability,
not actual certification," is the crucial question. Petn. 21a n. 43.
Accordingly, if class certification was appropriate, the mootness
of resp.'s claim did not bar adjudication. Petn. 28a.
This did not end the inquiry into ·class certification, however, for the CA agreed with the DC that the class proposed by
resp. was not appropriate for certification. Petn. 28a-30a.
hurdle,

:~ e spite

the court observed that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)( 4),

the DC has the power to limit the use of overbroad classes by
the use of subclasses. The court indicated that this
authority may be exercised

~

·' ·:

sponte. Furthermore, the court

found that it was probable that a manageable subclass of prisoners

this

sharing the same interests as resp. could be defined. The

t

court accordingly held that the DC had abused its discretion
by not considering the possibility of certifying a subclass
of prisoners

~

sponte. The case was remanded for evaluation

of this possibility. Petn. 32a.
Although this might have ended the matter, the court found
that it would "improvidently dissipate judicial effort" not to
reach the merits. The court concluded that the parole release
guidelines were infirm on two grounds: first, they failed to
take into account the length of the sentence imposed by the
trial court in determining the date of release; second, as they
applied to prisoners sentenced before their adoption_, they
constituted impermissible

~

post facto legislation.

The court suggested that the failure to take length of
sentence into account was incompatible with congressional intent
in adopting the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976;
the court also intimated that it violated constitutional concepts
of separation of powers. The legislative argument was not based
on any of the provisions of the Act. Indeed, the court admitted
that although the Act requires consideration of

~

number of

specific factors in determining the date of release, the length
of sentence is not among them. See 18

u.s.c.

§

4207 (1976). Rather,

the court focussed on the legislative history, and in particular
on the different emphases in the House and Senate Committees
and how they were resolved in Conference. Basically, the Senate
was primarily interested in firm guidelines that would reduce
the disparity in actual time served for similar offenses. The
House wanted to continue the practice of releasing prisoners
with good institutional behavior upon service of one-third of

their sentence. The Conference stated that its intent was that
(

the Parole Board should "review .and con~ider both the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner •••• " Petn. 43a. Despite this rather
broad mandate, the court concluded that "the Commission in
effect is following the views of the Senate version of the PCRA,
rather than the policies of the Conference Committee." Petn. 44a.
The separation of powers argument was more elusive. But
the court suggested that if it were true that the Parole Commission was giving no weight to the judicially-determined
sentence in fixing a parole date, "serious questions are raised
whether the constitutional protections provided by an independent
judiciary

are being undermined." Moreover, the court suggested

that the assumption of power by the Parole Commission to
ignore judicial sentences violated the non-delegation doctrine.
'~ether

or not federal criminal penalties should be redrafted[,]

it is of dubious constitutional propriety to delegate so crucial
a legislative VJnction to a non-representative body with no
standards other than a direction that the results 'not depre-

ciate the seriousness of the offense' and 'be consistent with
the public welfare.'" Petn. 53a.
Turning to the

~

post facto issue, the court noted that

resp. had been initially sentenced in the summer of 1973, just
before the new parole release guidelines were issued. The
court did not refer to the fact that resp. 's sentence had subsequently been reduced in 1975 in response to the guidelines.
Proceeding on the assumption that the 1973 sentence was of
controlling significance, the court concluded that the new

guidelines, if they were being applied in the manner alleged
by resp., deprived prisoners under a prior sentence of the
"possibility of a substantially more lenient punishment." Petn. 58a.
They thus fell afoul of

the~

post facto clause.

T~e

CA relied on

Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S.653 (1974), where the Court held that for
purposes of a repeal of a statute barring parole for certain
drug offenders, parole eligibility is determined at the time

of sentencing, and is not affected by a subsequent repeal. The Court no t
situation,
in dictum th9.t th~ converse I "a repealer of parole eligibility
previously available to imprisoned offenders[,] would clearly
present the serious question under the

~

post facto clause of

Art. I, §9, cl. 3, of the Constitution, of whether it imposed
a 'greater or more severe punishment than was prescribed by law
at the time of the ••• offense."' 417 U.S. at 663. In holding
that the parole guidelines, as described by resp., violated the
~

post facto clause, the court expressly noted its disagree-

ment with the contrary holdings of the 2nd and 6th circuits.
Shepard v.

Taylo~,

556 F.2d 648 (CA 2 1977); Ruip v. United States,

555 F.2d 1331 (CA 6 1977). Because the Parole Board had argued
that it engaged in individualize-d consideration __~£ prisoners,
and did not apply the guidelines mechanically, the court indicated
that the DC would have to take further evidence on remand.
CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that theCA's mootness decision
-:'

is in conflict with the decisions of this court and is directly
contrary to decisions of other circuit courts of appeals and
presents _an important question of federal jurisdiction. The
holding that the class action exception applies even where the
DC has not certified the case as appropriate for a class action
is inconsistent with Sosna and Jacobs, supra, which require a

'named plaintiff who has ••• a case or controversy at the time
(

the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is
certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23 •••• " Sosna,
419

u.s.,

at 402. The "relation back" exception of Gerstein v.

Pugh, supra, does not apply, since there can be no contention
that the present controversy is so inherently temporary in
nature that it is capable of evading judicial review even at
the trial court level. Decisions involving intervention, such
as Baxter v. Palmigiana, supra, are inepplicable.
Furthermore, the ruling that · the trial court erred by failing,
~

sponte, to consider the creation of subclasses, is unprecedented,

and will create unmanageable difficulties for the district courts.
The ruling conflicts with the general principles that it is
the responsibility of the litigants, not the judge, to establish
~

the propriety of a class action certification, and that grounds
for reversal may not ordinarily be urged on appeal that were
avai.lable, but not raised, in the district court. The decision
exposes the trial courts to reversal and renewed proceedings
for failing to construct class action theories that even plaintiff's
counsel, with an adversarial interest in the

lit~gation,

has

not dreamed up. As a result, it impairs the efficient use of
judicial resources in class action liti_gation.
With respect to theCA's ruling that the parole guidelines
are infirm because they fail to take length of sentence into
account, the SG argues that the CA displayed a complete misunderstanding of the respective roles of the courts and the
Parole Commissiou in determining the length of incarceration.
The court imposes a sentence, which under § 4205 sets the minimum
required and maximum permissible period of confinement. During

the period between these points, the Commission has substantial
discretion to decide whether to grant release on parole,
including the power to decline to give weight to the sentence
imposed. Until 1970, the Commission exercised this discretion on a case-by-case basis. But in response to widespread
criticism that this led to arbitrary and erratic decisions,
it began to experiment with structured release criteria, which
were formally embodied in the guidelines in 1973. Congress was
well aware of the guidelines when in passed the Parole Commission
and Reorganization

Act in 1976, in fact, the Act in good measure

was designed to ratify the guidelines. The Act makes no mention
of any obligation of the Commission to give consideration to
the length of the prisoner's sentence in applying its guidelines.
The legislative history reflects approval of the use of guidelines
to reduce the effects of sentencing disparity. Finally, the
decision below conflicts with two other courts of appeals that
have reviewed the same legislative history and have concluded
that the guidelines are consistent with the Act. Garcia v. U.S.
Board of Parole, 557 F.2d 100, 107 (CA 7 1977); Banks v. United
States, 553 F.2d 37, 40 (CA 8 1977).
Turning to the

~

post facto ruling, the SG would distinguish

decisions such as Warden v. Marrero, which concern the availability
of parole, from the present case, which involves when parole
eligibility will be exercised. Resp. was no less eligible for
parole after 1973 than he was prior to 1973. During both periods,
parole officials had very broad discretion in determining when
he would be released. The only difference is that after 1973
the guidelines provide a structure for the exercise of that
discretion. They do not alter any justified expectation of parole.

In addition, as the CA noted, the decision below conflicts
with the decisions of the CA 6 and CA 2 in Ruip and Shepard, supra.
'

Resp. Geraghty has filed a motion to substitute members
of the putative class as respondents in this court, or in the
alternative, to allow these members to intervene. Presumably,
this is to defeat the suggestion of mootness. Resp. does not
address the mootness issues or the issues

con~erning

the

vailidity of the parole guidelines on the merits.
DISCUSSION: The issues in this case bear some relation
to those in United States v. Addonizio, No. 78-156, cert. pending,
United States v. Edwards, No. 78-157, cert. pending, and
Bonanno v. United States, No. 77-1665, cert. pending. To be s·u .re,
those cases do not present a facial attack on the Parole
Commission guidelines, but involve
sentencing judge, under either 28

--

-;

.......__......

~he

question whether the

u.s.c.

§§

2255 or 2241, can

vindicate his "expectations" about the actual length of imprisonment when these expectations are frustrated by the guidelines. More
broadly, however, all of these cases raise issues about the
proper allocat·ion of sentencing responsibility between the
courts arid the Parole

Commission ~ They

also

shar~

in common a

concern about the fairness of having the Parole Commission
consider questions of relative culpability after this has been
weighed by the trial judge in imposing the initial sentence.
Whatever disposition the Court makes of these cases, it would
be desireable to consider them together at Conference. The Clerk's
Office advises that there is only one response outstanding in
the Addonizio, Edwards, Bonanno trilogy--a response from Resp.
Edwards which was due November 15. Perhaps the Court should call
for a response on the merits in the present case, and when it

arrives relist all of these cases for discussion at the
same Conference.
The instant case appears to be a possible candidate for

----- ------- --------

summary reversal on the jurisdictional question. The _CA's
....._---. -

--------

..........__

--........_____-----

decision that the class action exception to the mootness doctrine
applies in this case rests on two holdings. The first--that
the courts of appeals may in effect review the denial of
class certification when the action is moot as to the named
plaintiff, and may order that the certification "relate back"
to date of filing--is without colorable support in the decisions
of this Court. The second--that the DC abused its discretion
by failing to certify a subclass on its own initiative--is

equally unprecedented and quite mischievous. Reversal on the
mootness issue would of course mean that the ruling below on
the merits would be vacated.
If the Court does not summarily reverse, then the case would
appear to be a clear grant on both the jurisdictional and
the substantive issues. The

~ling

below creates -:::>
circuit

conflicts on three points. In holding

t~at

the court of appeals

may review the denial of class certification when the named
plaintiff no longer presents a live controversy, the decision
conflicts with Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n.,
560 F.2d 271 (CA 7 1977). In holding that the parole guidelines
conflict with the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganization Act,
the case conflicts with Garcia, supra (CA 7) and Banks, supra
(CA 8). And in holding that the guidelines violate

the~

post

facto Clause , the decision conflicts with Ruip, supra, (CA 6)
and Shepard, supra, (CA 2). The questions involved are of substantial
importance because of the uncertainty they creat for pris@ners and

because of the decision's potential for interference with the
management of the federal parole system. It might ·
be suggested that the decision is not final, because the CA
remanded for further proceedings in the DC and that, -with the
jurisdictional question technically unsettled, the

~~ling

with respect to the parole guidelines
is dictum. But finality is not a jurisdictional requisite
to certiorari under 28

u.s.c.

§

1254(1). And, more fundamentally,

the CA left no doubt but that the DC should certify the action
as a subclass, and proceed to enter the findings that the
Parole Commission does not rely on length of sentence in
reaching parole decisions (which is conceded) and that it applies
the sentencing guidelines in the overwhelming majority of
cases (which does not appear to be in dispute). In these
circumstances, the remand hearing on both the jurisdictional
and the substantive issues would be a mere formality.
CFR and summarily reverse or grant. There is a motion to
substitute members of the putative class or in the alternative
to intervene.
11/22/78

Merrill

Ops_, in petn.
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MEMORANDUM
Re:

No. 78-572 - U. S. Parole Comrn'n v. Geraghty
No. 78-904- Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper
No. 78-1008 - Satterwhite v. City of Greenville
I would be inclined to grant both Geraghty and

Roper and to hold Satterwhite.

If the Court is settled on

granting only one, however, Geraghty should probably be it.
In Satterwhite, the named plaintiff's claim was
dismissed on its merits after the DC had already denied class
certification without an evidentiary hearing.

TheCA 5,

~

bane, declined to permit the named plaintiff to represent a
putative class of women victimized by sex discrimination,
reasoning that Mrs. Satterwhite was not a proper class representative as required by Rule 23.

The court thought that once

her claim was adjudicated on the merits the ruling could not
be ignored.

And the merits determination indicated that

Mrs. Satterwhite did not have claims · typical of the members of
the class nor did she have an adequate common interest or nexus
with them.
The decision rested on an application of Rule 23,
then, and not on the case or controversy doctrine.

Moreover,

the court placed some emphasis on the fact that a full hearing
had not been held on the certification issue.

In this case,

- 2
Satterwhite had failed to seek an evidentiary hearing or
to make an offer of proof regarding the appropriateness of
a class action.

The court noted that it might be a different

case had a hearing been held and certification been improperly
denied by the DC.

In those circumstances, a record would have

been made, the named plaintiff would share no responsibility
for the court's error (which might bear on the adequacy of the
named plaintiff's representation), and any error of law by the
trial court would go uncorrected if the case were dismissed.
In both Geraghty and Roper the named plaintiffs' claims
had been mooted by factual circumstances rather than adjudicated
to have been meritless from the beginning.

Geraghty involves

an attack on the Parole Commission's parole release guidelines.
The named plaintiff in that case was released from prison upon
expiration of his sentence while appeal was pending.

The CA 3

held that if class certification was appropriate, the mootness
of Geraghty's own claim should not bar adjudication of the case.
It noted that Geraghty's attorneys,

'~hile

not possessed of a

legally continuing relationship with members of the plaintiff
class, have nonetheless undertaken this lit.i gation on a classoriented basis.

There is no indication of any diminution of vigor

in their efforts despite the release of Geraghty.

Indeed, as al-

ready observed, they represent another individual plaintiff who
now seeks to intervene in the matter.

Consequently, there is a

- 3 prima facie case of functional adversity, a central element
which the mootness doctrine seeks to preserve."

Petn. 27a.

In Roper, the named plaintiffs instituted suit as
credit card holders to recover for violations of state usery
statutes to the extent provided by the National Bank Act.

The

DC refused to certify a class of 90,000 similarly situated
persons.

The defendant thereupon tendered to respondents their

money demands, interest, and court costs, and the DC dismissed
the action.

The CA 5 held that the named plaintiffs could ap-

peal the denial of class certification.

Judge Rubin, writing

for the court, recalled his statement for the court in
Satterwhite that good reason exists for permitting the named
plaintiff to appeal from denial of class certification, though
the plaintiff's claim became moot prior to appellate review,
when there had been a full evidentiary hearing on the certification issue.

Particularly, unless the named plaintiff were

permitted to appeal, review of the certification decision would
depend upon the intervention of a putative class member, who is
not entitled under a Fifth Circuit case to notice of the individual compromise and who may therefore be unaware that the
class is without a representative.
The court thought that a viable controversy existed

l
i

~

with respect to the certification issue and that the named
plaintiffs were in a position to raise it because they had
objected to the defendant's proffered compromise.

And even had

. .
- 4 they been satisfied with the offer of judgment, they would
have maintained a stake in procuring class-wide relief.
Moreover, they maintained a nexus with the class and continued to be adequate representatives for purposes of
Rule 23, in the court's view.
elaborate
tion.

In their response, respondents

on their stake in the prospect of class certifica-

They explain that substantial expenses have been in-

curred in the proceeding thus far by the named plaintiffs and
that such expenses may exceed the full amount of individual
claims.

Were the case to proceed as a class action, these

expenses would be spread among a larger group of people.
These three cases, then, present the mootness issue
in (perhaps) significantly different light.

The impropriety

of allowing appeal of a denial of class certification is
probably the clearest in the Satterwhite situation.

That case

presents not only case or controversy problems but also Rule 23
problems in regard to adequacy of representation.

The named

plaintiff's failure to prevail on the merits established that
she had not suffered the discrimination assertedly uniting the
putative class.

Presumably, not having experienced the injury

alleged, Satterwhite was not in a position to represent the
class in an informed way.

As noted above, the court in

Satterwhite also placed some weight on the absence of a hearing
I'-

on the certification question.

(Though there may have been no

evidentiary hearing in Geraghty either.

See Geraghty Petn. 78a).

. .
- 5 An affirmance in Satterwhite, then, is not likely to affect

the decisions in Geraghty or Roper.

Indeed, the CA 5 views

Satterwhite and Roper as perfectly reconcilable.
Only if the Court thinks it is more likely than not
that Satterwhite will be reversed should the petition in that
case be granted; only then will a resolution in that case
provide guidance in cases like Geraghty and Roper, which appear to be more common.

Reversal of Satterwhite is unlikely,

however, in light of this Court's decision in East Texas Motor
Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).

There the Court

held that the named plaintiffs should not have been recognized
by the court of appeals as representatives of the class the DC
declined to certify because:
the trial court proceedings made clear
that [the named plaintiffs] were not
members of the class of discriminatees
they purported to represent . . • •
The District Court found upon abundant
evidence that these plaintiffs lacked
the qualifications to be hir.ed as line ·
drivers. Thus, they could have suffered
no injury as a result of the alleged
discriminatory practices, and they were,
therefore, simply not eligible to represent a class of persons who did allegedly
suffer injury. Id., at 403-404.
Moreover, there is no clear intercircuit conflict on
the issue whether a person whose claim was rejected on its
merits might properly represent a putative class.

See Goodman

v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (CA 4 1978) (alleged to conflict
with the CA 5's decision but only remanding the case to the DC

- 6 for retention on the docket for a reasonable time to permit
a proper plaintiff to come forward).
Roper, by contrast, presents the clearest case for
allowing appeal of the certification issue.

First, it is not

even apparent that the named plaintiff's claims were mooted
out because they opposed the defendant's proffer of settlement.
This was the ground for Judge Thornberry's separate concurrence.
Moreover, the named plaintiffs assert a continuing interest in
certification -- namely, ·spreading their litigation costs among
the members of the putative plaintiff classo

Geraghty does not

assert that interest, nor is it clear that it pertains to his
suit.

There is arguably no Rule 23 adequacy-of-representation

problem in Roper because the named plaintiffs at least suffered
the same injury as class members and may manage the suit in an·
informed way.
The Geraghty decision is the most troubling.

In that

case, there is no indication that the named plaintiff has any
interest in representing the putative class.

Geraghty's at-

torneys, rather, are endeavoring to serve as counsel for the
is
class if it/ultimately certified. Though the court adverted to
the possibility of their representing an intervenor, at the
time of the appeal apparently no motion to intervene had been
advanced.

- 7 -

Considering only the mootness issue, I think it
might be prudent and efficient to take both Roper and
Geraghty.

That is so because an affirmance in Roper would

not necessarily mean that Geraghty was properly decided and,
relatedly, a reversal in Geraghty would not necessarily dispose of the Roper case.

But Geraghty does clearly present

the issue whether appeal of a denial of certification may be
had when the named plaintiff's claim is truly moot.

It pre-

sents the sharpest conflict, then, with theCA 7's decision in
Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271
(1977).

Thus, if only one petition is to be granted, Geraghty

should be the one.
Petitioners in two of the cases seek review of
questions other than the mootness issue.
only issue is the mootness point.

In Satterwhite, the

Roper presents a few addi-

tional but insubstantial issues; the mootness issue is advanced
in the first and second questions presented.
vel~

Geraghty does in-

a few arguably certworthy issues besides the mootness point,

which is set forth as the first question presented.

The court

in Geraghty held that the DC abused its discretion in failing
to certify a subclass though subclasses were not
the plaintiff himself.

$ -~ gested

(Second question presented.)

by

Respondent

points out, however, that the plaintiff had no chance to suggest
that subclasses be created.

Though the plaintiff requested that

the DC rule on the class motion as soon as practicable, the DC

- 8 refused to do so until it was ready to announce its decision
on the merits.

Had the DC ruled promptly -- prior to its

decision on the merits -- the plaintiff would have proposed
a redefinition of the class, he says.

Thus the decision on

this point is not manifestly unreasonable and no

inter~ circuit

conflict is alleged.
The court also intimated that the parole guidelines
conflict with the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act (third question presented), and violate

the~

post facto

Clause of the Constitution (fourth question presented).

Two

other circuits have indicated their belief that the guidelines
are consistent with the Act.

Garcia v. U.S. Bd. of Parole,

557 F.2d 100, 107 (CA 7 1977) (reserving the question, however);
Banks

Vo

dicta).

United States, 553 F.2d 37, 40 (CA 8 1977) (arguably
And two circuits have decided that the guidelines do

not affront

the~

post facto Clause.

Shepard v. Taylor,

556 F.2d 648 (CA 2 1977); Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 1331
(CA 6 1977).
Respondent emphasizes, however, that the case was up
in the CA on appeal from summary judgment; accordingly, the facts
are in dispute.

In evaluating the guidelines on their merits

theCA based much of its reasoning on Geraghty's allegations,
which may or may not be proved.

And the factual issues may be

developed qn remand in such a way as to put Geraghty's case in
even a stronger light.

Thus, respondent submits, such important

- 9 issues should not be adjudicated on essentially hypothecated
facts.

Respondent has a point.

TheCA itself noted that:

Since this case comes before us from
a dismissal by summary judgment, and
since Geraghty has provided factual
support for his characterization of
the guidelines, we must take his account as[£Qrrect for purposes of this
appeal.
J

[*] However, since the Parole Commission
has presented contradictory material, and
since a large part of Geraghty's proof is
inferential, the case cannot be resolved
by summary judgment in Geraghty's favor
on the basis of the present record. Petn.
36a.
It may be wise to await a

determina~ion

on remand, then,

provided the judgment of the CA is sustained on the jurisdictional
issue.

But it may be efficient to hear the merits issueas long

as the case is here on the jurisdictional point.
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CHAMBERS OF"

February 23, 1979

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. 78-572 -U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty;
No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper;
No. 78-1008 -Minda Satterwhite v. Greenville, Texas.

The Conference voted to grant one or more of the above
cases and was interested in a suggestion as to which should
be selected.
I recommend that we grant both Roper and Geraghty and
hold Satterwhite.

The grant in Roper should be limited to

questions 1 and 2 (may named plaintiff whose case has mooted
out appeal the denial of class action certification) and in
Geraghty to questions 1 (the same as the Roper issue); 3 (are
parole guidelines inconsistent with the statute); and 4 (was
the

~

post facto clause violated by applying the guidelines

in this case).
I enclose a memorandum about these cases prepared by my
clerk, Gary Sasso.

t\<M\,'u..
~~

\)~ _ -nv._ fy~ ~~ Sincerely yours,
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Februar y 2 8, 1 9 79

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N

•
N o. 78 - 57 2 - U.S. Parole C ommission v . Geraghty
No . 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty Nationa l Bank v . Rope r
No . 78-1008- Satterwhite v . Greenville , Texa s

Re :

Dear Byron :
This relates to your letter of Februar y 23 recominending tha t
certiorar i be grante d in both Roper and Geraghty and that Satterwhite
be held for the othe r tw o. I fully agree .
I am. so1newhat disturbed , however , at your proposed lhnitation
of the grant in Geraghty . I think I would feel better if we grant Geraghty
across the board . The second issue concerns the propriety of the Thir d
C ircuit ' s ruling that the Distric't C ourt should have considered the pos s ibility of certifying a subclass of plaintiffs sua sponte . This ruling i s
really related to the Tb.ird Circuit's ruling on the first issue becaus e
the Court of Appeals agreed that tbc plaintiff's proposed class was un manageable . Thus , unless the trial court had a duty to consider sub class certification sua sponte , the case would be moo t even under th e
rationale of the Court of Appeals . As the SG points out , a rule requiring
trial judges to mull over possibly appropriate subclasses would impose
unique and unprecedented burdens on trial judges .

!

In a way, the presence of the second issue in Geraghty makes
it an easier case because the Court could reverse on this issue alone .

----

I arn also inclined io feC'l illat ihe subsiantive issues in GeraghJ:y
are , indeed, ripe . As I read the opinion of the Court of Appeals in its
entire ty, it seems to me that the District Court is given no discretion
on remand.
For these reasons, I am inclined to grant
Sincerely,

Mr . Justice White
cc : The Conferenc e
\

.•,·,,

Gcr~}J!.Y.

on all issues .
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.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N

•
Re :

No . 78-57 2 - U.S. Parol e C ommission v. Geraghty
No . 78-90 4 - Deposit Guaranty Nationa l Bank v. Ro p e r
No . 78- 1 008- Satterwhite v . Greenville , Texa s

tJ"Vi.-• ~

Dear Byron:
This relate s
...:c;._--'"'-- ;'-

~

recommending tha t
and that Satterwhite

I an1 somewhat disturbed , however, at your propose d limitatio n
of the grant in Geraghty . I think I would feel better if we grant Geraghty
across the board . The second issue concerns the propriety of the Thir d
Circuit ' s ruling that the District Court should have considere d the poss ibility of certifying a subclass of plaintiffs sua sponte . This ruling is
really related to the Third Circuit ' s ruling on the first issue because
the Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff' s proposed class was un rnanageable . Thus , unless the trial court had a duty to consider subclass certification sua sponte , the case wou l d be n10o t even under the
rationale of the Court of Appeals . As the SG points out , a rule requiring
trial judges to mu ll over possibly appropriate sub cla sses would impose
unique and unprecedented burdens on trial judg es .

1j
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In a way, the presence of the second issue in Geraghty makes
an easier case because the Co u rt could rever se on this issue alone .

I am. a lso inclined to feel that the substantive is sues in Ger~1:_y
are , indeed , ripe . As I read the opinion of the Court of Appeals in its
entirety , it seerns to me that the District Court is given no discretion
on rernand .
For these reasons , I an1 inc lin ed to grant
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc : The Corrie renee
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 1, 1979

Re:

No. 78-572:
No. 78-904:
No. 78-1008:

US Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty;
Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v.
Roper;
Satterwhite v. Greenville, TX.

Dear Harry,
I do not object to granting Geraghty across

the board.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
cmc

.§ 14rrtn1r C!J 01trl of t~ t ~lnitd1 .§\ t ll tr.s
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CHAMBERS OP

March l, 1979

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

.

RE: ~

U. S. Parole Commission v.

Gerag~ty

78-904- Deposit Guaranty National Bank.v. Roper
78-1008 - Satterwhite v. Gr ee nville, Texas

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I vote as follows :
78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v.
Geraghty

- Grant in ful l

78-904

- Grant Questions l

Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper

78-1008 - Satterwhite v.
Gr eenvi lle, Texas

a nd

- Hold for 78-572 and
78-904 .

Regards ,

~
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September 28, 1979

78-572

u.s.

Parole Commission v. Geraqhty

Dear ,John:
I aqree with Bill Rrennan that there is no reason
for you to recuse in this ca~e.
~incerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfP/SS
cc:

The Conference

~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w ...

September 28, 1979

J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

No. 78-572

United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghty

Dear John:
I see no reason whatever why you should recuse
yourself in the above.
Sincerely,
/'

\

,j_~J_}.
/

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

,Sn:punu <lfllllrl .o:f flr.t ~t.tb" ,j;btf.tg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUS T ICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

September 28, 19;7.9
I

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
I

j

Re:

78-572 - United States Parole Commission
v. Geraghty

The briefs on the merits have reminded me that I
was a member of the Seventh Circuit panel that affirmed
Geraghty's conviction in 1974, see United Sta·t es v.
Braasch, 505 F.2d 139.
I did not, howe~er, sit ~n the
panel that subsequently refused to review a reduction
in his sentence, see 542 F.2d 442.
l.

Since the appeal on which I did sit raised no
quest ions concerning the severity of Geraghty's sentence-and really had nothing whatsoever to do with the various
issues now before us--I do not think there is any reason
for me to recuse myself.
However, I thought I should
advise you of the facts and if the re is any contrary
feeling on the Court, I would welcome your advice.
Respectfully,

.-. L
'

I

~~

y

er 10/1/79

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Ellen

DATE:

October 1, 1979

RE:

US Parole Commission v. Geraghty, No. 78-572
The SG has filed a helpful reply brief addressing some of

the key arguments.

-

The brief does not, however, convincingly answer

...,

resp's most persuasive point - that denial of class certification
must be reviewable to prevent that issue from forever evading
The SG cites the Jacobs case and the dicta in Spangler v.
Board of Education to the same effect.

appe ~ l

revi ~~

Pasadena ~~

As you pointed out, these

dicta are controlling if they are the law.
wj th

~~

But neither case dealt

from a denial of class status, since the actions had been

treated as class actions below.

Resp has raised strong policy

concerns suggesting that the result should be different here.
Although I think he is wrong, the answer is not as simple as the SG
contends.
The SG also answers the motion to intervene filed by 5
prisoners with live claims in this Court, arguing that the Court is
without jurisdiction to grant the motion because intervention cannot
revive a dead case.
On the merits, the SG adds some current statistics: in 1978,
11% of the PC's decisions delayed release until after the guideline
range, while 10% allowed early release.
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October 9, 1979

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/

Re: No. 78-752 - United States Parole Commission
v. Geraghty
Dear Chief:
This note will confirm my comment to you yesterday by
telephone that, after further examination of this case,
my vote is to affirm. Accordingly, now that the case
has been assigned to me, I shall endeavor to write it
in that direction.
I would have thought, however, that the same person
should write this case and No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty
National Bank v. Roper.
They fall in the same area and
perhaps might have been covered in a single opinion.
Inasmuch, however, as you wish to retain Roper for yourself, I suggest that we plan (if the votes in Guaranty
hold firm) to bring the two cases down together.
I
would not wish us to be working at cross-purposes, even
to a slight degree.

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conf e r e nce

,;

.

/

cq omi cf tltt ~ttittb- ~ffiltg
~aglftttghm. ~. <!f. 2!1.?'-1~

.:§uvult.tt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N

Re:

November

No. 78-572 - United States Parole Commission,
et al. v. Geraghty

Dear Chief:
This circulation of a proposed opinion in the above
case will bring into focus the connection between this
case and your pending op1n1on in No. 78-904, Deposit
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper.
In my letter of October
9 and in your memorandum of November 1, each of us
expressed some concern about conflict between the two
opinions.
I have endeavored to draft Geraghty so that it would
provide .a minimum of tension with Roper.
Indeed, as you
will observe, Roper is cited in Geraghty several times.
You, of course, already have a Court in Roper.
Despite this fact, I call to your attention two minor points
in the Roper opinion that might create problems with
Geraghty.
These are the only ones, I believe, that are of
some concern to me:
1.

On pp. 6-7 and n.7 in Roper there is an
implication that a plaintiff who settles his
individual claim may not appeal a denial of a
class
certification.
The
case
authority
cited is the dissenting opinion {although it
is not described as a dissent)
in United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald.
This does not
directly
conflict
with
the
op1n1on
in
Geraghty,
since
Geraghty
also
does
not
involve a voluntary settlement.
I am not
persuaded, at least at this point, that the
settlement situation is all that easy and
clear.
I would prefer that it be left open
until presented
in
a
"concrete"
factual
context.

2.

On pp. 8-10 your op1n1on seems to approve the
distinction in the Electrical . Fittings case
between a judgment on the merits and "true"
mootness. The Roper opinion states on page 9:

...

···.

- 2 "The Court perceived the critical distinction
between the definitive mootness of a case or
controversy, which ousts the jurisdiction _of
a federal court and requires dismissal of the
case, and a judgment in favor of a party at
an intermediate stage of litigation, which
does not in all cases terminate the right to
appeal."
If I understand this language, I think it could be read as
adopting the Solicitor General's argument that "expiration"
of a claim is different for Art. III purposes from a judgment on the merits of the claim.
This may not be fully
consistent with Geraghty.
I shall be interested in your reactions to this.
If
my concern as to these two points in Roper is alleviated,
I would be in a position to join your opinion in that case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

..:§.u.pr ttttr
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 16, 1979

Re:

78-572 -U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty

Dear Harry:
Your draft and my editorially revised Roper passed in
today's circulations. There are some "tensions",~,
the final sentence on your page 11. This is not
surprising between a case with a clear economic and
property interest and one with quite a different element.
I may need to clarify possible ambiguities; for example, I
rest firmly on Roper's economic interest in spreading the
legal costs over the class and on the idea that
appealability is not terminated by the final judgment
here, rather than on any "obligation" of Roper to the
putative class. Geraghty does not seem to have a parallel
economic interest.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

'J

l

.§upumt Qimu-t .of f:lrt ~ni~~ .:§fattg
Jraglfittghtu. ~. ~· 2ll~'!~
CI--IAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 16, 1979

Re:

78-572 - United States Parole Commission
v. Geraghty

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Respectfully,
I

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
I

..
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November 19, 1979

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE Wt< . J . BRENNAN, JR.
I.

... '

RE:

No. 78-572

United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghty

Dear Harry:
I am happy to join your opinion for the Court
in the above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

1-

'

.§nprctttt ~cnrt .of tift ~tb- ~tatts
~a.gfringhttt. ~.
CHAMBE:RS OF

20p'~.:l

November 20, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

<lJ.

No. 78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission
v. John M. Geraghty

Dear Harry,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference
erne

78-572

u.s.

Parole Commission v. Geraqhty

Dear Harry:
As I was on the •short side• in both Roper and
Geraqhty, I expect to write a dissent.
I orobably will use Geraqhty as the princiPal case
for my iHssent, with a brief separate dissent in Roper.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
lfP/SS

cc:

The Conference

d
1

~rf tip~ '2,lni1d'

i .)df, i<l. (q.

;;_

l!Ll~Jl-;3

CHA!·..tf:'CRG O F

-JUST ICE li/,riRY A.

November 29 , 1919

BL.ACI~MU N

/
Dear Bi ll :

·

I fully understand your concern and discomfiture , fo r I
a gree that our past cases seem to move first in one direction
and then in anot her.
As a consequence , the drafting of the
proposed opinion for this case proved to be , for me at least ,
I believe , however , that my handling o f
a difficul t tas k.
these pas t case s, i ncluding i n particular footnot e 7, i s a n
honest one .
I shal l recirculate shortly with minor revisions , some of
whic h are occasioned by the changes made by the Chief Justic e
in his new draf t o f th e opinion in Ro pe r. My c hanges may or
may not all e vi at e y our concerns.
I am not sure th a t I u nd ers t a nd y our discomfiture with
part V, as e xp resse d in the next to the last paragraph of your
letter of No vemb e r 21.
I . had thought that the opinion (page
17) indicated that the District Court did not h a ve sua sponte
responsibility to const r uct su bcl as s e s.
In the new draft, I
am emphasizing this, and I believe that the ad ditional langu a ge should satisfy your concern on this point.
Sincerely,

Mr. Jus tice Rehnqui s t
cc : Th e Conferenc e

.in.prtmr <!Jttttrt cf tip• ~nitcl) j;tatca'lUaa-lyhtghllt, W. (If. :111btJl·.~
CHAMBERS OF"

November 29, 1979

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 78-572 -

u.s.

Parole Com. v. Geraghty

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

\

lfp/ss

12/31/79

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Ellen

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Dec. 31, 1979

Geraghty
Having revewed your draft of 12/28, I can well
understand why you found it rather difficult to write a
dissent.

Apart from the absence of a precedent that fairly

can be said to be wholly controlling, and in view of the
multiplicity of standing cases (both Article III and

1~udential)

including the mootness cases, the Court's opinion

presents a "moving" target.

It agrees with Roper that the

application of Article III must be on an 'issue by issue"
basis; it bisects the mootness doctrine into "flexible"
and "less flexible" cases, and it defines a "live controversy"
in a wholly unique way.
Nevertheless, Ellen, your draft is too long - as I
am sure you recognize.

Nor is my familiarity with the

myriad of cases sufficiently familiar to enable me to give
you precise guidance as to how best to eliminate five or
six pages from the text and perhaps also reduce somewhat
the notes.
1.

I nevertheless make the following observations.
With the rider I have dictated (and attached

hereto) the introductory paragraph on page 1 is OK.
2.

I also think your part I (pp. 2-6 , inclusiv€0
I

is a fine basis introduction - though it is confined to

2.
non class action cases.

The text in Part I is a bit

forbidding because of the multiple citation and repetitive
citation of the full titles of cases.

Possibly you can do

something about this.
3.

Part II of the draft moves into a discussion

of the class action cases.
half pages of text.
position.

This Part includes six and a

It reads well, and is supportive of our

Yet, I view Part III, commencing on page 13, as

the heart of our dissent.

To the extent that we will discuss

in Part III cases now in Part II, I suggest that we hold
our fire on these cases until we are attacking or responding
to the Court opinion.
I do think that much of what you have written in
Part II is excellent, and I am not sure how best to preserve
it without appearing to be repetitious and unduly prolonging
the opinion.
What would you think of combining Parts II and III,
and weaving your treatment of the authorities discusssed
in Part II into our principal attack on the Blackmun
opinion that we now make in Part III.
4.

After our Part I, I would move directly to

a description of what the Blackmun opinion says and really
does to Aritlce III mootness.

rt#/f/3:5

~

Part III c ommencing at

page 8 is a good starting place.

~

He takes quite a few

3.
liberties, as I view it, with prior decisions, paying scant
attention to the fact that Gerstein lends no support to HAB
because its decision turned on the short time span involved
so that cases almost always would evade review.
situation existed

in~~ although

The same

there a class had been

certified - as you correctly emphasize.
I have dictated, and will give you herewith, some
random thoughts as to what we might say in response to the
Court's new distinction between "flexible" and "less flexible"
mootness.

~

I think this can be ehe focal point of .a alll!:fcr
1\

ta~ s t

e~

our attack.
Despite what I have said above as to the central

importance of HAB's Part III, I suppose what he says commencing
at the bottom of page 14 and going through page 15 in his
redefinition of "personal stake" actually is the most
radical portion of his analysis.
He identifies three "imperatives" of a continuing
live dispute:

(i) a sharply presented issue, (ii) a

concrete factual setting; and (iii) a self interested party
who actually is contesting the case.
The last of these imperatives is conspicuously
absent in the present case, despite HAB's conclusion that
"these elements can exist with respect to the class
certification issue notwithstanding the fact that the named
plaintiff's claim on the merits has expired."

He then

4.
makes the astonishing statement:
"Respondent here continues vigorously to
advocate his right to have a class certified."
Is there anything in the record that indicates any
interest on respondent's part?
here, but he concedes that his

To be sure his lawyer is

re~

no longer has the

slightest interest in the outcome of the litigation.
Then, as you demonstrate quite well, HAB's splitting
the mootness "atom" into two, is unprecedented and unsound
(seep. 16) .
In sum, Ellen, we will have a stronger - and more
readable - dissent if we move at a fairly early point to
define our targets - drawing them specifically and fairly
from HAB's opinion.
precedent and logic.

Then, we should attack them with
As to the precedents, you have already

distinguished those Harry relies upon, and emphasized
those that support our view.

Your task is to do this as a

part of our basic rebuttal, rather than spreading

~
~

-1

out.

I know that it is easier for me to suggest this
restructuring of the draft than it will be to accomplish
this.

I will appreciated your doing this, taking such

time as may be necessary.

Our dissent is important, at least

in the interest of continuity of doctrine.

We also should

let the law schools know that at least some of us think
the Court's decision is a radical departure from precedent
and principle.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

J.J.J:-1/

~~

l.

I :Jl./

MEMORANDUM ,
TO:

Ellen

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Dec. 31, 1979

Geraghty
Having revewed your draft of 12/28, I can well
understand why you found it rather difficult to write a
dissent.

Apart from the absence of a precedent that fairly

can be said to be wholly controlling, and in view of the
multiplicity of standing cases (both Article III and
prudential) including the mootness cases, the Court's opinion
presents a "moving" target.

It agrees with Roper that the

application of Article III must be on an 'issue by issue"
basis; it bisects the mootness doctrine into "flexible."
and "less flexible" cases, and it defines a "live controversy"
in a wholly unique way.
Nevertheless, Ellen, your draft is too long - as I
am sure you recognize.

Nor is my familiarity with the

myriad of _cases sufficiently familiar to enable me to give
you precise guidance as to how best to eliminate five or
six pages from the text and perhaps also reduce somewhat
the notes.
1.

I nevertheless make the following observations.
With the rider I have dictated (and .attached

hereto) the introductory paragraph on page 1 is OK •

2.

.

I also thi nk your part I (pp. 2-6), inclusive
\t

is a fine basis introduction - though it is confined to

2.
non .class action cases.

The text in Part I is a bit

forbidding because of the multiple citation and repetitive
citation of the full titles of cases.

Possibly you can do

something about this.
3.

Part II of the draft moves into a discussion

of the class action cases.
half pages of text.
position.

This Part includes six and a

It reads well, and is supportive of our

Yet, I view Part III, commencing on page 13, as

the heart of our dissent.

To the extent that we will discuss

in Part III cases now in Part II, I suggest that we hold
our fire on these cases until we are attacking or responding
to the Court opinion.
I do think that much of what you have written in
Part II is excellent, and I am not sure how best to preserve
it without appearing to be repetitious and unduly prolonging
the opinion.
What would you think of combining Parts II and III,
and weaving your treatment of the authorities discusssed
in Part II into our principal attack on the Blackmun
opinion that we now make in Part III.
4.

After our Part I, I would move directly to

a description of what the Blackmun opinion says and really
does to Aritlce III mootness.

Part III commencing at

page 8 is a good starting place.

He t akes quite a few

3.
liberties, as I view it, with prior decisions, paying scant
attention to the fact that Gerstein lerids no support to HAB
because its decision turned on the short time span involved
so that cases almost always would evade review.

The same

situation existed in Roper, although there a class had been
certified - as you correctly emphasize.
I have dictated, and will give you herewith, some
random thoughts as to what we might say in response to the
Court's new distinction between "flexible" and "less flexible"
mootness.

I think this can be -the focal point of a major ·

thrust of our attack.
" to the central
Despite what I have said above as

importance of HAB's Part III, I suppose what he says commencing
at the bottom of page 14 and going through page 15 in his
redefinition of "personal stake" actually is the most
radical portion of his analysis.
He identifies three "imperatives" of a continuing
live dispute:

(i) a sharply presented issue) (ii) a

concrete factual setting; and (iii) a self interested party
who actually is contesting the case.
The last of these imperatives is conspicuously
absent in the present case, despite HAB's conclusion that
"these elements can exist with respect to the class
certification issue notwithstanding the fact that the named
plaintiff's claim on the merits has expired."

He then

4.
makes the astonishing statement:
"Respondent here continues vigorously to
advocate his right to have a class certified."
Is there anything in the record that indicates any
interest on respondent's part?

To be sure his lawyer is

here, but he concedes that his respondent no longer has the
slightest interest in the outcome of the litigation.
Then, as you demonstrate quite well, HAB's splitting
the mootness "atom" into two, is unprecedented and unsound
(seep. 16).
In sum, Ellen, we will have a stronger - and more
readable - dissent if we move at a fairly early point to
define our targets - ·drawing them specifically and fair-ly
from HAB's opinion.
precedent and logic.

Then, we should attack them with
As to the precedents, you have already

distinguished those Harry relies upon, and emphasized
those that support our view.

Your task is to do this as a

part of our basic rebuttal, rather than spreading it out.

I know that it is easier for me to suggest this
restructuring of the draft than it will be to accomplish
this.

I will appreciated your doing this, taking such

time as may be necessary.

Our dissent is important, at least

in the inte rest of continuity of doctrine.

We also should

let the law schools know that at least some of us think
the Court's decision is a radical departure from pre c e de nt
a nd pr inciple.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

..
'

.

lfP/SS

1/17/aO
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Ellen

FROr.'l:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

,Jan. 17, 1Q80

78-572 Geraqhtv
I have reviewed carefully, and with much
the revised draft of 1/16/80 of an opinion in this case.

I

conqratulate you on a closely knit and persuasively reasoned
dissent.

You have restructured the opinion alonq the lines

suqqested very well inoeed.

I also thank Greq for doinq an

early edit to accommodate my time problem.
Apart from self evident editinq, I have tried to
eliminate what seemed to me to be marginal statements in the notes and text.

Some, it seemed to me, adoeo

Others, seemed to reach out a bit for arguments that
debatable.

Actually, my eliminations have not been numerous:

yet, when you and Greg reread the opinion, bear in mind that
our basic points are so stronq, it would be unwise to present
marginal arquments.
The lonq rider I have dictated for paqe 9 is
designed merely for emphasis and increased clarity.
raise this rather fundamental question.

Rut I

If, indeed, Roper

Preserves the essence of Article III should I reconsider my

2.

tentative decision to dissent in that case as well as in
"M' ,,~
.......
,.;.~'!II...
'

Garaqhty?

~ ••

$~'it\~~"'l~~'I

~

.. '

q"IJ"·t·
•. .,.' ,
! . ·..
.

'

,

D

have not yet reexamined Roper, which I read

several weeks aqo. I I will, of course, do this, and suqqest ,
,,

that you complete your preliminary draft of the dissent.
Then I would welcome the views of both of you on the question
I

" ~- ,.;._·

raise.

'

The distinction we draw on oaqe 9 appears to put
Geraqhty in a substantially different liqht from Roper.
does not surprise me too much, as

I

This

have always Perceived

Geraqhty as the more shockinq of the two oecisions by this
Court.

Moreover, unless Justice Stewart has chanqed his

in Geraqhty, he may be a possible ioin in our dissent.

min~

Nor

has Justice Rehnquist come to rest, as I understand it.
In order to move this alonq, I suqqest that it qo
to the printer today, hopinq to obtain a Chambers Oraft
before I leave for Florida tomorrow afternoon.

I could then

review that and let you know by telephone if I have chanqes.

.' ,

Meanwhile your co-clerks can review the Chambers Draft.
is an important dissent.

., .

The Court is makinq a maior

departure from Article III iurisprudence.

The law reviews '
~·(

are certain to examine the opinions with care.

Ours must be

h,· ~.

;,

·~

,.,.

~ ~ .(j ~'

.,+.;

the soundest reasoned even if not the most popular result.

L.F.P., Jr.

er 1/22/80

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Ellen

RE:

No. 78-572, Geraghty Chambers Draft

I

Before going to press on this, I'd like to draw your
attention to two things:
1.

What we say about Art. III here is in some tension

with your concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974).

Particularly at pages 184 and 196-197, you seem

to adopt the Harlan view from Flast v. Cohen, that the barriers
against the "public action" are prudential only.

I think that your

more recent opinions for the Court reject that view (Warth v.
Seldin, and Gladstone, Realtors, for example), and that Richardson
should be read in liqht of the stricter Art. III limits imposed in
those cases.
2.

On a more mundane level, I have added some citations

and clarified the language of Foot
editing, I had previously

6.

In the course of

second paragraph of that

footnote, in which I had

ledged that the obligation to give

notice upon settlement an

duty to represent class members have

'·

.

2.

been imposed by some courts even before certification.

It destroys

the flow of the footnote to put that thought back in, and I have
concluded that it is not inconsistent with what we now say.
Finally, I have found no direct support for the last
sentence in note 6.
where he

The closest I have come is Newberg's treatise,

says that the Sosna/Franks result is analogous to the

well-settled rule that a trust does not fail for want of a trustee.

<'

-

?

\o pv--e ~s ~

•
I am circulating my
f.,>·4a f. ternoon.
;I
·· ·
·
If my records are correct, both of you voted
tentatively as I did at Conference. I believe all of the
votes are in except yours. I would welcome company, and
therefore invite your comments. Indeed, even if you conclude
not to join me, I would still welcome any suqgestions - as I
view what is written in this case in particular as lik e ly to
have a significant effect on Article III iurispruoence •
. ...
~

Although there i~ some tension between Geraghty and
Roper, that you have joined, there are some distinctions. At
the practical level (emphasized by the CJ in his Roper
opinion) there is a major distinction bet.ween the two cases.
If Roper were decided the way that I think it should be,
members of the putative class - havinq slept on their rights
for nine years more or less - may be barred by ~ he statute of
limitations.
.J!
. '~>. I
,
In GeraqhtJ, no one will be adversely affected by
applyina conventiona Article III mootness. Geraghty's
counsel, as you will remember, was refreshinqlv candid about
this. He aqreed that his only client, Geraahty, had nothinq
whatever to qain by class certification. ~oreover, counsel
stated that there would be no problem in commencinq another
suit to test the validity of the parole procedure. Th~re
"
were plenty of available clients still imPrisoned with terms
lonq enouqh to assure they would not be Parolert durinq the
course of litigation.

~·'

..

'·

•. -

"•

..

2.

In short, a fresh suit - for which "captured
clients" are available - would ensure that the issue is
litiaated. 'l'he reasons principallv reliet1 upon in :Ro-oer for ,
preservtnq the class action simply do not ~xist in Ger.aqhty .
Sincere-ly ,

r.

Justice Stewart
Justic~ Rehnquiat

,.

",I.

.iu.prtmt <!JMni of tlft ~t~ .ilatts
-asftinghnt. ~. <!J. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

I
v

February 1, 1980

Re:

No. 78-572 - United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissent in this case. I have joined
the Chief's opinion in Roper, and therefore do not anticipate
joining your forthcoming dissent in Roper. Frankly, I think our
cases on "mootness" are at sixes and sevens, and that any
litigant or any court can derive support from statements made in
one or another of them. Because I think Harry's opinion for the
Court in this case is not lacking in precedental support, and
because I think there is undoubted tension between a "join" in
Roper and a dissent in this case, I shall probably write
separately to explain my position. I hope to do so within the
next two or three days.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,jnp:rtmt Q}ltltftqf tlft~b ~taf.tg
~MJringhm. ~. (!}. 2ll.;f,.~

~

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

~

Re:

78-572 - United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty

Dear Lewis:
Please add my name to your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~ttprtmt

Q}onrt of

~z.t.slrmgton.

t~t> ~u~ .:§tatr.s

;m. <.q.

20c?J~;J

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 11, 1980

Re:

/

78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty

Dear Harry:
I have made a final review of this case after
reading Lewis' revised dissent in Roper. As you know,
I have never viewed these cases as being governed by
the same principles; for me the application of
traditional concepts of mootness calls for reversal of
Geraghty and affirmance of Roper, since the former has
no vestige of interest in the litigation.
If Lewis makes some changes in his dissent in this
case, I may join him.
Otherwise, I will simply dissent "solo".

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.iu.pumt <qourt of tqt ~nitt~ .itattg
:Jifa:gfrington, ~. <q. 2.llp'l>$
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 11, 1980
PERSONAL

Re:

78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty

Dear Lewis:
I could join your dissent if
(a) on line 9, page 9, after "paid" you insert
"into court but not accepted by plaintiffs
.",
(b) change the final sentence of the first full
paragraph to read:
"One can disagree with that analysis yet conclude
that Roper affords no support for the Court's
holding here."

Mr. Justice Powell

·~·,

March 11, 1980

Dear Chief:
Thank you for your letter of this oate.
I am happy to make the chanqes in my dissent that
you suqqest.
These will be made, and I hooe to circulate by
tomorrow.
Welcome aboard!
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

{{!,.

lfp/ss

~·

.··

~u.pumt

<!Jcurt ttf tqt ~tdt ~tatts
'JIDagfringtcn., ~. <!J. '2flc?Ji·2

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 11, 1980

Re:

78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty

Dear Harry:
I have made a final review of this case after
reading Lewis' revised dissent in Roper. As you know,
I have never viewed these cases as being governed by
the same principles; for me the application of
traditional concepts of mootness calls for reversal of
Geraghty and affirmance of Roper, since the former has
no vestige of interest in the litigation.
If Lewis makes some changes in his dissent in this
case, I may join him.
Otherwise, I will simply dissent "solo".

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.:iu.prtmt <!Illud llf t4t ~b ;italtg

..-agfri:ngron. IO. <!I·

zogrn.~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 12, 1980

Re:

78-572 - United States Parole Commission
v. Geraghty

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for the accommodation in your
dissent, which I now join.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.:§uvumt (!Jll'ltrt Gf tlrt 'Jtlnitd~ j;rn.tta
2)tlaalrhtg-httt. ~. <!J. 2llblJ!~
CHAMBERS OF

March 13, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: No. 78-572 - United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty
On page 11 of the proposed opinion I am inserting the
following immediately after the numeral in the eighth line
of the second paragraph:

..

"See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S., at 469."

.§ttprtutt ~omt of tltt 'Jtlnitdt ..§ita:Ua

'J]tlaaJri:ttgt~. ~. ~· 20&tJI-;l
CHAMBERS OF

March 13, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

MEHORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: No. 78-572 - United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty
On page 11 of the proposed opinion I am inserting the
following immediately after the numeral in the eighth line
of the second paragraph:

..

"See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437

u.s.,

at 469."
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April 22, 1980

78-572

u.s.

Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty

Dear Henry:
I return my opinion in this case with your
suqqested editorial changes, and in qeneral they seem fine as
usual.

'

Both my clerk and I do have some question as to
what seems to me to be an unnecessary use of "hyphens". My
impression is that recently vour office has been suqqestinq
the addition of more hyphens than usual. I am inclined to
leave stylistic decisons of this kind to you, and if vour
usaqe is heinq accepted qenerally by other Chambers I will
acauiesce.

\

I do note that the Government Printing Office Style
Manual (January 1973), page 75, §6.16 a~dresses the use of a
hyphen "to form a temporary or made compound", and states
that "restraint should be exercised" in this usaqe. This
would apply, in my view, to "personal stake requirement" and
"class action context". ~
The matter is not one of vast consequence, and
accordingly if vou will let me know tha.t your present usage
of hyphens is beinq followed uniformly in Court opinions, I
will be content. I do think uniformity with respect to
stylistic matters of this kind is desirable, and therefore I
will rely on your iudqment.
.,i,

~·.

Sincerely, .

"' }

"'"

t),'-
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M_ 2 ?, .:::t;~United Stat.es Parole Commission On Writ of Certiorari to
V

/') _et !l., Petitioners,
1
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John M. Geraghty.
~
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the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
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MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

~

This case raises the question whether a trial court's denial
of a motion for certification of a class may be reviewed on
appeal after the named plaintiff's personal claim has become
~~~"moot." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
~~ ~·.--' - ..J• ...ceacuit held. that a named plaintiff, respondent here. who
~D- · . ~rv--br~ght a class action challenging the validity of the United
, States Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines, could
/_,~ ~' continue his appeal of a ruling denying class certification even
~-~ ..,
though he had been released from prison while the appeal was
? ?
pending. We granted certiorari. 440 U. S. 945 ( 1979), to
-- l
~
consider this issue of substantial significance, under Art. III of
.
~
the Constitution, to class action litigation, 1 and to resolve the
1
ict in a~ach among the Courts of Appeals. 2
. A~~ ,
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~ _

_ .I

rl /"

'f

.

4

yv"" r

SL

gra of certiorari also included the question of the validity of the
arole Release Guid<>lines, an i~sue left open in United States v. Addonizio,
Jf L
,/.
442 U . S . - , - (1979) (slip op. , at 5--6). We have concluded, howJ c..r)
<>ver, that it would be premature to r<>ach the merits of that question at
_,..~ this time. See injm, at 17.
_ L~
While the petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, respondent
I
~~
Geraghty illed a motion to substitute as respondents in this Court. five
~ ~---•
prisoners, then incarcera.ted, who also were represented by Geraghty's
~
attorneys. In the alterna.tive, the pri ·oners sought to intervene. We
111
• J_.
deferred our ruling on the motion to the hearing of the case on the merits .
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In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted explicit
Parole Release Guidelines for adult prisoners. 3 These guidelines establish a "customary range" of confinement for various
classes of offenders. The guidelines utilize a matrix. which
combines a "parole prognosis" score (based on the prisoner's
age r.t first conviction. employment background, and other
personal factors) and an "offense severity" rating. to yield
the "customary" time to be served in prison.
Subsequently, in 1976. Congress enacted the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (PCR.A). Pub. L. 94-230. 90
Rtat. 219. 18 U. S. C. ~~ 4201-4218. This Act provided the
440 U. S. 045 (1979). The~e prisonrr,;, or mo"t of thrm , no\\' nl~o
hrwe been rclea~ed from incflreemtion. On September 25, 1979, a. supplement. to the motion to ~ubstitutc or intervene wn~ filed, proposing six new
~ub,-titutr respondents or intrrnnors; ench of t hc~e is a. pre~entl~· inrarrcrnted fcdernl prisoner who, allegrdl~·, hn s been ndversely affrrted b~·
thr guideline>' nne! who i~< reprrf'entrd b~· Cicrnght~·'s counsrl.
Rinrc we hold thnt. re~ponrlrnt. mny continue to litigntr the rlflss rert ific::ttion issue, there is no need for us to consider whether the motion should
br grnnted in order to prrvrnt the cnsr from bring moot. We conclude
t hilt the District Court. initially should l'llll' on the motion.
3 Sec, e. g.. Armour v. City of Anniston. 507 F. 2d 46. 48-49 (CA5
J!179): Susman v. Lincoln AmPrica.n r'01']J .. 5~7 F. 2d R6fi (CA7 1!178),
rrrt. pending, No. 78-116!1: Goodman \'. Schlesinger. 5R4 F. 2cl 1325,
1332-1333 (CA-~ 1!)78); Camper v. ('alumet Petrochemirals, Tnt .. 584
F. 2cl 70 (CA5 1978); Roper v. Consun•e. lnc., 578 F. 2d 1106 (CA5
2978), nff'd sub nom. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank t'. RopPr, ante , p . (1079); Sattl'1·u•hite v. City of Greenville. 57R F. 2cl 987 (CA5 1978)
(en bane), rcrL pending, No. 7R-100R: Vtm Cannan v. Breed. 565 F. 2d
1096 (CA9 Hl77): Winokur v. Bell Fedeml Savings ~~ Loan Assn .. 560
F. 2cl 271 (CA7 1977), cert. clrnird. 435 U. S. 932 (1978); Lasky v.
Quinlan. 55S F. 2cl 113:3 (CA2 1977); Kuahulu v. Employers lns. of
Wausau. 557 F. 2cl 1334 (CA!) Hl77); Boyd v. Justices of Special 1'e1·m ,
546 F. 2d 526 (CA2 1976); Napier v. Gertrude. 542 F. 2d 825 (CAlO
1076), cert. drnird, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
~ 38 Fed. Reg. 31942-31945 (1973). The guidelines cmrentl~r in force·
npprar nt 28 CFTI § 2.20 ( 1970).
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first legislative authorization for parole release guidelines. It
required the newly created Parole Commission to "promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the
powe [r] ... to grant or deny an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner." § 4203. Before releasing a prisoner on parole, the Commission must find, "upon
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the prisoner," that release "would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or
promote disrespect for the law" and that it "would not jeopardize the public welfare." § 4206 (a).
Respondent John M. Gcr~hty was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Northerri:01strict of Illinois of
conspiracy to commit extortion. in violation of 18 U. S. C'.
§ 1951. and of making false material declarations to a grand
jury. in violation of 18 U.S. C'. § 1623.4 On .January 25, 1974.
two months after initial promulgation or' the release guidelines. respondent was sentenced to concurrent prison terms
of four years on the conspiracy count and one year on the false
declarations count. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed respondent's conviction~. United
State'! Y. Braasch, 505 F. 2d 139 (1974). ccrt. denied sub nom.
Geraghty v. United States. 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
Geraghty la.ter, pursuant to a motion under Fed. Rule
C'rim. Proc. 35, obtained from the District Court a reduction
of hi" sentence to 30 months. Thr court granted the motion
because, in the court's view, application of the guiclelinrs
"·oulrl frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with respect to
the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. Un1'ted
States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (ND Ill., 1975). appral
dism'd and mandamus denied, 542 F. 2d 442 (CA7 1976).
The Pxtortion count wns b:-t~ed on rrspondrnt'R usE' of his position ns a
Yire squ::~d officer of the Chicngo police forcr to "~hnkedown" dispenserR
of nlcoholic beverngcs; the fnlsc drrlnrntions concerned hiR involvement.
in this scheme.
4

~

t
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Geraghty then applied for release on pa.role. His first
application was denied in January 1976 with the following
explanation:
"Your offense behavior has been rated as very high severity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have
been in cnstody for a tota.J of 4 months. Guidelines cstablislH'cl by the Board for adult cases which consider the
above factors indicate a runge of 26-36 months to hC'
served bdorC' release for case's with good institutional
progrmn performance and adj ustrnent. After review of
all relevant factors and information presented, it is found
that a derision at this consideration outside the guidelines
does not appear warranted.'' App. 5, 24.
If the customary release date' applicable to respondent under
the guide] ines ·were adhered to, he woukl not be paroled before
serving his entire sentence minus good-time credits. Geraghty
applied for parole again in June 1976; that application was
denied for the same reasons. He then instituted this civil
suit as a cl~_action in the United States District Court for
the District Ofl:""olumbia, challenging the guidelines as inconsistent ·with t11C' PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning
the procedures by which the guidelines v;·ere applied to his
case.
Respondent sought certification of a class of "all federal
prisoners who are of\\·ho 'W1tt"brcome eligible for release on
parole." Id., at 17. Without ruling on Geraghty's motion.
the court tranRfrrred the case to tlw Middle District of Pennsylvania. 'vherc respondent was incarcerated. Geraghty continued to press his motion for class certification, but the comt
postponed ruling on the motion until it was prepared to render
a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court subsequently denied Geraghty's request
for class certification a.nd granted summary judgment for petitioners on all the claims Geraghty asserted. 429 F. Supp.
737 (MD Pa. 1977). The court regarded respondent's action
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as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to which Fed. Rule
C'iv. Proc. 23 applied only by analogy. It d~ed class certification as "neither necessary nor appropriate." 429 F. Supp.,
at 740. A class action was "necessary" only to avoid mootnC'ss. The court found such a consideration not comprehended
hy Rnle 23. It found class certification inappropriate because
Geraghty raised certain individual issues and , ina.smuch as
some prisoners might be benefite-d by the guidelines, becausr
his claims were not typical of the entire proposed claF>s. 429
F . Rupp., at 740-741. On the merits, the court ruled that the
guidelines are consistent with the PCRA and do not offend
tlw Ex Post Facto Clause. U. R. Const., Art. I. § 9, cl. 3. 429
F. Stlpp., at 741- 744.
R0spondent. individually "and on behalf of a cla.ss." appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. App. 29. Thereafter, another prisoner, Becher, who
had been denied parole through applicatiOn of the guidelines
and who was represented by Geraghty's counsel, moved to
intervene. Becher sought intervention to ensure that the
legal issue raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class "will not
esrape review in the appeal in this case." Pet. to Intervene
After Judgment 2. The District Court, concluding that the
filing of Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested it of jurisdiction, denied the )etition to intervene. Becher then filed a
timely notice of appeal from the denial of intervention. The
t\YO appeals were consolidated.
On J~7, before an brief had been filed in the
Court of Appeals, Geraghty was mandatorily released from
prison; he had served 22 months of 11s sen ence, and had
earned good-time credits for thr rest. Petitioners then moved
to dismiss the appeals as moot. The appellate court reserved
decision of the motion to dismiss until consideration of the
merits.
The Court of Appeals, concluding that the litigation was not
moot, reversed the judgment of the District Court and re-
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manded the case for further proceedings. 579 F. 2d 238
(CA3 1978). If a class had been certified by the District
Court. mootncss of respondent Geraghty's personal claim
would not have rendered the controversy moot. Ace. e. (]. ,
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). The Comt of Appeals
reasoned that an erroneous denial of a class certification should
not lead to the opposite result. 579 F. 2d, at 248-252.
Rather, certification of a. "certifiable" class, that erroneously
had been denied, relates back to the original denial and thus
preserves jurisdiction. Ibid.
On the question whether certification erroneously had been
denied, the Court of Appeals held that necessity is not a prerequisite unrler Rule 23. 579 F. 2cl. at 252. The court expressed doubts about the District Court's finding that class
certification was "inappropriate." ']\Thile Geraghty rais0d
some claims not applicable to the entire class of prisoners who
are or will become eligiblr for parolC', the District Court could
havE' "certif[iedl certain issues as subject to class adjudication.
and ... limitr d] overbroad classes by the use of sub-classes."
!d., at 253. Fa.ilurr "to consider these options constituted a
failure properly to exercise discretion. Indeed. this authority
may be exercised sua sponte." Ibid. The Court of Appeals
also held that refusal to c0rtify bC'cn.usP of a potential conflict
of interest between Geraghty and other m0rnbers of the putative class was error. The subclMs mechanism would hav0
remerlied this problem as m'll. ld .. at 252- 253. Thus. tlw
Court of Appeals reversed the denial of class certification and
remanded the case to the District Court for an initial evaluation of the proper subclasses. Icl., at 254. The court also
remanded the motion for intervention. !d.. at 245. n. 21."
In order to avoid "improvidently dissipatring] judicial
E-ffort." id., at 254, the Court of Appeals went on to COilsider
"·hether the trial court hnd decided the merits of respondent 's
case properly. ThE' District Court's entry of sumn.1ar_v .inrlg-

r

5

Apparently Becher, too,

hn ~

now been rrle:t Hrd from prison.
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ment 'ms found to be error because "if Geraghty's recapitulation of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported
by the evidence." the guidelines "may well be" unauthorized
or unconstitutional. Id., at 259. 268. Thus, the dispute on
the merits also was remanded for further factual development.
II

Article III of the Constitution limits federal "judicial
Power." that is. federal court jurisdiction, to "Cases" and
"Contro1:ersies." This case or controversy limitation serves
"two complementary" purposes. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. R.
83. 95 (1968). It limits the busine~<s of federal courts to
"question~ prrsentrd in an adversary context and in a form
hi~<torically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." and it defines the "role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the
federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government." Ibid. Likewise. mootnf'ss
has two aspects: "when the issues presented are no longer
'live' or tl1f' parties lack a Jc~~:all:v cognizable interest in the
011trome." Powell v. Af cCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 (1969).
1t is clear that the controversy over the validity of the
Parolf' Release Guidelines is still a "live" one betwecn petitioners and at least some membf'rs of thf' class rrspondf'nt
seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the fact that
1wisoners currently affectrcl by the guidelines have moved to
hc snbstitutcd. or to intervene, as "named" respondents in this
Court. See n. 1, supra. 'Ve therefore are concerned here
" ·ith the second aspect of mootne~<s. that is. the parties' interest in the litigation. The Court has refrrred to this concept
as the "personal stake" requirement. E. g .. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. R. 747. 755 (1976); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186. 204 (1962).
The personal stake requirement relates to the first purpo~<e
of the case or controversy doctrine-limiting judicial powrr
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to disputes capable of judicial resolution.
v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 100-101, stated:

v. GERAGHTY

The Court in /?last

"The question whether a particular prrson is a proper
party to maintain the action docs not, by its own force,
raise separation of powers problems related to improper
judicial interference in areas committrd to other branches
of the Federal Government. . . . Tllus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction. the
question of standing is rrlatcd only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated \Yill be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicinl resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party
invoking federal court jurisdiction has 'a personal stnke
in the outcome of the controversy,' Baker v. Carr, [369
U. S.l, at 204, and \\'hether the dispute touches upon 'the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'
Aetna Life Insurance Co. "· Haworth, r300 U. S.l. at
240-241."
Ree also Schlesi11ger v. Reservists to Stop the TtJ!ar, 418 U. R.
208. 216-218 (Hl74).
The "personal stake" aspect of mootness doctrine also serv<:>s
primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are presented 'vith disputes they are capable of resolving. One
commentator has defin<:>d mootness as "the doctrine of stanclinlt.:'et in a time J;ame: The requisite personal interest that
must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness) ." Monaghan, Constitutional Ad.iudication: The Who and When. 82
Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 ( 1973).

III
On several occasions the Court has considered the application of the "personal stake" requirement in the class action
context. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), it held that
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mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim after a
rlass has been duly certified does not render the action moot.
It rcasonerl that "even though appellees ... might not again
enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against
rthe class representative l. it is clear that they will enforce .it
against those persons in the class that appellant sought to repre8ent anrl that the District Court certified." I d., at 400.
The Court stated specifically that an Art. III case or controversy "may exist ... between a named defendant and a
n1ember of the class represented by the named plaintiff. even
thouf!h the claim of the named plaintiff has becorne moot."
ld .. at 402. 6
Although one might argue that Sosna contains at 1 st an
im )lication that the cn ICa factor or Art. III purposes is the
timing of c ass certi ca wn, ot 1er cases, app ying a 'rea ion
b~monstrate thal 'timi~1g is not crucial.~
\Vhen the claim on the merits is "capabl~ct
evading review," the named plaintiff may litigate the class
certification issue despite loss of his personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. E. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110. n. 11 (1975). The "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" doctrine, to be sure, was developed outside the class
action context. Sec Southen1 Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498. 514-515 (1911). But it has been applied where
the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset
of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with
respect to that plaintiff; the litigation then may continue not"·ithstanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal

It

The claim in Sosna also fit the traditional category of actions that arc
drrmed not moot deRpite the litigant's loss of prrsonal stake, that is, thosr
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific Terminal Co., v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498 , 515 (1911). In Franks v. Bowman
'Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 753-755, however, the Court held tha.t
the class action aspect of mootness doctrine does not depend on the class
claim's being so inberentl~r transitory that it meets the "capable of
repetition , yet evading review" standard.
6

·"

-

~
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stake. See, e. g., Wewstew v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149'
(1975); Roe Y. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 123-125 (1973). Since
the litiga.nt faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the
same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can be expected to continue.
When. however, there is no chance that the named plaintiff's expired claim will reoccur, mootncss still can be avoided
through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named
plaintiff's personal claim. E. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S .. at 752-757. Sec Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-130 ( 1977). Some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even
enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before·
the proposed representative's individual interest expires. The
Court considered this possibility in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420·
U. 8 .. at 110, n. 11. Gerstein was an action challenging pretrial detention conditions. The Court assumed that the
named plaintiffs were no longer in custody awaiting trial at
tho time the trial court certified a class of pretrial detainees.
There was no indication that the particular named plaintiffs
might again be subject to pretrial detention. NonethcleE's,
the case was held not to be moot because:
"The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at
the outset. and it may be ended at any time by release on
recognizance. dismissal of the charges, or a guilty ph'a, as
well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is by no
means certain that any given individual. named as plaintiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district
judge to certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney representing the named
respondents is a public defender. and we can safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing liveinterest in the case." Ibid.
Sec also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 F. R., at 402, n. 11.

(
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1n two different contexts the Court has stated that the proposed class representative who proceeds to a. judgment on the
merits may appeal denial of class certification. First, this
assumption w
an
portant ingredient," Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank . Roper, nte, p . - (slip op., at 10), in the rejection of it terloc ry appeals, "as of right," of class certification denials. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesa.y, 437 U. S. 463,
46~. 470. n. 15 (l~ed that denial of
claRs status will not necessarily be the "death knell" of a small
claimant action. since there still remains "the prospect of prevailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class
certification." Ibid.
Second. in United Airlines, Inc . . McDonald, 43 U.S. 385.
393-395 ( 1977), the Court held tha
putativ
ass member
may intervene , for the purpose of appealing the denial of a
class certification motion, after the named plaintiffs' claims
have been satisfied and judgment entered in their favor. Undcrl~ring that decision was the view that "refusal to certify
"·as subject to appellate review after final judgment at tlH'
behest of the named plaintiffs." !d., at 393. And today. the
Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied
through entry of judgment over their objections may appeal
the denial of a class certification ruling. Deposit Guaranty
N nt.
: v. Roper, ante, p. - .
erstein,
cDonald, and Roper are all examples of cases
fo ncl
to be moot. despite the loss of a "persona.! stake" in
the merits of the litigation by the proposed class representative. The interest of the named plaintiffs in Gerstein was
precisely the same as that of Geraghty here. Similarly, after
judgment had been entered in their favor, the named plaintiffs in McDonald had no continuing narrow personal stake in
the outcome of the class claims. And in Roper the Court
points out that an individual controversy is rendered moot. in
the strict Art. IU sense. by payment and satisfaction of a final
judgment. Ante, p . - (slip op .. at 6).

I
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These cases demonstrate th
f tho
1e past,
Art. ITT mootness doctrine. 7 As
Art. III justiciability is "not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification." Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497.508 (1961) (plurality opinion). "fT]he justiciability doctrine [is] one of uncertain and shifting contoms."
Flast Y. Cohen, 392 U.S .. at 97.

TV
Prrhaps somewhat anticipating; tochy's decision in Roper,
petitioners arp:uc that the situation presented is entirely different when mootness of tlw individual claim is caused by
"expiration" of the claim. rather than by a judgment on the
claim. They assort that a proposPd elass representative "·ho
individually prevails on the merits still has a "personal stakP"
in the outcome of the litigation. \rhilo the named plaintiff
whoso claim i~ truly moot docs not. ln the latter situation .
"·here no class has been certifiPd. there is no party before tlw

l

7 Three of the CoUJj's caReR might br drsrribrd a,; adopting 11 l e~R flrxihlc fiJU!.f2arh. In 'J'hdianapolis School Comm.'rs v . .!arabs, 420 U. ~ . ] ~q
(1975), and inVWein~tein v. Bradford. 423 U.S. 147 (1975), dismi8snl of
putntivo cla8S :;:uits, ns mook'1·n~ ordrrrd nfter thr nnmcd plaintiffs''
rlnim~ becnme moot. And in Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spanqler,
427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976), it wns indirntrd thnt thr artion would hnYr
hrrn moot, upon rxpiration of thr n.1mNl plaintiffs' claims, hnd not the
Unitrd States int('n·ened ns a pnrt~· pl~1intiff. Enrh of these. howeYer,
was :1. cn~e in ll'hich there 11·as nn nttrmpt to apprnl the merit~ without
first having obtnined proper rcrtificntion of n, rln~s. In rnch rn8r it wnR
1he defendnnt who prtitionrd this Comt for rr,·iew. As is observed
~llhsrfJuently in t.hc text, nppral from ..i£ninl of rlns,; rlassificntion is p~
mittrd in ~ome rirrumstaiierf' whrre nppen l q!!, thr merits ]s not. In thr
sffitation where the propo~rd rbRFreprr~entalivr has lost. a "pcrsonnl
f'take," the mrrits c.'lnnot br rrnrhed until a. clns~ properly is certified.
Although ihc Court prrhaps ro11ld ha\·r rrmnndrcl Jacobs and Weinstein
for reconsideration of the clnss certific:1tion issue, n,; the Court of Appenls
did here, the pnrtics in tho8e Clli"C'S did not suggest "relation bnck" of
claRS certification. Thus II'C do not find this line of casrs dispositi1·e of '
the fJuestion now before us.
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court with a live claim, and it follows, it is said, that we have
no jurisdiction to consider whether a class should have been
certified. Brief for Petitioners 37-39.
We do not find this distinction persuasive. As has been
noted earlier. Geraghty's "personal stake" in the outcome of
the litigation i~no different from that
of the putative class represE'ntativcs in Roper. Further, the
opinion in
t'Flat the approach to take in apply-·
ing; Art. III i Issue by issue. "Nor does a confession of judgment by defel ants on'!(; than all the issues moot an entire
case; other issues- ill the case may be appealable. We ran
assume that a district court's final judgment fully satisfying
named plaintiffs' private substantive claims would preclude
their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment; however,
it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate
the named plaintiffs' right to take an appeal on the issllc of
class certification." Ante, p. (slip op., at 7). See also
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S., at 392; Powell v.
M cCorrnack, 395 U. S., at 497.
Similarly, the fact that a named plaintiff's substantive
claims are mooted due to an occurrence other than a judgment
on the merits does not mean that all the other issues in the
case are mooted. A plaintiff who brings a class action presents
two separate issues for judicial resolution. One is the claim
o~e other is the claim that he is entitled to
represent a class. "The denial of class certification stands as
an adjudication of one of thE' issues litigated," Roper, ante,
p . - (slip op., at 9). We think that in determining whether
the plaintiff may continue to press the class certification claim.
after the claim on the merits "expires," we must look to the
nature of the " ersonal stakC'" in the class certification claim.
DE' crmmmg Art. III's "uncer ain and s I mg contours, sec
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97, with respect to nontraditional
forms of litigation, such as the class action, requires reference
to the purposes of the case or controversy requirement.

Ro:;:;er-' -
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Application of the personal stake requirement to a proce-dural claim, such as the right to represent a class, is not automatic or readily resolved. A "legally cognizable interest," as
the Court described it in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S .. at
496, in the traditional sense rarely ever exists with respect to
the class certification claim. 8 The justifications that led to
the development of the class action include tf1e protection of
the defendant from incon'SIS'tentobligations, the protection of
the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits. and the
facilitation of the spreadin of litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.
ee. e. g., Advisory Committee Notes on Feel. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S. C. App., pp.
427-429; Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions. 89'
Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1321- 1323. 1329-1330 (1976). Although
the named representative receives certain benefits from the
clnss nature of the action. some of which are regarded as desirable and others as less so.u these benefits generally are byproducts of the class action device. In order to achieve the
primary benefits of class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the proposed class representative the right to have
~
a class certified if the requirements
of
the
rules
are
met.
This
1•
.J.v
I
,.
'7J
"right" is more analogous to the' private attorney general con?~
cept
than
to
the
..
type
of
ni'terest
trachbonally
thought
to
d.d:"
~~ ,,
/
1
lfV , _)_,.__'-'~satisfy the "personal stake" requirement. See Roper, ante, -~ L-....,
MV'v- "p. - (slip op., at 10-11).
_ &.... 11
As noted above. the purpose of the "personal s!!ke" require- (
~
_ A~
},A
ment is to assure that the case is in aform capable of judi~~
V' .~r
cial resolution/?) The ir'lieratL~s of a dispute capable of judicial" .-L?_
(l"""'resolution a~arply pre~ented issues in a concrete factual ~
-~L/J--

/-1- ,. ,

1/'

L'

·w ere the class an indisprnsablP party, the n:1med plaintiff'~ interests
in rertifica.tion would appro:1ch a "legally cognizable interest."
9
See, e. g., Landrrs, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Con~umer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedmc Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 842 (1974); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of De-

vv- Y

-
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rp .. .,

•

~

~
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'''"<lion, 55 F . R. D. 375 (1972) .
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setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions.Fr(i;ih v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U.S., at 753-756; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. 8., at 204; Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion). We conclude
that these elements can exist with respect to the class certification issue.notw1t stan ing t 1e ac t at the name
am 1ff's
cli:tim on t 1e merits as p1re .
1e questiOn whether class
ceitlfr~mains as a concrete, sharply presented issue. In ~ v. Iowa it was recognized that a named
plaintiff whose claim on the merits expires after class certification may still adequately represent the class. Implicit in that
decision was the determination that vigorous advocacy can be
assured through means other than the traditional requirement
of a "personal stake in the outcome." Respondent here con- }
tinues vigorously to ~d~s right to ~
We ther~<i that an action brought on behalf of a
rlass does not become moot upon expiration of the named
plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification
10
The propos:ed representative retains a
/ has been denied.
"personal stake" in obtaining class certification sufficient to
assure that Art. III values are not undermined. If the appeal
results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a class
subsequently is properly certified. the merits of the class claim
then may be adjudicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna.
Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial of tlw
class certification motion. A named plaintiff whose claim
expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits
until a class has been properly certified. See Roper, ante,
p. (slip op., at 10). U, on appeal. it is determined that
class certification properly was denied. the claim on the merits
must be dismissed as moot.

l,

~......

I

~~4
·~..

10

We intimate no view ns to whethrr a. namrd plaintiff who settles the )
individual claim after denial of clnss certification mny, consistent with
Art.. III, appeal from the adver~e rulin~r on clnss ccrtifica.tion. See
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-394, and n. 14
(1977).

·'

~~
'-'\..-'
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Our conclusion that the controversy here is not moot does
not automatically establish that the named plaintiff is entitled
to continue litigating the interests of the class. "[ll t does
shift the focus of examination from the clements of justiciability to the ability f tl. e nam cl representative to 'fairl and
adecu:atel
rotect e interests of t1c class.
ule 23 (a)."
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. R.. at 403. We hold only that a case
or controvf'rsy still exists. The question of who is to reprr-·
sent the class is a separate issuc. 11
We need not clecide er0 whether Geraghty is a proper rcprcsentati~e purpos0 o representmg the' class on the
me~ No class as yet has been certified. Upon remand. the
District Court can determine whether Geraghty may continue
to press the class claims or whether another representative
"·ould be appropriate. vVe decide only that Geraghty was a
proper representative for th0 purpose o a Jpe, m
e ru mg
denymg cer 1 c lO 1 o
1e c a
1a 1e mit1ally defined.
Thus, it was not improper for the Court of Appeals to consider
whether the District Court should have granted claRs
CPrtification.

v
We turn now to the question whether the Court of App0als'·
decision on the District Court's class certification ruling was
proper. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in
requiring the District Court to consider the possibility of certifying subclasses sua sponte. Petitioners strenuously contend that placing the burden of identifying and constructing
subclasses on the trial court creates unmanageable difficulties.
Brief for Petitioners 43-51. We feel that the Court of Appeals' decision here docs not impose undue burdens on the dis11

See, e. g., Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Fedem[ Courts: Part Two-Clns~ Actions, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289, 1331-1332·
(1976) ; Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions
Following Dismissal of the Glas~ Representative, Hl74 Duke L. J. 573,
602-608.
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trict courts. Respondent had no real opportunity to rPquest
r0rtifi.cation of subclasses aftN tho class he proposed was rrjccted. The District Court denied class certification at tho
same time it rendered its adverse decision on the merits. Requesting suhclass certification at that time would have bP-en
a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest effort
in deciding the subclass question after it had ruled that no
relief on thf' merits was available. Tho remand merely p;ivrs
respondent the opportunity to perform his function in the
adversary systrm. On remand. however. it is not the Distric
Court that is to bear the burden of constructing f:ubclasscs
That burden is upon the rrspondent a.nd it is he who i
required to submit proposals to thr court. The court has n
sua sponte obligation so to act. With this modification. th
C'ourt of Appeals' remand of the case for consideration of sub
clnr-ses was a proper disposition.
It would be inappropriate for this Court to reach the merits
of this controversy in the present posture of the case. Our
holding that the case is not moot extends only to the appeal of
the class certification denial. If the District Court again
denies class certification. and that decision is affirmed. the
controversy on the merits will be moot. Furthermore. although the Court of Appeals commented npon the merits for
the sole purpose of avoiding waste of judicial resources. it did
not reach a final conclusion on the validity of the guidelines.
Rather, it held only that summary judgment was improper
and remanded for further factual development. Given the
interlocutory posture of the case before us, we must defer
decision on the merits of respondent's case until after it is
determined affirmatively that a class properly can be certified.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the\
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this l
opinion.
It is so ordered.

To: The Chief (;·u.st ice
Mr. Ju::-;Licc· :2., .,3nnan
S\l:ll't
Mr . Jll8"Ll"'t0
Mr. .:;uct·i ) ' ,i.-~o
I
,)

l.'r . Ju.stJ 3 fr.n·sh~11
Mr. Jur;C~··') .>J'.''~J11
~Lr. ,JlL] Li C' E .tHll' ·i. st
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This case raises the question whether a trial court's denial
of a motion for certification of a class may be reviewed on
appeal after the named plaintiff's personal claim has become
"moot." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a named plaintiff, respondent here, who
prought a class action challenging the validity of the United
States Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines, could
continue his appeal of a ruling denying class certification even
though he had been released from prison while the appeal was
pending. We granted certiorari; 440 U. S. 945 (1979), to
consider this issue of substantial significance, under Art; III of
the Constitution, to class action litigation/ and to resolve the
conflict in approach among the Courts of Appeals. 2
The grant of certiorari also included the question of the validity of the
Release Guidelines, an isrme left open in United States v. Addonizio,
442 U. S - , (1979) (slip op., at 5-6) . We have concluded, however, thai it would be premature to reach the merits of that question at
this time. See infra, at 17.
While the petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, respondent
Geraghty filed a motion to sub::;tituto as respondents in this Court five
prisoners, then incarcerated, who also were represented by Geraghty's
attorneys. In the alternative, the prisoners sought, to intervene. We
deferred our ruling on the motion to the hearing of the case on the merit!i,
1

Paro~

[Footnote 2 is vn p . 2]
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D

1980 ~-
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I
In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted explicit
Parole Release Guidelines for adult prisoners. 3 These guidelines establish a "customary range" of confinement for various
classes of offenders. The . guidelines utilize a matrix, which
combines a "parole prognosis" score (based on the prisoner's
age at first conviction, employment background, and other
personal factors) and an "pffense severity'' rating, to yield
the "customary" time to be served in ·prison.
Subsequently, in 1976, Congress enacted the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (PCRA), Pub. L. 94-233, 90
Stat. 219, 18 U. S. C. §§ 4201-4218. · This Act provided the
440 U. S. 045 ( 1979) . These prisoner:;, or most of them, now also
lJaye been rl'lea~l'd from incarceration. On September 25, 1979, a supplement to t.he motion to substitute or intervene wa~; filed, proposing six new
sub:;titute rl'~pondent:; or intervenor~; each of these is a presently incarcerated fl'deral pn~01wr who, allrgedly, ha.: been adversely affected by
tho guideline,.; and who i~ rl'prr~en t P d by C:Prnghty's counsel.
Sinro Wt:' hold that. rf'Kpondent. may l'Ontinue to lit.igate the class certification issue, tlwre ~~ no need for us to con8ider whether the motion should
be granted in order to prevent thl' ca:;e from bemg moot. We conclude
that thl' Di~trirt Court initially should ntle on the motion.
2 See, e g., A1'mour v. City of Anniston, S97 F . 2d 46, 48-49 (CAS
1!J7H) ; Susman v. Lincoln American Co1'p., S87 F . 2d 866 (CA7 1978),
eert. pending, No. 7S-1169 ; Goodman v. Schlesinger, S84 F . 2d 1325,
1332-1333 (CA4 1978) , Camper v. Calumet Petrochemicals, Inc., S84
F . 2d 70 (CAS 1978) ; Roper v. Consurve, Inc., S78 F . 2d 1106 (CAS
2978), aff'd sub nom. D eposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p . (197H) ; Satterwhit e v. City of Greenville, S78 F . 2d 987 (CAS 1978)
(en bane), rert. pending, No. 78-1008 ; Yun Cannan v. Breed, S6S F. 2d
1096 (CA9 1977) ; Winoku1' ,. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Assn., S60 ·
F . 2d 271 (CA7 1977), rert deml'd, 43S U . S. 932 (1978); Lasky v.
Quinlan. 55~ F . 2d 1133 (CA2 1977) ; Kuahulu v. Employe1's Ins. of
Wausau , 5S7 F. 2d 1:334 (CA9 1977) ; Boyd v. Justices of Special Term,
S46 F. 2d 52G (CA2 1976) ; Napie1' " · Gertrude, S42 F . 2d 82S (CAlO ·
1976) , cert . dmird, 42H U . S. 1049 (1977) .
u 38 Fed. Hrg. 31942-31945 (1973) . The guidelines currently in forcetippear at. 28 CFR § 2.20 (1979).
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first legislative authorization for parole release guidelines. It
required the newly created Parole Commission to "promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the
powe [r] . . . to grant or deny an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner." § 4203. Before releasing a prisoner on parole, the Commission must find, "upon
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the prisoner," that release "would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or
promote disrespect for the law" and that it "would not jeopardize the public welfare.'' § 4206 (a).
Respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the United
States District" Court for the Northern District of Illinois of
conspiracy to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 1951, and of making false material declarations to a grand
jury, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623.4 On January 25, 1974,
two months after initial promulgation of the release guidelines, respondent was sentenced to concurrent prison terms
of four years on the conspiracy count and one year on the false
declarations count. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed respondent's convictions. United
States v. Braasch, 505 F. 2d 139 ( 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Geraghty v. United States, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
Geraghty later, pursuant to a motion under Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 35, obtained from the District Court a reduction
of his sentence to 30 months. The court granted the motion
because, in the court's view, application 'of the guidelines
would frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with respect to
the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. United
States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (ND Ill., 1975), appeal
dism'd and mandamus denied, 542 F. 2d 442 (CA7 1976).
4 The extortion count was based on re~pondent•s use of his position as a
vice squad officer of the Chicago police force to "shakedown" dispensers
of alroholic beverages; tlu'l fa! ·e derl:uatiom;· concerned his involvement
i» this scheme.
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Geraghty then applied for release on parole. , His first
application was denied in January 1976 with the following
explanation:
"Your offense behavior has been rateq as very high severity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You· have
been in custody for a total of 4 months. Guidelines established by the Board for adult cases which consider the
above factors indicate a range of 26-36 months to be
served before release for cases with good institutional
program performance and adjustment. After review of
all relevant factors and information presented, it is found
that a decision at this consideration outside the guidelines
does not appear warranted." App. 5, 24.
If the customary release date applicable to respondent under
the guidelines were adhered to. he would not be paroled before
serving his entire sentence minus good-time credits. Geraghty
applied for parole again in June 1976; that application was
denied for the same reasons. He then instituted this civil
suit as a class action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as in_consisteut with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning
the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his
case.
Respondent sought certification of a class of "all federal
prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on
parole." /d., at 17. Without ruling on Geraghty's motion,
the court trausferred the case to the Middle District of P~nn
sylvauia, where respondeut was incarcerated. Geraghty continued to press his motion for class certification, but the court
postponed ruling on the motion until it was prepared to render
a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court subsequently denied Geraghty's request
for class certification a.nd granted summary judgment for petitioners on all the claims Geraghty asserted. 429 F. Supp.
137 ·(MD Pa. 1977) . The court regarded respondent's ac~ion
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as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to which Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 23 applied only by analogy. It denied class certification as "neither necessary nor appropriate." 429 F. Supp.,
at 740. A class action was "necessary" only to avoid mootness. The court found such a consideration not comprehendedby Rule 23. It found class certification inappropriate because
Geraghty raised certain individual issues and, inasmuch as
some prisoners might be benefited by the guidelines, because
his claims were not typical of the entire proposed class. 429
F. Supp., at 740-741. On the merits, the court ruled that the
guiJelines are consistent with the PCRA and do not offend
the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 429
F. Supp., at 741- 744.
Respondent, individually "and on behalf of a class," appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. App. 29. Thereafter, another prisoner, Becher, who
had been denied parole through application of the guidelines
and who was represented by Geraghty's counsel, moved to
intervene. Becher sought intervention to ensure that the
legal issue raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class "will not
escape review in the appeal in this case." Pet. to Intervene
After Judgment 2. The District Court, concluding that the
filing of Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested it of jurisdiction, deoied the petition to intervene. Becher then filed a
timely notice of appeal from the denial of intervention. The
two appeals were consolidated.
On June 30, 1977, before any brief had been filed in the
Court of Appeals, Geraghty was mandatorily released from
prison; he had served 22 months of his sentence, and had
earned good-time credits for the rest. Petitioners then moved
to dismiss the appeals as moot. The appellate court reserved
decision of the motion to dismiss until consideration of the
merits.
The Court of Appeals. concluding that the litigation was not
moot:, reversed the Judgment of the District Court and re-
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manded the case for further proceedings. 579 F. · 2d 238
(CA3 1978). If a class had been certified by the District
Court, mootness of respondent Geraghty's personal claim
would not have rendered the controversy moot. See, e. g.,
1
osna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). · The Court of Appeals
reasoned that an erroneous denial of a class certification should
not lead to the opposite result. · 579 F. 2d, at 248-252.
Rather, certificatio.n of a "certifiable" class, that erroneously
had been denied, · relates back to the original denial and thus
preserves jurisdiction. lbid.
On the question whether certification erroneously had been
denied, the Court of Appeals held that necessity is not a pre~
requisite under Rule 23. 579 F. 2d, at 252. The court expressed doubts about the District Court's finding that class
certification was "inappropriate." 'While Geraghty raised
some cla1ms not applicable to the entire class of prisoners who
are or will become eligible for parole, the District Court coutd
havr. "certif[ied] certain issues as subject to class adjudication,
and . .. limite [ d] overbroad classes by the use of sub-classes-."
I d., at 253. Failure "to consider these options constituted a
failure propedy to exerCise discretion. Indeed, this authority
may be exercised sua sponte." Ibid. ·The Court of Appeals
al o held that refusal to certify because of a potential conflict
of interest between Geraghty and other members of the puta~
tive class was error. · The subclass mechanism would have
remedied this problem as well. -ld., at 252-253. Thus, the
Court of Appeals reversed the denial of class certification and
remanded the case to the District Court for an initial evaluation of the proper subclasses. 1d., at 254. "The court also
rema11ded the motion for intervention. !d., at 245, n. 21. 5
In order to avoid "improvidently dissipat[ing] judicial
effort." id., at 254. the Court of Appeals went on to consider
whether the' trial court had decided the merits of respondent's
case properly. The District Court's entry of summary judgs. AJ?pa r~ntly Becher, too, h tti:i now b.een relea.1:1ed from prison.
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ment was found to be error because "if Geraghty's recapitulation of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported
by the evidence," the guidelines "may well be" unauthorized
or unconstitutional. /d., at 259, 268. Thus, the dispute on
the merits also was remanded for further factual development.

II
Article III of the Constitution limits federa.I "judicial
Power," that is, federal court jurisdiction, to "Cases" and
"Controversies." This case or controversy limitation serves
"two complementary" purposes. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S.
83, 95 '(1968) . lt limits the business of feqeral courts to
"questions presented in an adversary context and in a ·form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process," and it defines the "role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the
federal courts will not intrude into areas committed tO the
other branches of government." lb,id. Likewise, mootness
has two aspects : "when the issues presented are no longer
'live' or the parties lack a legally eognizable interest in the
outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).
It is clear that the controversy over the validity of the
Parole Release Guidelines is still a "live" one between petitioners and at least some members of the class respondent
seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the fact that
prisoners currently affected by the guidelines have moved to
be substituted, or to intervene, as "named" respondents in this
Court. See n. 1, supra. We therefore are concerned here
with the second aspect of mootness, that is, the parties' interest in the litigation. The Court has referred to this concept
as the "personal stake" requirement. E. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755 (1976); Baker ·v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962) .
The personal stake requirement relates to the first purpose
of the casp or controversy doctrine-limiting judicial power
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.

't o disputes capable of judicial resolution.
v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 100-101, stated:

The Court in Flast

"The question whether ' a particular person is a proper
party to maintain the action does· Iipt, by it~ o~n force)
raise separation of ·powers problems related to improper
judicial iuterference' in areas committed to other branches
of the Federal Government . . : : Thus, in terms ~~ Article III limitations Oi) federal court juri~diction, the
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adver.;.
sary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution. Il i ~ for that reason that the emphasis in st,anqing problrms .is on whether the party
invoking federal co~rt jurisdiction has 'a .personal stake
in the outcome of ~he COI~troversy,' ·Baker v. Carr, [369
U. S.], at 204, ancl wpether the dispute touches upon 'the
legal relations of pttrties having adverse legal interests,'
Aetna Life Insura'fl.ce Co. v. Haworth, [300 U. S.], at
240-241."

·u.

See also Schlesinger v, ]l(3ser~ts to Stop the War, 418
S.
208, 216- 218 ( 197.4) , .
The "personal stake" aspect of mootness doctrine also serves
primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are presented with disputes they are capable of · resolving. One
commentator has defined mootness as "the doqtrine of standing set in a time frame : The requisite personal interest that
must exist at the commencement of the litigation .(standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." Monag-1
han, Constitutional Adjudication : The Who and When, 82
Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 (1973).

III
On several occasions the Court has considered the applica-. ·
tion of the "persona} -stake'' r~quireme~1tt in .thlil ~lass action
cohtext. J.n Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975) , it held that.
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mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim after a
class has been duly certified does not render the action moot.
It reasoned that "even though appellees ... might not again
enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against
[the class representative], it is clear that they will enforce it
against those persons in the class that appellant sought to represent and that the District Court certified." Id., at 400.
The Court stated spf'cifically that an Art. III case or controversy "may exist ... between a named defendant and a
member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even
though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot."
I d., at 402.8
Although one might argue that Sosna contains at least an
implication that the critical factor for Art. III purposes is the
timing of class certification, other cases, applying a "relation
back" approach, clearly demonstrate that timing is not crucial.
When the claim on the merits is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review," the named plaintiff may litigate the class
rf'rtiflcation issue despite loss of his personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. E. {f., Gerstein v. Puyh, 420 U. S. 103,
JlO, n. 11 (1975). 1.'he "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" doctrine, to be sure. was developed outside the class
action context. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498,514-515 (1911). But it has been applied where
the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset
of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with
rrspect to that plaintiff; the litigation then may continue notv,:ithstanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal
The claim in So.sna also fit the traditional category of actions that are
deemed not. moot despite the litigant's loss of personal stake, that is, those
" c·apable of repetition, yet evading review." See Southern Pacific Terminal Co., v. ICC, 219 U. S. 4\)8, 515 (1911). In Jlranl.;s v. Bowman
Transportat ion Co ., 424 U. S., a,!, 753-755, however, the Court held that
the class action nspect of mootness doctnne does not depend on the class
l'laim 's being so inherently tntn:>itory that it meet::; the "capable of
re1:>etition, yet evading review" ::;tandard.
6

78-572-0PINION

iO

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

stake. See, e. g., Weinstein v. Br!Jdford, 423 U. S. 147, 149
(1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 123-125 (1973). Since
the litigant faces some likeli?ood of becoming involved in the
same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can· be expected to continue.
When, however, there is no chance that 't he named plaintiff's expired claim will reoccur, mootness still can be avoided
through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named
plaintiff's personal claim. E. g., Franks v. Bowman "Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 752-757. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U . S. 119, 129-130 (1977). Some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even
enough time to rule on a motion for Class certification before
the proposed representative's individual interest exp"ires. The
Court considered this possibility in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S., at 110, n. 11. Gerstein was an action challenging pretrial detention conditions. 'The Court assumed that the
named plaintiffs were no longer in custody awaiting trial at
the time the trial court certified a class of pretrial detainees.
There was no indication that the particular named plaintiffs
might again be subject to pretrial detention. Nonetheless,
the case was he1d not to be moot because:
"The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at
the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release on
recognizance. dismissal of the charges, or a guilty plea, as
well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is by no
means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district
judge to certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney representing the named·
respondents is a public defender, and we can safely assume that he has other clients with a continuii1g live,
interest in the case." Ibid.

See also Sosna v.. Iowa, 419 U.

S.~

at 402, n .. 11~
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In two different contexts the Court has stated that the pro·
posed class representative who proceeds to a judgment on the
merits may appeal denial of class certification. First, this
assumption was "an important ingredient," Deposit Guaranty
(slip op., at 10), in the reNat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. jection of interlocutory appeals, "as of right," of class certification denials. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
469, 470, n. 15 (1978). The Court reasoned that denial of
class status will not necessarily be the "death knell" of a small
claimant action, since there still remains "the prospect of prevailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class
certification." Ibid.
Second, in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385,
393-395 ( 1977), the Court held that a putative class member
may intervene, for the purpose of appealing the denial of a
class certifica.tion motion, after the named plaintiffs' claims
have been satisfied and judgment entered in their favor. Underlying that decisiou was the view that "refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs." ld., at 393. And today, the
Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied
through entry of judgment over their objections may appeal
the denial of a class certification ruling. Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - .
Gerstein, McDonald, and Roper are all examples of cases
found not to be moot, despite the loss of a "personal stake'' in
the merits of the litigation by the proposed class representative. The interest of the named plaintiffs in Gerstein was
precisely the same as that of Geraghty here. Similarly, after
judgment had been entered in their favor, the named plaintiffs in McDonald had no continuing narrow personal stake in
the outcome of the class claims. And in Roper the Court
points out that au individual controversy is rendered moot, in
the strict Art. III sense, by payment and satisfaction of a final
(slip op., at 6).
j.udgment.. A rtle, p. -
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These cases demonstrate thE;). flexible character of the
Art. III mootness doctrine/ As has been noted in the past;
Art. III justiciability is "not a legal concept with a fixed con ...
tent or susceptible of scientific verification." Poe v. Ullman,
36iU. S. 497,508 (1~61) (plurality OI)itiion). "[T]he justi..
ciability doctrine [is] one of uncertain and shifting contours,';
Fla.st v. Cohe1L1 392 U. S., at 97.
•
'

I

IV
Perhaps sqmewhat anticipating today's decision in Roper;
petitioners argue that the situation presented · is entirely different when nwotness ~f the individual claim is -caused by
"expiration" of th~ qlai1p, ra~her tha1~ by a judgment on the
claim. They assert that a proposed class representative who
individually prevails 011 the merits stillhas a "personal stake 1'
in the outcome of the litigation, .while the named plaintiff
whose claim is truly moot does not. , In the latter situation,
where no class has been certified, there is no party before the
1

Three of the Court's case. might be described as adopting a less flexiblu approaeh . In htdianapoli~ School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128
(1975), and in Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), dismissal of
putatJvfl cia~~ ~uit:;, as moot, wa:!i ordered ' after the named plaintiffs'
1·laim;; became moot. And in Pasadena City· Bd. of Education v. Spangler,
427 ll. S. 424, 4:30 (1976) , it. wa.~ indieated that the action would have
bee11 moot, upon expiration of the named plaintjff:,;' claims, had not the
United State~ intervened as a party plaintiff. Each of the:;e, however,
wa:; a ca:;e in whtrh there waK mi attempt. to appeal the merit:; without
tir:;t hnving obtained proper certification of a class. In each case it was
the defrndant who petitionpd this Court for rrview. As is oboorved
~nb~equently in the text, itppeal from denial of clas~:; clas~:;ification is per-.
mitted in :;orne c1i·cnmstanees when• appeal on the merits is not. In the
~ituation where the propo~ed cla~~ rrpre~Pntative ha:; lost a · "per~onal
stake," the merits c:mnot lw rPached until a class properly is certifird.
Although the Court perhap:s could have remanded Jacobs and Weinstein
for recon~tderation of the elm;::; eertifiration i;.;;o;ue, as the Court of Appeals
did hen•, the partir~ in thooo caHei' did not :;uggest "relation back" of
\ola:ss certification. ThuR we do not find this line of cases .dispositive '
the que::;tion now before u&.

of
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court with a live claim, and it follows, it is said, that we have
no jurisdiction to consider whether a class should have been
certified. Brief for Petitioners 37-39.
We do not find this distinction persuasive. As has been
noted earlier, Geraghty's "personal stake" in the outcome of
the litigation is, in a practical sense, no different from that
of the putative class representatives in Roper. Further, the
opinion in Roper indicates that the approach to take in applying Art. III is issue by issue. "Nor does a confession of judgment by defendants on less than all the issues moot an entire
case; other issues in the case may be appealable. We can
assume that a district court's final judgment fully satisfying
named plaintiffs' private substantive claims would preclude
their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment; however,
it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate
the named plaintiffs' right to take an appeal on the issue of
(slip op., at 7). See also
class certification.'' Aute, p. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S., at 392; Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U. S., at 497.
Similarly, the fact that a named plaintiff's substantive
claims are mooted due to an occurrence other than a judgment
on the merits does not mean that all the other issues in the
case are mooted. A plaintiff who brings a class action presents
two separate issues for judicial resolution. One is the claim
on the merits; the other is the claim that he is entitled to
represent a class. "The denial of class certification stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," Roper, ante,
p. (slip op., at 9). We think that in determining whether
the plaintiff may continue to press the class certification claim,
after the claim on the mer·its "expires," we must look to the
nature of the "personal stake" in the class certification claim.
Determining Art. Ill's "uncertain and shifting contours," see
Flast \'. Cohen, 392 U. S. , at 97, with respect to nontraditional
forms of litigation , such as the class action, requires reference
to the purposes of the case or controversy requirement,
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Application of the personal stake requirement to a procedural claim, such as the right to represent a class, is not automatic or readily resolved. A "legally cognizable interest," as
the Court described
it in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at
.
'
496, in the traditional sense ·'rarely ever. exists with respect to
the class certification claitn. 8 The justifications that led to
the development of the class action include the protection of
the defendant from inconsistent obligations, the protection of
the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the
facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims. See, e. g., Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S. C. App., pp.
427-429; Note, Developments in the ·Law-Class Actions, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1318, '!321-1323, 1329-1330 (1976). Although
the named representative ·receives certain benefits from the
class nature of the action, some of which are regarded as desirable and others as less so, 9 these benefits generally are ·byproducts of the class actiou device. In order to achieve the
primary benefits of class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the proposed· class representative the right to have
a class certified if the~requirements ofthe rules are met. This
"right" is more analogous to the private attorney general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to
satisfy the "personal staRe" requirement. See Roper, ante,
p . - (slip op., at 10-11).
As noted above, the purpose of the "personal stake" requirement is to assure that the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution . The imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
8

Were the class an indispensable party, the named plaintiff's interests
in certification would approach a "legally cognizable interest."
9
See, e. g.. Lander~. Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Cla:,:s Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47· S. Cal. L.
Rev. 842 (1974) ; Simon, Cla~s Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of De-t:ltr.uction, 55 F . It: D , 375 (1972) .
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resolution are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual
setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U. S., at 753-756; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 204; Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion). We conclude
that these elements can exist with respect to the class cert~fi.ca
tion issue notwithstanding the fact that the named plaintiff's
claim on the merits has expired. The question whether class
certification is appropriate remains as a concrete, sharply presented issue. Ill Sosna v. Iowa it was recognized that a named
plaintiff whose claim on the merits expires after class certification may still adequately represent the class. Implicit in that
decision was the determi11ation that vigorous advocacy can be
assured through means other than the traditional requirement
of a "personal stake in the outcome." Respondent here continues vigorously to advocate his right to have a class certified.
We therefore hold that an action brought on behalf of a
class does not become moot upon expiration of the named
plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification
has been denied. 10 The proposed representative retains a
"personal stake" in obtaining class certification sufficient to
assure that Art. III values are not undermined. If the appeal
results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a class
subsequently is properly certified, the merits of the class claim
then may be aclj udicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna.
Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial of the
class certification motion. A named plaintiff whose claim
expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits
until a class has been properly certified. See Roper, ante,
p. (slip op., at 10) . If, on appeal, it is determined that
10 We intimate no view as to whether a named plaintiff who settl~ the
individual claim after 'denial of class certification may, consistent with
ArL. III, appeal from the adver~e ruling on class certifica.tion. See
United Airlines, lnc v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-394, and n. 14,
( 1977).
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class certification properly was denied, the claim on the merits
f
must be dismissed as moot. 11
Our conclusion that the controversy here is not moot does
MH. JusTic~; PowELL, in his diss«:'nt, advocates a "~dly foo nal! >!Jc"
approach to Art. III, ]Jost, at 4, and suggests that our cci ·ion today is
lhe Court's first d«:'parture from the formalistic view. /d., at 6-11. We
agree that the issue at hand is one of first impres~:>1on and thus, in that
11urrow sen~e. is "unpn•cedeuted," id., at 11. Wf:' do not belif:'ve, however,
that the decision cou~titutes a redefinition of Art. III principles or a
";;ignificant departure," id., at. 1, from "carefully considered" precedents,
id., at 9.
The ero~ion of the strict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun
WE'll beforP toda~·',: df:'cision. For f:'xample, the protf:'stations of the dissent
ar<· ~t rikiugly rrmiubef:'nl. of l'vlr. .lust ice Harlan's dis~·nt in Plast v.
Cohen, :~9~ ll. S. 8:3, 116, in 1968. ::\Jr. Justice Harlan hailed the taxpa~·rr standiug rule pronounced in that cast' as a "new doctrine" resting
"on premJs<'s that do not w1th::;tand analysis." !d .. at 117. He felt that
the problf:'ms prr::;pnted by taxpayer standing "involve nothing less than
the proper fun('tiouing of tlH• federal courts, and so run to the roots of our
constitutional systt'm." /d., at 116. Tlw taxpayer::; werr thought to complain a::; "private attorneys-gf:'nera 1," and " [ t Ihe interests tht>y represent,
and the right~ the~· t>spouse are ut>reft of any pE'rsonal or proprietary
colomtion." !d .. at 119. Such taxpayer actions '·are and must be . . .
'public actions' broug11t to vindicatP public rights." !d., at 120.
Notwith,.;landing tlw taxpayrr~' lack of a formalistic "personal stake,"
even .Ju:;!Jce Harlan fpJt that the ca::;e should be held nonjusticiable on
purely prudrntial ground:>. HiH interprt>tation of the cases led him to
condudr that ''it is . . . clear that Lplaintiffs in a public action] as such
:He not, c·on~titnt wnall~· excluded from the federal court;::.." Ibid. (emphasis
iu origina I) .
I,.; it not .,;om(•what ironic that MH. Juwl'l(.:E PowELL, who now seeks to
explain United Airli·nes. Inc. v. McDonald, supm, as a ~htforward
aupli<;lltion of Fiettled doctrint>, post, at 7-9, expressed in lm; di~sent in
MrDonald . .J-:~Tt'r . S., at :396, thr vit>w that thr holding re::;tpd on a fundamental mi:::concrptton about the mootne:;~ of an uncertified clasH action
a tt'r ~:>elt rmen o the namrd plaintiffs' claims He stated:
11

'·J'f·rvading the Court'~ opinion i~ the assumption that the elas;; action
:>Omt>how contimwd aftt>r tht> Dbtrict Court denied clas~ ~tatu~ . But that
n~:;umption i~ :;upportec.l. nc1ther by the text nor by the history of Rule 23~.

,
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not automatically establish that the named plaintiff is entitled
to continue litigating the interests of the class. "[I]t does
shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciabilTo the contrar~· •. .. thP denial of cla~s status converts the litigation to an
ordinary noncla::;.s action ." /d., at 399.
TIH' di:ssent went on to Hay:
"[Prtitionerl arguei' with great force that, as a result of the settlemPnt of
thPir individual claims. ihP namPd plaintiffs 'could no long appeal the
denial of clas,.;' status that had occurred years earliPr. . . . Although this
question has not bePn decidPd by this Court, the answer on principle is
clear. Thr ~PttlPmPnt of nu individual claim typically moot~ any i~su~
a;;;:sociatPd with it . . . . Thi~ cas<' i:-; sharply distingui~hable from cases
Ruch as Sosna ' . fou•a. . .. and Pranks v. Bowman Transp. Cu . .. . where
WP nllowPd namrd plaiutiffs who,;<' individual claim:; were moot to continue
to repre:sent their cla::;:,:e,.;. In tho~e ca~e~, the District Courts previou~ly
had c(•rtifi<>d the classe~, thus giving them 'a legal statu~ separate from
the intere:st[:s] nsserted by [the named plaintiffs].' Sosna v. Iowa, supra,
at 399. Thi~ ca:;e presents prPci:;ely the opposite situation: The prior
denial of cla:s~ statu~ had Pxtinguishf'd any representative capacity." 432
U. S., at 400 (footnote omittrd).
Tim~. tlw a:;sumption thought" to be "[p]ervacling the Court'~ opinion"
in McDonald, and :so y]gorously ilttackrd by the dis:sent there, is now relegated to ''gratuituu,.;" ''dictum," po8t. at 8. MR. Ju::;·rrcE PowELL, who
findH the ::;ituation pretit•ntrd in the ca:se at hand '·fundamentally different"
from that in .So8rta and 1/r-an/.:s, post. at 5, a~ouncl~ the facts of
McDonald ''Khnrply di;;tiugui:;hable" from those previou:s cases. 432 U.S.,
at 400.
We do uot recite the:se ca:se:s for the purpose of ~bowing that our result
i;; mandated by tlw precrdent~. We concede that the prior cases may be
said to be somewhat confusing, and that some, perhap:s, are irreconcilable
with other:;. Our point is that the stri~ formali:;tic v~II
jurisprudence, while perhaps tlw starting point of all inquiry, is ~d
with exceptions. And, in creating each exception, the Court has looked
- : : ; , to pra'Ctf · T •· an
rudential considerations. The resulting doctriiie"Ciln
br characterized, ap y, as
e
; 1 l'
een developed, not irresponsibly, but "with some carr,'' post. at 2, including the preoout case.
Tlw di~seut iti correct thd one~ exception:; are made to the formalistic
interpretation of Art. III , principlrd distinctions and bright lines become
more difficult to draw . We do not attempt to predict how far down the
roQd the Court evrntually will go townrd premi:;ing jurisdiction "upon the·
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ity to the ability of the named representative to 'fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.' Rule 23 (a)."
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 403. We hold only that a case
o•· controversy still exists. The question of who is to repreSt'nt the class is a separate issue. 12
We ueed not decide here whether Geraghty is a proper representative for the purpose of representing the class on the
merits. No class as yet has been certified. Upon remand, the
District Court can determine whether Geraghty may continue
to press the class claims or whether another representative
would be appropriate. We decide only that Geraghty was a
bare exi:stenc·r of a ~ha rply pre~entcd i~su<> in a concrete and vigorously
at 12. Each case mu ~t be decided on its own facts.
Wc· ha~tPH to note, however, that thi:-~ case does not even approach the
rxtn•nw frared b~· the di::;:-;ent. Thi::; re:;pondent ~Pred act ~concr!te
injut} ...U" a re::;ult of the putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would
~at i:-~t\' the formali:-~tic per:;onal stake requirement if damages were sought.
SPt', e. (J., Powell v. MrConnacl.:, 395 1J. S., at 495-500. Hi:; injury contimt<'d up to aud bryond the time the District Court denied class certification . We rnerPly hold that whPn a District Court errmlf'ously denif'S a
pmcPdmal motion, which, if correctly decided, would have prevented the
ac·tiou from becoming moot, an appeal lies from thP denial and the corrt•<"tPd ruling ''rplatPs back" to tlw datP of the original denial.
,lU tcial proce:;i:i
will not become a vehicle for "concerned bystand\'1',, '' post, at 4, Pven if one in respondent's position can conceivably be
('haracterizc•d a,.; a by:;tander, becau:;e the issue on the merits will not be·
:tddres:;Pd until a clas:; with an interest in the outcome has been certified.
Tlw " relation back'' principlP, a traditional equitable doctrine applied to
tla,.;s certific·ntion rlaim~ in Gerstein v. Pugh , s·upra, serves logically to·
eli~ I ingui~h t hi~ ca~e from thr one brought a day after the prisoner is
relPased. See post, at 1:3. n. 15. If the named plaintiff hao; no personal
stak<' in the onteome at t.he time cia::;;; certification is denied, relat.ion back
of appellatP rrver~al of that. denial :;till would not prevent mootness of
the· ac·t ion.
12
Srr, e . g .. Comment, A Srarch for Principleo; of Mootnr::>i:i in the FedL'ral Courts: Part Two-Cla:;:-; Actiou:;, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289, 1331-1332·
(1976); Coumwnt, Contimmtion aml H(•ru·e:;e11tation of Cla~s Actions·
Foll0wing l isrni;;~al of the Cia:;;; Representative, 1974 Duke L . J. 57a~
arg~~t·d C'a:>P," po~>t,

002'-60 ' .

'713--'572-0PINION

·20

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

1~

proper representative for the purpose of appealing the ruling
denying certification of the class that he initially defined.
Thus, it was not improper fl>r the Court of Appeals to c011sider
whether the District Court should have granted class
certification.

v

We turn now to the question whether the Court of Appeals'
decision on the Disttict Court's class certification ruling was
proper. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in
requiring the Disttict Court to consider the possibility of certifying subclasses 8Ua sponte. Petitioners strenuously contend that placing the burden of identifying and constructing
subclasses Oll the tt1al court creates unmanageable difficulties.
Brief for Petitioners 43-51. We feel that the Court of Appeals' decision here does not impose undue burdens on the district courts. Respondent had no real opportunity to request
certification of subclasses after the class he proposed was rejected. 'i''he District Court denied class certification at the
same time it rf'nderert its aclverse decision on the merits. Requesting subclass certincation at that time would have been
a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest efl'ort
in deciding the subelass question after it had ruled that no
relief on the merits was available. The remand merely gives
respondent the opportunity to perform his function in the
adversary system. Ou remand. however. it is not the District
Court that is to bear the burden of constructing subclasses.
That burden is upon the respondent and it is he who is
required to submit proposals to the court. The court has no
sua sponte obligation so to act. With this modification, the
Court of Appeals' remand of the case for consideration of subclasses was a proper disposition.
It would be inappropriate for this Court to reach the merits
of this controversy in thr present posture of thf' case. Our
holding that the case is not moot exte11ds only to the appf'al of
the class certification denial. If the District Court again
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denies class certification. and that decision is affirmed, the
controversy on the merits will be moot. Furthermore, although the Court of Appeals commented upon the merits for
the sole purpose of a voiding waste of judicial resources, it did
not reach a fi11al conclusion on the validity of the guidelines.
Rather, it held only that summary judgment was improper
a11d remauded for further factual development. Given the
interlocutory posture of the case before us, we must defer
decision on the merits of respondent's case until after it is
determined affirmatively that a class properly can be certified.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
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at 17.
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In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted explicit
Parole Release Guidelines for adult prisoners. 8 · These guidelines establish a "customary range" o(confinement for various
classes of offenders. The guidelines utilize a matrix, which
combines a "parole prognosis" score (based on the prisoner's
age at first conviction, employment background, and other
personal factors) and an "offen.se severity" rating, to yield
the "customary" time to be served in' prison.
Subsequently, in 1976. Congress enacted the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (PCRA), Pub. L. 94-233, 90
Stat. 219, 18 U. S. C. §§ 4201-4218. This Act provided the
440 U. S. 945 ( 1979). The~;e prison(•r,:, or mo~t of them, now al~o
have been rrlen ~ f'd from incarrrmtion. On September 25, 1979, a supplement to the motion to substitutr or intcr\'enr wa~ filed, propo~ing six new
substitute respondent;; or intcrvrnors; rnrh of these is a pre~ently incarcerated fedrral prboner who, allegedly, ha~ been adversely affected by
tho guidclinrR and who i~ 'rrprC'~rnted b~· Gl.'rnght~· 's counsrl.
Since wo hold that. respondent. mar continue to litigate the class certification is::;ue, then• i~ no need for UH 1o con~ider whether the motion should
be grnnted in order to prrvcnt fhc ca~e from being moot. We conclude
that the Distrirt Court initially :should rule on the motion.
3 See, e. g., Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F . 2d 46, 48-49 (CA5
1979); Susman v. Lincoln American Corp .. 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978).
cert. pending, No. 78-1169; Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F. 2d 1325,
1332-1333 (CA4 1978); Cam]Jer v. Calumet Petrochemicals. Inc., 584
F. 2d 70 (CA5 1978); Roper Y. Consurve, Inc., 578 F. 2d 1106 (CA3
2978), aff'd sub nom. Deposit Guamnty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p . (1979); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, ·578 F. 2d 987 (CA5 1978)
(en bane), cert. prndi11g, No. 78-1008; Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F . 2d
1096 (CA9 1977); Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 560
F. 2d 271 (CA7 1977), cert. denied, 435 U . S. 932 (1978) ; Lasky v.
Q·uinlan, 558 F. 2d 1133 (CA2 1977); Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 557 F. 2d 1334 (CA9 1977); Boyd v. J-ustices of Special Term,
546 F. 2d 526 (CA2 1976) ; Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F . 2d 825 (CAIO
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 104-9 (1977) .
3 38 Fed. Heg. 31942-319-1:5 (1973).
The guidelines currently in force,
appeaT at 28 OFR § 2.20 (1979).
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first legislative authorization for parole release guidelines. It
required the newly created Parole Commission to "promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the
powe[r] ... to grant or deny an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner." § 4203. Before releasing a prisoner on parole, the Commission must find, "upon
consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the prisoner," that release "would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or
promote disrespect for the law" and that it "would not jeopardize the public welfare." § 4206 (a).
Respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois of
conspiracy to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 1951, and of making false material declarations to a grand
jury, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623.4 On January 25, 1974,
two months after initial promulgation of the release guidelines, respondent was sentenced to concurrent prison terms
of four years on the conspiracy count and one year on the false
declarations count. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed respondent's convictions. United
States v. Braasch, 505 F. 2d 139 (1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Geraghty v. United States, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
Geraghty la.ter, pursuant to a motion under Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 35, obtained from the District Court a reduction
of his sentence to 30 months. The court granted the motion
because, in the court's view, application of the guidelines
would frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with respect to
the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. United
States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (ND Ill., 1975), appeal
dism'd and mandamus denied, 542 F. 2d 442 (CA7 1976) .
4 The extortion count was based on r~:>spondent's use of his position as a
vice squad officer of the Chicago police force to "shakedown" dispensers
of alcoholic beverages; the fal~e declarations concerned his involvement
in· this l>'Cheme.
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Geraghty then applied for release on parole. His first
application was denied in January 1976 with the following
explanation:
"Your offense behavior has been rated as very high severity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have
been in custody for a total of 4 months. Guidelines established by the Board for adult cases which consider the
above factors indicate a range of 26-36 months to be
served before release for cases with good institutional
program performance and adjustment. After review of
all relevant factors and information presented, it is found
that a decision at this consideration outside the guidelines
does not appear warranted." App. 5, 24.

If the customary release date applicable to respondent under
the guidelines were adhered to. he wou1d not be paroled before
serving his entire sentence mi11us good-time credits. Geraghty
applied for parole again in June 1976; that application was
denied for the same reasons. He then instituted this civil
suit as a class action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as inconsistent with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning
the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his
case.
Respondent sought certification of a class of "all federal
prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on
parole." Id., at 17. Without ruling on Geraghty's motion,
the court transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where respondent was incarcerated. Geraghty continued to press his motion for class certification, but the court
postponed ruling on the motion until it was prepared to render
a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court subsequently denied Geraghty's request
for class certification and granted summary judgment for petitioners on all the claims Geraghty asserted. 429 F . Supp.
737 (MD Pa. 1977). The court regarded respondent's action
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as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to which Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 23 applied only by analogy. It denied class certifi.
cation as "neither necessary nor appropriate." 429 F. Supp.,
at 740. A class action was "necessary" only to avoid mootness. The court found such a consideration not comprehended
by Rule 23. It found class certification inappropriate because
Geraghty raised certain individual issues and, inasmuch as
some prisoners might be benefited by the guidelines, because
his claims were not typical of the entire proposed class. 429
F. Supp., at 740-741. On the merits, the court ruled that the
guidelines are consistent with the PCRA and do not offend
the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 429
F. Supp., at 741-744.
Respondent, individually <~and on behalf of a class," ap·
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. App. 29. Thereafter, another prisoner, Becher, who
had been denied parole through application of the guideliues
and who was represented by Geraghty's counsel, moved to
intervene. Becher sought intervention to ensure that the
legal issue raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class <~will not
escape review in the appeal in this case.'' Pet. to Intervene
After Judgment 2. The District Court, concluding that the
filing of Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested it of jurisdiction, denied the petition to intervene. Becher then filed a
timely notice of appeal from the denial of intervention. The
two appeals were consolidated.
On June 30, 1977, before any brief had been filed in the
Court of Appeals, Geraghty was mandatorily released from
prison; he had served 22 months of his sentence, and had
earned good-time credits for the rest. Petitioners then moved
to dismiss the appeals as moot. The appellate court reserved
decision of the motion to dismiss until consideration of the
merits.
The Court of Appeals, concluding that the litigation was not
moot, reversed the judgment of the District Court and re-
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mantled the . case for further proceedings. 579 F. 2d 238
(CA3 1978). If a class had been certified by the District
Court, rnootness of respondent Geraghty's personal claim
would not have rendered the controversy moot. See, e. g.,
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). The Court of Appeals
reasoned that an erroneous denial of a Class certification should
not lead to the opposite result. 579 F. 2d, at 248-252,
Rather, certification of a "certifiable" elass, that erroneously
had been denied, relates back to the original denial and thus
preserves jurisdiction. 1bid.
On the question whether certification erroneously had been
denied, the Court of Appeals held that necessity is not a prerequisite under Rule 23. 579 F. 2d, at 252. The court expressed doubts about the District Court's finding that class
certification was "inappropriate." While Geraghty raised
some claims not applicable to the entire class of prisoners who
are or will become eligible for parole, the District Court could
have "certif[ied] certain issues as subject to class adjudication,
and ... limiter d] overbroad classes by the use of sub-classes."
ld., at 253. Failure "to consider these options constituted a
failure properly to exercise discretion . Indeed, this authority
may be exercised sua sponte." Ibid. The Court of Appeals
also held that refusal to certify because of a potential conflict
of interest between Geraghty and other members of the puta. tive class was error. The subclass mechanism would have
remedied this problem as well. !d., at 252-253. Thus, the
Court of Appeals reversed the denial of class certification and
remanded the case to the District Court for an initial evaluation of the proper subclasses. ld., at 254. The court also
remanded the motion for intervention. !d., at 245, n. 21. 5
In order to avoid "improvidently dissipat[ing] judicial
effort," id., at 254, the Court of Appeals went on to consider
whether the trial court had decided the merits of respondent's
case properly. The District Court's entry of summary judg..
5

Apparently Becher, too, has now been released from prison.
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ment was found to be error because "if Geraghty's recapitulation of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported
by the evidence," the guidelines "may well be" unauthorized
or unconstitutional. ld., at 259, 268. Thus, the dispute on
the merits also was remanded for further factual development.

II
Article III of the Constitution limits federal "judicial
Power," that is, federal court jurisdiction, to "Cases" and
"Controversies." This case or controversy limitation serves
'itwo complementary" purposes. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S.
83, 95 (1968). It limits the business of federal courts to
uquestions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process," and it defines the "role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the
federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government." Ibid. Likewise, mootness
has two aspects : "when the issues presented are no longer
'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; 496 (1969).
It is clear that the controversy over the validity of the
Parole Release Guidelines is still a "live" one betweell petitioners and at least some members of the class respondent
seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the fact that
prisoners currently affected by the guidelines have moved to
be substituted, or to intervene, as "named" respondents in this
Court. See n. 1, supra. We therefore are concerned here
with the second aspect of mootness, that is, the parties' interest in the litigation. The Court has referred to this concept
as the "personal stake" requirement. E. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755 (1976); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962).
The personal stake requirement relates to the first purpose
of the case or controversy doctrine-limiting judicial power

7
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to disputes capable of judicial resolution. The Court in Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 100-101, stated:
"The question whether a particular person is a proper
party to maintain the action does not, by its own f.orce,
raise separation of powers problems ·related to improper
judicial interference in areas committed to other branches
of the Federa.l Government .... ·Thus, in terms of Ar~
ticle III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adve_r ...
sary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution. It is for that· reason that the em~
phasis in standing problems is on whether the party
· invoking federal court· jurisdiction has ·'a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy,' Baker v. Carr, [369
U. S.], at 204, and whether the dispute touches upon 'the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests,'
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, [300 U. S.], at
240-241."
See also Schlesinger v. Reserv-ists to Stop the · War, 418 U. S.
208, 216-218 (1974).
The "personal stake" aspect of mootness doctrine also serves
primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are pre..
sented with disputes they are capable of "resolving. One
commentator has defined mootness as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that
must exist at the commencement of the 'litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness) ." Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The · Who and When, 82
Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 (1973).

III
On several occasions the Court has considered the application of the "personal stake" requirement in the class action
· context. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U, S. 393 (1975), it held that
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mootness of the named plaintiff's individual claim after a
class has been duly certified does not render the action moot.
It reasoned that "even though appellees ... might not again
enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against
[the class representative], it is clear that they will enforce it
against those persons in the class that appellant sought to represent and that the District Court certified." I d., at 400.
The Court stated specifically that an Art. III case or controversy "may exist ... between a named defendant and a
member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even
though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot."
Id., at 402. 6
Although one might argue that Sosna contains at least an
implication that the critical factor for Art. III purposes is the
timing of class certification, other cases, applying a "relation
back" approach , clearly demonstrate that timing is not crucial.
When the claim on the merits is "capable of repetition , yet
evading review," the named plaintiff may litigate the class
certification issue despite loss of his personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. E. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
llO, n. ll (1975). The "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" doctrine, to be sure. was developed outside the class
action context. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 514-515 (1911). But it has been applied where/
the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset
of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with
resy.ect to that pla,intiff; the litigation then may continue notWithStanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal

---

8 The claim in Sosna also fit the traditional category of action:; that are
deemed not moot. despite the litigant';; JosH of per~onal stake, that is, those
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Southem Pacific Tenn1:nal Co., v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911) . In Fmnkli \'. Bmcnwn
Tmnspo1'tation Co., 424 U. S., at 75:3-755, however, the Court held that
the class action aspect of mootness doctrine does not depend on the cla~s
claim's being so inherently trnnsitory that it meets the " capable of
repetition, yet evading review" standard.

;
{
I
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stake. See, e. g., Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149
(1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 123-125 (1973). Since
the litigant faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the
same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can be expected to continue.
When, however, the're is no chance that the named plaintiff's expired claim will reoccur, mootness still can be avoided
through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named
plaintiff's personal Claim. 'E. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 752-757. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-130 ( 1977). Some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even
enough time to rtile on a motion for class certification before
the proposed representative's individual interest expires. The
Court considered this possibility in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S., at 110, n. 11. Gerstein was an action challenging pretrial detention conditions. 'The Court assumed that the
named plaintiffs were no ' longer in custody awaiting trial at
the time · the trial court certified a Class of pretrial detainees.
There was no indication that the particular named plaintiffs
might again . be subject to pretrial detention. Nonetheless,
'the case was held not to be·moot because:
"The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at
the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release on
recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or a guilty plea, as
· well as by acquittal or conviction after trial It is by no
means certain that any given individual, named as plain. tiff, would be in pretria] custody long enough for a district
judge to certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney representing the named
respondei1ts is a public defender, and we can safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live
interest in the case." Ibid.
See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, n. 11.
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In two different contexts the Court has stated that the proposed class representative who proceeds to a judgment on the
merits may appeal denial of class certification. First, this
assumption was "an important ingredient," Deposit Gu.aranty
(slip op., at 11) , in the reNat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. jection of interlocutory appeals, "as of right," of class certification denials. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
469, 470, n. 15 (1978). The Court reasoned that denial of
class status will not necessarily be the "death knell" of a small
claimant action, since there still remains "the prospect of prevailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class
certification." Ibid.
Second, in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385,
393-395 ( 1977) , the Court held that a putative class member
may intervene, for the purpose of appealing the denial of a
class certification motion, after the named plaintiffs' claims
have been satisfied and judgment entered in their favor. Underlying that decision was the view that "refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs." !d. , at 393. And today, the
Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied
through entry of judgmeut over their objections may appeal
the denial of a class certification ruling. Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - .
Gerstein, J.)!f cDonald, and Roper are all examples of casesl
found not to be moot, despite the loss of a "persona.! stake'' in
the merits of the litigation by the proposed class representative. The interest of the named plaintiffs in Gerstein was
precisely the same as that of Geraghty here. Similarly, after
judgment had been entered in their favor , the named plaintiffs in McDonald had no continuing narrow personal stake in
the outcome of the class claims. And in Roper the Court
points out that an individual controversy is rendered moot, in
the strict Art. III sense, by payment aud satisfaction of a final
judgment. Ante, p . - (slip op., at 6).

~
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These cases demonstrate the flexible character of the
Art. III mootness doctrine. 7 As has been noted in the past;
Art. III justiciability is "not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification." Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (plurality opinion). "[T]he justiciability doctrine [is] one of uncertain and shifting contours."
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97.

IV
Perhaps somewhat anticipating today's decision in Roper,
petitioners argue that the situation presented is entirely different when mootness of the individual ·claim is caused by
''expiration" of the claim, rather than by a judgment on the
claim. They assert that a proposed class representative who
individually prevails on the merits still has a "personal stake"
in the outcome of the litigation, wliile the named plaintiff
whose claim is truly moot does not. In the 1atter situation,
where no class has been certified, there is no party before the
Three of the Court's cases might be described as a.dopting a less fiexi~
ble approach. In lndimiapolis School Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128
(1975), and in Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), diiillli~sal of
putative cla~s Ruits, as moot, WlU' ordrred after the named plaintiffs'
claims beeame moot. And in Pasadena. City Bd. of Education v. Spangler,
427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976), it. was indi(·ated that the action would have
been moot, upon expiration of the 1wmcd plaintiffs' claims, had not t1te·
United States intervened as a party plaintiff. Each of these, however,
was a case in which there was an attempt t.o appeal the merits wit.h out
first having obtained proper crrtification of a class. In each case it was
the defendant who petitioned this Court for review. As is observed:
subsequently in the text,· appeal from denial of class classification is .permitted in some circumstances wl1ere appeal on the merits is not. In the
situation where the proposed class rrpre~enta tive has lost a "per~onal
stake," the merits cannot be rcachrd until a class properly i::; certified.
Although the Court perhaps could have remanded Jacobs and Weinstein
for reconsideration of the cia:;:; certification i:»·ue, as the Court of Appeals
did her~, the parties in those case:; did not i'l uggest "relation bm:k" of
class certification. Tim:; we do uot find this line of cases dispositive of'
the question now before us.
7
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court with a live claim, and it follows, it is said, that we have
no jurisdiction to consider whether a class should have been
certified. Brief for Petitioners 37-39.
We do not find this distinction persuasive. As has been
noted earlier, Geraghty's "personal stake" in the outcome of
the litigation is, in a practical sense, no different from that
of the putative class representatives inr..Roper. Further, the
opinion in Roper indicates that the approach to take in applying Art. III is issue by issue. ''Nor does a confession of judgment by defendants on less than all the issues moot an entire
case; other issues in the case may be appealable. We can
assume that a district court's final judgment fully satisfying
named plaintiffs' private substantive claims would preclude
their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment; however,
it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate
the named plaintiffs' right to take an appeal on the issue of
class certification." Ante, p . - (slip op., at 6-7). See also
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S., at 392; Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U. S., at 497.
Similarly, the fact that a named plaintiff's substantive
claims are mooted due to an occurrence other thau a judgment
on the merits does not mean that all the other issues in the
case are mooted. A plaintiff who brings a class action presents
two separate issues for judicial resolution. One is the claim
on the merits; the other is the claim that he is entitled to
represent a class. "The denial of class certification stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," Roper, 'ante,
p. - - (slip op., at 9-10). We think that in determining
whether the plaintiff may contiuue to press the class certification claim, after the claim on the merits "expires," we must
look to the nature of the "personal stake" in the class certification claim. Determining Art. III's "uncertain and shifting contours," see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 97, with respect
to nontraditional forms of litigation, such as the class action,
requires reference to the purposes of the case or controversy
requirement.
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Application of the personal stake requirement to a procedural claim, such as the right to represent a class, is not automatic or readily resolved. A "legally cognizable interest," as
the Court described it in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at
496, in the traditional sense rarely ever exists with respect to
the class certification claim. 8 The justifications that led to
the development of the class action include the protection of
the defendant from inconsistent obligations, the protection of
the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the
facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims. See, e. g., Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S. C. App., pp.
427-429; Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1321- 1323, 1329- 1330 (1976). Although
the named representative receives certain benefits from the
class nature of the action, some of which are regarded as desirable and others as less so,9 these benefits generally are byproducts of the class action device. In order to achieve the
primary benefits of class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the proposed class representative the right to have
a class certified if the requirements of the rules are met. This
"right" is more analogous to the private attorney general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to
satisfy the "personal stake" requirement. Se\ Roper, ante,
p . - (slip op., at 11-12).
As noted above, the purpose of the 11 personal stake" requirement is to assure that the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution. The imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
8
Were the class an indispensable party, the named plaintiff's interests
in certification would approach a "legally cognizable interest."
9
See, e. g., Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 842 (1974); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F . R. D. 375 '197'2) .
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resolution are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual
setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U. S., at 753-756; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204; Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion). We conclude
that these elements can exist with respect to the class certification issue notwithstanding the fact that the named plaintiff's
claim on the merits has expired. The question whether class
certification is appropriate remains as a concrete, sharply presented issue. In Sosna v. Iowa it was recognized that a named
plaintiff whose claim on the merits expires after class certification may still adequately represent the class. Implicit in that
decision was the determination that vigorous advocacy can be
assured through means other than the traditional requirement
of a "personal stake in the outcome." Respondent here continues vigorously to advocate his right to have a class certified.
We therefore hold that an action brought on behalf of a
class does not become moot upon expiration of the named
plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification
has been denied. 10 The proposed representative reta.ins a
"personal stake'' in obtaining class certification sufficient to
assure that Art. III values are not undermined. If the appeal
results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a class
subsequently is properly certified, the merits of the class claim
then may be adjudicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna.
Our holding is limited to the appeal of the denial of the
class certification motion. A named plaintiff whose claim
expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits
until a class has been properly certified. See Roper, ante,
p . - (slip op., at 10). If, on appeal, it is determined that
10 We intimate no view as to whether a named plaintiff who settles the
individual claim after denial of clas:; certification may, consistent with
Art. Ill, appeal from the aclver:;c ruling on class certification. See
United Airlines, lnc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-394, and n. 14

(1977).
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class certification properly was denied, the claim on the merits
must be dismissed as moot. 11
Our conclusion that the controversy here is not moot does
11

MR. Jus·riCE PowELL, in his dissent, advocates a "rigidly formalistic"
approach to Art. III, post, at 4, and suggests that our decision today is
the Court's first departure from the formalistic view. /d., at 6-11. We
agree that the issue at hand is one of first impres~on and thus, in that
narrow sense, is "unprecedented," id., at 11. We do not believe, however,
that the deci~Sion constitutes a redefinition o'f Art. III principles or a
"significant departure," id., at 1, from "carefully considered" precedents,
id., at 9.
The ero~Sion of lhe ~trict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun
well before today's decision. For example, the protestations of the dissent
are strikingly remini:scent of Mr. Justice Har1an'i:i dis:sent in Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. 8~~. 116, in 1968. Mr . .Ju::;tice Harlan hailed the taxpayer standing rule pronounced in that case as a "new doctrine" resting
"on premises that do not with::;tand analy:sis." /d., at 117. He felt that
the problrms presented by taxpayer standing "involve nothing less than
the proper functioning of the federal courts, and so run to the roots of our
constitutional system." !d., at 116. The taxpayers were thought to complain as "private attorneys-general," and "[t]he interests they represent,
and the rights they espouse are bereft of any personal or proprietary
coloration." /d., at 119. Such taxpayer actions "are and must be . . .
'public actions' brought to vindicate public rights." /d., at 120.
Notwithstanding the taxpayers' lack of a formalistic "personal stake,"
even Justice Harlan felt that the ca~e should be held nonjusticiable on
purely prudential grounds. His interpretation of the cases led him to
conclude that "it is ... clear that [plaintiffs in a public action] as such
are not comtitutionally excluded from the federal courts." Ibid. (emphasis
in original).
Is it not somewhat ironic that MR. Jus'l'ICE PowELL, who now seeks to
explain United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, supm, as a straightforward
application of settled doctrine, post, at 7-9, expressed in his dissent in
McDonald, 432 U. S., at 396, the view tl1at fhe l10lding rested on a fundamental misconception about the mootne~s of an uncertified Cla:;s action
after settlemeut of the nam<'d plaintiff"' claims? He stated:
"Pervading the Court's opinion is the assumption that the class action
somehow continued after the District Court denied class status. But that
assumption i.s supported neither by the text nor by the history of Rule 2~.
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not automatically establish that the named plaintiff is entitled
to continue litigating the interests of the class. "[I]t does
shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciabil.
To the contrary, ... the denial of class status converts the litigation to an
ordinary noncla::;s action." !d., at 399.
The dissent went on to say:
"[Petitioner·] argueii with great force tha1, as a result of the settlement of
their individual claims, the named plaintiffs 'could no long appeal the
denial of cla~s' statu:; that had occurred years earlier. . . . Although thil'!
question has not been derided by thi~ Court, the answer on principle is
clear. The set1lemeJlt of an individual claim typically moots any i::;suCl'!
associated with it. . . . This case is ~harply dbtinguishable from ca3es
such as Sosna v. !O'Il'a ... and F'raukl! Y. Bowmau Transp. Co . ... where
we allowed named plaintiffs whose individual claims were moot to continue
to represent their classe». In thos<' case;;, the District Courts previously
had certified the cla::;:,;e~, thu::; giving them 'a legal status separate from
the interestLs] asserted by [thr named plaintiffs].' Sosna v. Iowa, supra,
at 399. This case presents precisely the opposite situation: The prior
denial of cla::;s status had extingui::;hed any representative capacity." 432
U.S., at 400 (footnote omitted).
Thus, the assumption thought to be "[p Jervading the Court's opinion"
in McDonaLd, and so vigorously attarked by the dissent there, is now relegated to "gratuitou::;" "dictum," post, at 8. MR. JusTICE PowELL, who
finds the situat ion presented in the case at hand " fundamentally different"
from that in Sosna and Franks. post, at 5, also found the facts of
McDonald "sharply distinguif'hable" from tho::;e previous cases. 432 U.S.,
at 400.
We do not recite the~e cases for the purpose of showing that our result
is mandated by the precedent::;. We concede that the prior cases may be
said to be somPwhat confusing, tmd that some, perhaps, are irreconcilable
with others. Our point is that the strict, formalistic view of Art. III
jurisprudence, while perhaps the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled
with exceptions. And, in creating each exception, the Court has looked
to practicalities and prudential considerations. The resulting doctrine can
be characterized, aptly , as "flexible"; it has been developed, not irresponsibly, but "with some care," post, at 2, including the present case.
The dissent is correct that once exceptions are made to the formalistic
interpretation of Art. III, principled distinctions and bright lines become
more difficult to draw. We do not attempt to predict how far down the
road the Court eventually will go toward premising jurisdiction "upon tl1e

78-572-0PINION

18

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

ity to the ability of the named representative to 'fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.' Rule 23 (a)."
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 403. We hold only that a case
or controversy still exists. The question of who is to represent the class is a separa.te issue. 12
We need not decide here whether Geraghty is a proper representative for the purpose of representing the class on the
merits. No class as yet has been certified. Upon remand, the
District Court can determine whether Geraghty may continue
to press the class claims or whether another representative
would be appropriate. We decide only that Geraghty was a
bare existence of a :sharply pre~ented i::;sue in a concrete and vigorously
argued case," post, at 12. Each case must be decided on its own facts.
We hasten to note, however, that Uti:> casr does not even approach the
extreme feared by the dissent. This respondent suffered actual, concrete
injury as a re:;ult of thr putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would
satisfy the formalistic per:;onnl stake requirement if damages were sought.
See, e. g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 495-500. His injury con.
tinued up to anti beyond the time the District Court denied class certifica.
tion. We merely hold that when a District Court erroneously denies a
procedural motion, which, if correctly decided, would have prevented the
action from becoming moot, an appeal lies from the denial and the cor.
rected ruling "rE>latr~ back" to the date of the original denial.
The judicial procc,;:s will not become a vehicle for "concernrcl bystanders," post, at 4, l'Vl'n if one in respondent's position can conceivably be
characterized as a bystander, because the issue on the merits will not be
addressed until a cla:;;s with an interest in the outcome has bren certified.
The "relation back" principle, a traditional equitable doctrine applied to
class certification claims in Gerstein v. Pugh, supra. serves logically to
distinguish this case from the one brought a day after the prisoner is
released. See post, at 13, n. 15. If the named plaintiff has no personal
stake in the outcome at t.he time class certification is denied , relation back
o{ appellate reversal of that denial still would not prevent mootness of
the action.
12 See, e. g., Comment, A Search for Principles of MootnE>ss in the Federal Courts: Part Two-Cia~~ Action:;, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289, 1331-1332
(1976); Comment, Continuation and Hepre:sentation of Class Actions
Following Di:smissal of the Cia:;:; Reprc~entative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573,
602-608.
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pfoper representative for the pur•pose of appealing the ruling
denying certification of the class that he initially defined.
Thus, it was not improper for the Court of Appeals to consider
whether the District Court should have granted class
certification.

v

We turn now to the question whether the Court of Appeals'
decision on the District Court's class certincation ruling was
proper. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred iii
requiring the District Court to consider the possibility of certifying subclasses sua sponte. Petitioners strenuously contend that placing the burden of identifying and constructing
subclasses on the trial court creates unmanageable difficulties.
Brief for Petitioners 43-51. We feel that the Court of Appeals' decision here does not impose undue burdens on the district courts. Respondent had no real opportunity to request
certincation of subclasses after the class he proposed was rejected. The District Court denied class certification at the
same time it rendered its adverse decision on the merits. Requesting subclass certincation at that time would have been
a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest effort
in deciding the subclass question after it had ruled that no
relief on the merits was available. The remand merely gives
respondent the opportunity to perfor·m his function in the
adversary system. On remand, however, it is not the District
Court that is to bear the burden of constructing subclasse~.
That burden is upon the respondent and it is he \vho is
required to submit proposals to the court. The court has n
sua sponte obligation so to act. With this modification, th
Court of Appeals' remand of the case for consideration of sub
classes was a proper disposition.
It would be in~priate for this Court to reach the merits
of this controversy in the present posture of the case. Our
holding that the case is not moot extellds only to the appeal of
the dils's certification deui.al. lf the District Court again

-

-
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denies class certification, and that decision is affirmed, the
controversy on the merits will be moot. Furthermore, al-)
though the Court of Appeals commented upon the merits for
the sole purpose of avoiding waste of judicial resources, it di~
nqt reach a final conclusion on the validity of the guidelines.
Rather, it held only that summary judgment was imprope
and remanded for further factual development. Given the
interlocutory posture of the case before us, we must defer
decision on the merits of respondent's case until after it is
determined affirmatively that a class properly can be certified.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated a.nd the
case is remanded for furth er proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.

'"?
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

The Court holds today that the named plaintiff in an
action brought on behalf of a class has a "'personal stake' in
obtaining class certification" which, wholly apart from his
interest in obtaining relief on the merits for himself or anyone
else, is sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy
limitation on the jurisdiction of a federal court.
The analysis proceeds in two steps:

Ante, at 15.

First, the Court concludes

that mootness is a wholly flexible doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation.

Second,

the Court holds that a right "analogous to the private attorney
general concept" supports the jurisdiction of an Art. III court
to decide whether an action may be maintained on behalf of a
class.

Because both steps depart radically from settled law in

a manner that cannot rationally be confined to the narrow issue
presented in this case, I dissent.
I

2.

As the Court has said, this case involves the personal
stake aspect of the mootness doctrine.

Ante, at 7-8.

There is

no doubt that the controversy, if any exists, involves a claim
that federal courts may properly resolve without intruding upon
the province of the political branches.

The only question is

whether there is a plaintiff who may raise it - that is, whether
there is a controversy between adverse parties which casts the
dispute in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the
personal stake requirement at some length, most commonly in the
context of arguments that a plaintiff has no standing to bring
an action in the first instance.

We have repeatedly held that

the inquiry has a double aspect:

On the one hand, it derives

from Art. III limitations on the power of the federal courts.
On the other, it embodies self-imposed restraints on the
exercise of judicial power.

Singleton v. Wulff, 428

u.s.

106,

112 (1976); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
91, 99 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422

u.s.

u.s.

490, 498 (1975).

To the extent the personal stake is a constitutional
prerequisite to the invocation of judicial power, it must
continue throughout the action.

See ante, at 8.

Should the

plaintiff lose that minimum stake, there is no continuing "case

3.

or controversy" and the Court must dismiss the action as moot.
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S 395, 401-403 (1975); North Carolina
v. Rice, 404

u.s.

Human Rights, 404

244, 246 (1971); SEC v. Medical Committee for

u.s.

403, 407 (1972);

395 U.S. 486, 496 n.7 (1969).

Powell v. McCormack,

When mootness is predicated upon

this constitutional deficiency, we do not inquire into practical
concerns which often militate against a dismissal of the action
by the time it reaches this Court.

Richardson v. Ramirez 418

U.S. 24, 37 (1974); see Sosna v. Iowa, 419
(1975).

393, 401 n.9

Instead, we routinely vacate and remand such cases with

directions to dismiss.

u.s.

u.s.

36, 39 (1950).

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340

However, Art. III may be satisfied by some

continuing impairment of personal interests which is unaffected
by the mootness of the original claim to relief.

In such cases

our constitutional power to hear the case is unabated, and we
may base our prudential decision whether to do so in part on the
obvious practical differences between an action we are asked to
dismiss at its inception and one in which the parties have
invested substantial resources.
The prudential aspect of standing and mootness is
aptly described as a doctrine of uncertain and shifting
contours. Ante, at 12.

But the shared constitutional core of

these doctrines is not flexible.

Despite the doctrinal

4.

revolution of the last decade, which has liberalized the
requirements of Art. III to the point where "'an identifiable
trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of
principle,'" United States v. SCRAP, 412
(1973), quoting Davis, Standing:
Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613 (19

u.s.

669, 689 n. 14

Taxpayers and Others, 35

u.

), we have continued to insist that

principle alone is simply not enough.

Only last term the Court

stated without dissent that "in order to satisfy Art. III, the
plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant.

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina

Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 u.S. 59, 72 (1978);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. 429
252, 260-261
Org., 426

(1977); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

u.s.

26, 38 ( 1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422

499 [(1975)]; Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
(1973)."

u.s.

u.s.

u.s.

[490],

614, 617

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of of Bellwood, 441

U.S. 91, 99 (1979). See also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 59 n.7, 60, 64 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
We have squarely rejected all attempts to substitute
"abstract concern with a subject" for the "concrete injury
required by Art. III."

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

5.

Org., supra, 426

u.s.,

Stop the War 418

u.s.

at 40; see Schlesinger v. Reservists to
208, 227 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414

U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
(197 ).

u.s.

727, 738

We have called this requirement an "indispensable,"

Shclesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War 418

u.s.

166, 181

(1974), and "irreducible" constitutional minimum, United States
v. Richardson, 418

u.s.

166, 181

(POWELL, J., concurring); Simon

v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, 426

u.s.,

at 60,

id. at 64 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); to which we have
"steadfastly adhered."

Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,

617 (1973)(footnotes omitted).
If a plaintiff can demonstrate the concrete personal
injury required by Art. III, he may in some circumstances be
permitted to argue the rights of third parties or the public
interest in support of his claim.
428

u.s.,

at 113; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405

Griswold v. Connectcut, 381
346

u.s.

Singleton v. Wulff, supra,

249 (1953).

u.s.

u.s.

438 (1972);

479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson,

Prudential considerations militate against

this result, Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S., at 100; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
429 U.S., at 2G3.
such concerns.

but congressional authorization sweeps away

We have therefore construed the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, to permit suits by "private

6.

attorneys general" representing the public interest - but only
where the plaintiff also alleges concrete, individual injury, no
matter how small.
727-728~

167

cf.

(1972)~

Sierra Club v. Morton, Supra 405 U.S., at

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
Tileston v. Ullman, 318

u.s.

u.s.

163, 166-

44, 46 (1943).

In no

event may Congress abrogate the Art. III minimum. Gladstone,
Realtors, v. Village of Bellwood, supra, 441 U.S., at

u.s.

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414

100~

488, 494, 493-494 n. 2 (1973). 1

The personal stake requirement may appear formalistic
in such cases.

But we have insisted upon it because it is a

requirement imposed by the Constitution, "founded in concern
about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in
a democratic society."
(1975)~

Warth v. Seldin, 422

see United States v. Richardson, 418

(POWELL, J., concurring).

u.s.

490, 498

u.s.,

at 188-189

This consistent thread in our

decisions "prevents the judicial process from becoming no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders."
687

(1973)~

United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,

see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

u.s.,

v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment).

at

u.s.,

740~

Simon

at 60

Because the interest

of a "private attorney general" is by definition that of a
concerned bystander, we have never permitted that interest alone

7.

to supply the personal stake necessary to support the
jurisdiction of a federal court.
II
Until today our decisions in the class action area had
applied these principles in a straightforward fashion.

Our only

departure from settled law has been to recognize that a class
that has been certified in accordance with Rule 23 "acquire[s] a
legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named
plaintiff]."

Sosna v. Iowa, 419

u.s.

393, 399 (1975).

We have

therefore held that "given a properly certified class," the live
interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply
the case or controversy required by Art. III after the
individual claim of the named plaintiff becomes moot.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424

u.s.

Franks v.

727, 755-756 (1976); Sosna

v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
Neither Sosna nor Franks remotely suggests that Art.
III may be satisfied by any means other than the traditional
requirement of a personal stake in the outcome.

Both cases

simply acknowledge the effects of a procedure which gives legal
recognition to additional--and unquestionably adverse--parties
plaintiff. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
(1937).2

Hawor~h

300 U.S. 227, 240

The situation is entirely different when the named

plaintiff's claim becomes moot at a time when the interests of

8.

absent class members cannot be recognized because the district
court has not properly certified the class.

In these

circumstances, the existence of a case or controversy turns
entirely on the individual interest of those who seek to
represent the class.

Because the named plaintiffs have no

personal interest in representing a class and cannot rely for
Art. III purposes upon the live interests of absent third
parties in securing their representation, we have uniformly held
that these actions may be permitted to continue only when the
named plaintiff is able to allege some personal stake in
addition to his interest in obtaining relief for the class.
Thus, a named plaintiff who alleges no individualized
injury at the outset of the action "may not seek relief on
behalf of himself or any other member of the class."
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974).

O'Shea v.

If the named plaintiff

states a claim which becomes moot before the district court has
ruled on his certification motion, the entire case must be
dismissed as moot unless it falls within "that narrow class of
cases" involving wrongs which are capable of repetition but "by
nature [so] temporary" that they "become[] moot as to [the named
plaintiffs] before the district court can reasonably be expected
to rule on a certification motion."

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.

103, 110-111 n. 11 (1975); see Swisher v. Brady, 438

u.s.

204,

9.

213-214 n. 11 (1978); Sosna v. Iowa, supr,a, 419 U.S., at 402 n.
11.

In such cases, depending on "the reality of the claim that

the issue would otherwise evade review," we have permitted
certification to "relate back" to the filing of the complaint
for Art. III purposes. Ibid.

This rule embodies in shorthand

form a principle first noted in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
ICC, 219

u.s.

498, 515 (1911) and subsequently established in a

long line of decisions bearing no relationship to class
actions.3

Although the Court has never fully explained how the

furthest reaches of the Southern Pacific rule may be squared
with Art. III, that rule has never been thought to undermine the
constitutional requirement of a personal stake in the outcome.4
In any event, the Court has applied it in the class action
context only where an "individual [plaintiff] could . • • suffer
repeated deprivations" with no means of redress and thus retains
an individualized stake in the outcome of the action on the
merits.
Wade, 410

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

u.s.

u.s.,

at 110 n. 11; see Roe v.

113, 125 (1973).

Where there is no suggestion that the challenged
conduct will recur and evade review, we have never suggested
that "relation back" may save an uncertified class action once
the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot.

Even if the plaintiff

has obtained district court approval of his proposed class, the

10 •

case will be moot if the attempted certification is determined
on appeal to have been so faulty as to prevent the class from
obtaining separate legal status under Sosna.
School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420
Palmigiano 425

u.s.

u.s.

308, 310 n.1

Education v. Spangler 427

u.s.

Indianapolis

128 (1975); see Baxter v.

(1976); Pasadena City Board of

424, 430 (1976).

If certification is denied, the named plaintiff who
abandons his claim to represent the class by failing to appeal
that ruling cannot continue to litigate the merits after his
individual claim becomes moot.

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423

u.s.

147 (1975); see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,
436

u.s.

1, 8 (1978).

We have never squarely addressed a case

in which a mooted named plaintiff continued to press the class
claims by appealing the denial of certification.

But the named

plaintiffs in Jacobs, Baxter, and Spangler each vigorously
asserted the claims of the class.

They did not do so by the

procedural route of appealing a denial of certification only
because the district court had granted - albeit defectively class status.

Therefore, it was the defendant who raised the

question of the named plaintiffs' right to represent a class, a
right which the named plaintiffs continued to assert. By failing
to remand for correction of the procedural defects in the oral
certification order, we recognized that a named plaintiff has

11.

suffered no injury which could be redressed by adequate
certification and implicitly held that an individual's interest
in representing a class is insufficient to supply the personal
stake necessary to satisfy Art. III.
It is true that the Court has twice permitted appeals
from the denial of class certification after the named
plaintiffs' claims on the merits had been satisfied.
Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, a·nte, at
v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).

Deposit

United Airlines, Inc.

But neither case supports the

broad proposition that the claim to represent a class may be
asserted by a plaintiff who has no other personal stake in the
outcome of the action.
In McDonald, putative class members were permitted to
intervene to appeal an adverse class certification ruling after
the individual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been
settled pursuant to a judgment on the question of liability. Id.
Provided their individual claims were not time-barred, the
intervenors in McDonald plainly possessed the personal stake
necessary to continue the action, for those claims had yet to be
resolved.5

Indeed, the Court devoted its entire opinion to the

issues of timeliness and limitations, a focus which obscures the
meaning of the case as precedent on the question of mootness.
Unsupported as it is by reasoning on that question, McDonald can

12.

mean no more than that an action which is promptly pursued by
interested parties at all times does not "die" in an Art. I I I
because of an interval in which neither the original nor any
substitute party was present before the court. The same
conclusion is implicit in those cases in which the Court has
permitted the representatives of the estates of deceased
criminal defendants to carry on their appeals, Wetzel v. Ohio,
371 U.S. 61

(1962), as well as those class actions in which we

have relied upon the interests of timely intervenors without
inquiring whether the intervention occurred before the mooting
of the original named plaintiff's claim, Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425

u.s.,

at 310 n.

1.

The Court did state in McDonald that the denial of
class certification would be subject to appellate review at the
behest of the named plaintiffs, 432

u.s.,

at 393, a dictum which

was repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437

u.s.

463, 469,

470 n. 15 (1978), and is today adopted as the law. Deposit
As explained in

Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, at

Roper, however, this rule turns entirely upon a "critical
distinction between the definitive mootness of a case or
controversy • . . and a judgment in favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation • • •

"

Slip op., at 9.

When

such a judgment has been entered, the Court holds, Art. I I I is
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only indirectly concerned and the central question is
appealability. Id., at 7, 12.

Moreover, the Roper Court

expressly notes the named plaintiffs' interest in obtaining
class certification in order to reduce their costs of litigation
-an interest not present here.

Id., at 10 n. 8.

Roper may be criticized on other grounds, ante, at

Although
, its

rationale leaves undisturbed the fundamental understanding which
unifies our decisions in this area:

without more, a named

plaintiff has no personal stake in any "claim" to represent a
class.6
IV
In my view, the foregoing precedents dispose of this
case.

We cannot rely on the personal stake of the unnamed

members of the putative class, as we did in Franks and Sosna,
for they have not been identified in a proper certification
order.

There has been no suggestion that the issue is one

which, like the pretrial confinement in Gerstein, could evade
review.

On the contrary respondent's lawyer has assured us that

if this case is held to be moot he will immediately file another
action.

Although the Court does not rule on the motion to

substitute new parties respondent filed with this Court, that
motion was filed well over a year after respondent was released
from prison.

In the interim respondent had not only obtained a
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ruling from the Court of Appeals but also filed his petition for
certiorari.

In these circumstances the motion can scarcely be

deemed timely within the meaning of McDonald.

Nor is the

question one of appealability as defined in Roper.

Accordingly,

the case is moot under the rule of Indianapolis School Comm'rs
v. Jacobs and Weinstein v. Bradford unless the plaintiff can
identify some personal stake, not present in those cases, which
could be affected by the outcome of this action.
No such stake has been identified.

In the words of

his own attorney, respondent "can obtain absolutely no
additional personal relief" in this case and is here solely to
represent other parties.

Transcript of Oral Argument, at 25-26.

The Court does not suggest that respondent has a personal stake
in obtaining relief on the merits for the members of the
putative class.

Indeed, it must squarely reject that contention

in order to hold that mootness precludes consideration of the
claim on the merits until a class is properly certified.
Instead, the Court holds that respondent has a personal stake in
the "claim" that he is entitled to represent a class, wholly
apart from the merits.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court

makes no attempt to identify any benefits that may accrue to
this plaintiff from the use of the class action device.
he is said to have a personal stake in obtaining class

Rather,

1 5.

certification because (i) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
give him a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general
concept," to have a class certified in certain circumstances,
and (ii) he "continues vigorously to advocate his right to have
a class certified" in what the Court finds to be a "concrete
factual setting."

Ibid.

This novel approach to the personal stake requirement
leads to a result which is reconcilable with our past class
action decisions in a narrow technical sense:

We have never

dismissed as moot an appeal from a denial of class
certification.

But the result reached today will require

reconsideration, if not outright overruling, of substantial
portions of the settled law governing this area.

Moreover, the

Court attempts to avoid the conclusion implicit in our decisions
- that a named plaintiff has no personal stake in representing a
class - by drawing an untenable distinction between the named
plaintiff's right to have a class certified and his right to
obtain relief for that class on the merits.

Finally, the Court

relies exclusively on factors that have previously been thought
relevant only to the prudential decision applicable to cases
which have been shown to be within our jurisdiction as defined
by Art. III.

If these factors alone suffice to establish the

personal stake required by the Constitution, then this case is a

1 6.

startling departure indeed -

for it upsets the settled

understanding that a plaintiff who can identify no concrete
injury that may be remedied by judicial action has no claim to
the resources of an Art. III court.
A

If, as the Court holds today, a named plaintiff's
stake in obtaining class certification is sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Art. III whenever concrete adversity is
present in fact, then at least three of our precedents must be
subject to reconsideration on the ground that their analysis was
wholly misguided.
First, Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs can
survive only if the newly defined personal stake in obtaining
class certification may be destroyed when the issue is raised on
appeal by the defendant rather than the plaintiff.

As the Court

intimates today, this irrational distinction must be rejected
and Jacobs recast as a case that was moot only because the named
plaintiff failed to suggest the proper ground in support of his
claim.
Second, it appears that we must jettison that portion
of Gerstein v. Pugh which limits the occasions on which a mooted
named plaintiff may continue to press his certification motion
after his own claim becomes moot to those cases which are

17 •

"capable of repetition, yet evading review."

It would be

difficult to justify such a limitation even on prudential
grounds, for the named plaintiff's interest in obtaining
certification surely cannot be increased by the district court's
denial of his motion in the first instance.
Third, the Court's view cannot logically be confined
to moot cases.

If a plaintiff who is released from prison the

day after filing a class action challenging the parole release
system could seek certification of the class, why should a
plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be
treated differently?

As an Art. III matter, there can be no

difference - both plaintiffs clearly satisfy the minimum the
Court has determined to tolerate in this case.

Even on

prudential grounds, the difference between the posture of this
action on remand and the posture of a newly filed action is so
subtle as to escape detection.

This Court has ruled neither on

the merits nor on the propriety of the class action.

At the

same time, it has vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which in turn vacated the decision of the District Court dealing
with these questions.
to preserve.

Accordingly, there is no law of the case

Moreover, counsel expressly stated that the

mootness aspect of this case was of no practical importance
whatever, because the same issues will be raised in a new action
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if this one is dismissed as moot. Transcript of Oral Argument,
at 25.

It is difficult to imagine a case in which the

prudential considerations aligned against a finding of mootness
are less compelling.

If the holding of O'Shea v. Littleton

survives at all, its scope has been drastically reduced.
B
The Court attempts to avoid yet more drastic
incursions into settled law by rejecting respondent's attempt to
litigate the merits of the class claims.

This result is

accomplished by separating respondent's interest in representing
the class into two separate "claims":
may be maintained on behalf of a

class~

First, that the action
and second, that the

class is entitled to relief on the merits.

Because Art. III is

not easily applied to "procedural claims," respondent is said to
have a personal stake in the first claim despite his lack of a
stake in the second.

This distinction is wholly illusory.

Any attempt to uncover the personal stake underlying a
"procedural claim" is bound to end in frustration, because the
claim that a litigant is entitled to employ a procedural device
is not a separate claim at all.

As the Court notes today in

Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, these issues are
"ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Slip Op.,
at 6.

A motion for class certification resembles a motion for a

19 •

determination that the plaintiff is entitled to join additional
parties or to present his case to a jury rather than a judge, in
that each seeks only to present a substantive claim in a
particular context.

It is meaningless to discuss anyone's

interest in these issues apart from his claim to relief on the
merits, for they have value only insofar as they may enhance the
possibility of obtaining that relief.

The parties are permitted

to litigate them, not because they have some independent
personal stake in the procedures, but rather because they are
part and parcel of their attempt to establish substantive
claims.?

As we held in O'Shea, a plaintiff may not invoke the

jurisdiction of a federal court simply to decide whether he may
represent a class.

I see no reason why the result should change

because the plaintiff once had standing to sue on his own
behalf.
Because respondent in this case has no interest in
obtaining class certification apart from his generalized
interest in representing the class on the merits, the result
reached today cannot be reconciled with the most basic premises
of our class action decisions.

c
Although the Court's departure from our class action
precedents is troubling, by far the most radical aspect of the

20.

case is its willingness to accept the "private attorney
general's" abstract concern with the interests of third parties
- here those of the defendant, absent class members and the
court in avoiding the inconveniences occasioned by multiple
lawsuits - as a personal stake within the meaning of Art. III.
We have steadfastly refused to countenance such plaintiffs in
other factual settings which would amply satisfy the Court's
twin tests of authorization in law and adversity in fact.B
p.

See

supra.
This break with tradition is in no sense justified by

the need to recognize the novel interests at stake in
"nontraditional forms of litigation".
action is scarcely a new idea.

Ante, at 13.

The class

Rule 23 merely codified and

provided standard procedures for dealing with a form of action
that had long been known at equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class
Actions§ 1004 (1977).

That federal jurisdiction should

properly attach to the class aspect of such actions as an
adjunct to the litigation of an individual claim has never been
questioned.

But even when we deal with truly new procedural

devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to the
recognition of different "means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts."

Aetna

Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S., at 240 (1937)(Declaratory
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Judgment Act)(emphasis supplied), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).

Unless we are

willing to abandon the personal stake requirement entirely, this
freedom must end when we are unable to identify a concrete
injury that may be remedied in the course of the litigation.
The effects of a finding of mootness on the vitality of a device
such as the class action,9 which has significantly advanced the
administration of justice, must always be a factor in prudential
decisions made under the rubric of mootness.

But such policy

judgments are powerless to authorize a plain violation of Art.
III.
I would hold that the absent members of the class are
not presently before the Court, and that the individual
respondent no longer has any interest in the injuries that may
be redressed if this action is permitted to continue.

Because

the action lacks a plaintiff having that minimal personal stake
which is an absolute constitutional prerequisite to the
jurisdiction of an Art. III court, I would vacate the decision
of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss
the action as moot.

FOOTNOTES

These decisions unequivocally reject the
suggestion, expressed in some earlier opinions, that Congress
might be able to confer jurisdiction where none would otherwise
exist under Art. III.

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972)

(WHITE, J., concurring): see Linda

R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S., at 617.

Because there is no

expression of congressional will in the case before us, however,
the issue is not presented here.
2

The order certifying the class represents a

judicial finding that injured parties other than the named
plaintiff exist and provides a definition by which they may be
identified.

Certification sharpens the interests of unnamed

class members in the outcome, for only thereafter wil they be
bound by the result.

Moreover, unnamed parties can be certain

after certification that the action will not be settled or
dismissed without the approval of the court and appropriate
notification to class members.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).

Vigorous

advocacy is thereafter assured by the authoritative imposition
on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the
entire class.

Even if the named plaintiff's own claims

subsequently become moot, the court can police his performance
and decertify the class under Rule 23 if the representative

FN2.

defaults in this responsibility.

The posture of the case is no

different in principle from the more traditional representative
action in which a single party who cannot be brought before the
court because of his incompetence, for example, is permitted to
litigate through an appointed fiduciary.
Although some courts have suggested that Rule 23(e)
notice must be required even before certification and others
have indicated that the named plaintiff's duty to the class
begins with filing rather than certification, none has applied
either theory after certification has been denied.

See Advisory

Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966) • .
3

American Party v. White 415 U.S. 767, 770 n.1

(1974); Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1969); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-125 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 333 n. 2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969);
Sibron v. New York, 302 U.S. 40 (1968)(alternative holding);
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345

u.s.

629 (1953); see

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S., at 149; SEC v. Medical
Committee for Human Rights, 404

u.s.,

at 406.

Although Roe and

Dunn involved class actions, the Court made no reference to the
procedural posture of the case in determining that neither case
was moot under the Southern Pacific rule.
4

Although the rule was initially applied only to

FN3.

litigants whose stake in the outcome was assured by specific
threats to their own future interests, subsequent cases suggest
that even those individuals who allege no such threat may
continue to litigate if their claim is by nature so inherently
trnasitory that it otherwise would evade review at the behest of
any single challenger.

E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S., at

333 n. 2; Moore v. Ogilvie, 394

u.s.,

at 814.

Such cases can be

explained on the basis of the importance of the issues addressed
or on the theory that a constitutional rule absolutely
precluding review in whole classes of cases would represent an
abdication of judicial responsibility so serious as to erode the
role of the courts in our federal system by imposing
inappropriate burdens on the political branches.

Although

either explanation arguably is inconsistent with the rigid rule
that Art. III requires a "personal stake in the outcome" in
every case, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that rule
despite the existence of the exception.
5

See p.

, supra.

It is significant that the Court found it

necessary to decide whether the intervenors' claims were barred
by limitations; that is, that they had some prospect of
obtaining relief from a favorable judgment on the merits of the
class claims.

This inquiry would seem unnecessary if, as the

Court holds today, they had a personal stake in the class

FN4.

certification issue itself.

In fact, members of the putative

class whose arguably meritorious claims have "expired" by reason
of limitations would stand in a strikingly similar position to
the plaintiff before us today.
6 This understanding is further reflected in the
repeated dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to
supply adverseness once the named plaintiff's claim becomes
moot.

East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406

n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424
U.S., at 754 n. 6, 755-756; see Zablocki v. Redhail, 98 S. Ct.
673, 679 n. 6 (1978); Kremens v. Bartley, 431

u.s.

119, 129-130

(1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 39
(1974)(jurisdiction in this Court proper only because state
courts had treated action as a class).

Conversely, we have

often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim

must

be a live one both at the time the action is filed and - subject
to the Gerstein exception - at the time of certification.
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S., at 143 n. 6 (BRENNAN, J.
dissenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419

u.s.

Wolfish,
7

u.s.,

at 402; see Bell v.

n. 5 (1979).

In this very case, respondent's interest in the

merits is the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a
class.

The class claims were addded to his complaint only

FNS.

because he feared that intervening mootness would otherwise
prevent a final determination of the merits.
of Respondent at 23, 33.

App. at 17, Brief

The same theme infused respondent's

argument before this Court, which he attempted to devote
entirely to the merits, urging that the mootness question was
"not very significant" because if the case were held moot
another pr.isoner would simply file a new case.
8

The Court finds initial authorization for the

"private attorney general" concept in the fact that Rule 23
grants named plaintiffs a right to have a class certified in
certain circumstances.

But we have held that even Congress may

not grant us jursidiction when Art. III does not.

Far less so

may a rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend
. . • the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.

The Court's test must therefore be that

whenever a rule of law - common law statute, or rule - confers a
right to litigate the only requirement of Art. III is that there
be "sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and
self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing
positions."

But these requirements are surely met in the

typical "private attorney general" action brought by an
individual ,as citizen to challenge governmental action found to
be offensive or simply wrong.

Respondent's actual interest in

FN6.

this case has nothing to do with the procedural protections
mentioned by the Court.

See n. 7, supra.

It is neither

surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
the legality of the parole system rather than the rights of
strangers or the smooth running of the judicial process.

But if

the degree of "vigor" and "self-interest" with which this
respondent approaches the certification question is sufficient
to satisfy the Court's Art. III test, then the advocate who
presses a deeply held belief as to the public interest must also
prevail against a challenge based upon Art. III.
9

In view of the tremendous analytical gap the Court

is willing to bridge to save this action, it is appropriate to
note how slight are the practical imperatives for hearing this
case.

I have already noted the unimportance attached to the

mootness question by respondent's lawyer.

See p.

, supra.

This attitude is likely to be fairly typical of class actions
brought under Rule 23 (b)(1) or (2) in which only injunctive or
declaratory relief is sought.

Such actions are not subject to

the danger, illustrated by Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper,
ante, at

, of complete frustration through sequential

settlement offers "picking off" each intervening plaintiff.

Nor

is the loss of a single plaintiff potentially disastrous because
others are deterred by the enormous notice costs that often flow

FN7.

from the certification of a class under Rule 23 (b)(3).
Moreover, the question is not whether the parole commission may
ever be required to conform its guidelines to the mandates of
the law.

As we have expressly noted in another context, if the

guidelines are invalid there will be other plaintiffs who may
properly challenge them.

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421

U.S. 454, 467 n. 13 (1975).

lfp/ss

Rider~, p. ~?(Geraghty)

12/31/79

Note to Ellen:
Possible Approach to Part II of our opinion:
This case presents a fundamentally different
situation.

\

No class has been certified and the only

plaintiff no longer has any personal xxag stake in the
litigation.

In my view, the precedents of this Court,

and the purpose of Article III, require a dismissal of
what remains \ - essentially a lawyer's case, however
conscientious the lawyer may be ~

But the Court today

views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine
to justify breathing life into a lawsuit with no parties
plaintiff.
It anounces for the first time there are two
categories of

"~the

Article III mootness doctrine":

"flexible" and "less flexible".

Ante, at 12 and n. 7.

Not surprisingly, the Court then relies on cases
said to

11

H.demonstrate" the flexible type of mootness

in class action litigation.

These cases include

So

Gerstein, McDonald, and today's decision in Roper,
ante at 11.

2.
(Ellen:

Here distinguish each of these cases

much as you have done so in your draft.)

The "less flexible" approach to the mootness
doctrine is said to be illustrated by Jacobs, Bradford
and Spangler.

As these are about to be made second class

precedents, they are relegated to afs footnote.
p. 12 n. 7.

Ante,

But these cases are qui t e recent decisions

of this Court; no Justice who participated in any of them
suggested the distinction made today; and, as the opinions
therein make clear, settled principles of Article III
jurisprudence - long established by prior cases - were
applied.

I suppose it would have been awkward to overrule

them today.

Yet this would have been the straightforward

method of dispatching the "less flexible" cases.

The

Court's abbreviated treatment ignores their relevance ~f

not controlling force - to the issue presented by

the present case.
(Note to Ellen:

Here discuss these three cases

much as you already have in your draft, distinguishing

3.
them from the "more flexible" cases and emphasizing that
they are indistinguishable on principle from the
present case).

lfp/ss

12/31/79

Rider A, p . 21 (Geraghty)

We thus have a case in which the named plaintiff
(the respondent here) no longer has any interest in the
injuries asserted in his complaint , and where no member
of the putative class is before the Court .

The case

therefore lacks a plaintiff having that minimal personal
stage which is a constitutional prerequisite to the
jaxixxBEXXBRK jurisdiction of an Article III court .
In any realistic sense , the only party before this
Court who appears to have an interest xaxxha is a
counsel who no longer has an identifiable client .
I would vacate the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the
action as moot .

lfp/ss

12/31/79

Rider A, p. 7 (Geraghty)

Note to Ellen:
Possible Approach to Part II of our opinion:
This case presents a fundamentally different
situation.

No class has been certified and the only

plaintiff no longer has any personal xxag stake in the
litigation.

In my view, the precedents of this Court ,

and the purpose of Article III, require a dismissal of
what remains - essentially a lawyer's case, however
conscientious the lawyer may be.

But the Court today

views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine
to justify breathing life into a lawsuit with no parties
plaintiff.
It anounces for the first time there are two
categories of "j!the Article Ill mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible".

~'

at 12 and n. 7.

Not surprisingly, the Court then relies on cases
said to "&demonstrate" the flexible type of mootness
in class action litigation.

These cases include

Gerstein, McDonald, and today's decision in Roper,
~at

.

~·

11.

2.

(Ellen:

Here distinguish each of these cases

much as you have done so in your draft.)

The

11

less flexible" approach to the mootness

doctrine is said to be illustrated by Jacobs, Bradford
and Spangler.

As these are about to be made second class \ \

precedents, they are relegated to aia footnote.
p. 12 n. 7.

~,

But these cases are quite recent decisions

of this Court; no Justice who participated in any of them
suggested the distinction made today; and, as the opinions
therein make clear, settled principles of Article III
jurisprudence - long established by prior cases - were
applied.

I suppose it would have been awkward to overrule

them today.

Yet this would have been the straightforward

method of dispatching the "less flexible" cases.

The

Court's abbreviated treatment ignores their relevance of not controlling force - to the issue presented by
the present case.
(Note to Ellen:

Here discuss these three cases

much as you already have in your draft, distinguishing

lfp/ss

12/31/79

Rider A, po 21 (Geraghty)

We thus have a case in which the named plaintiff
(the respondent here) no longer has any interest in the
injuries asserted in his complaint, and where no member

//+'~~~~~.

of the putative class is before the CourtA

The case

therefore lacks a plaintiff having that minimal personal
stage which is a constitutional prerequisite to the
~HxixxaEXXRRK

jurisdiction of an Article III court.

In any realistic sense, the only party before this
Court who appears to have an interest xaxxka
counsel who no longer has
~

is~

*

G'L/
~ ideatifiab~ client.

A

I would vacate the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the
action as moot.

lfp/ss

Rider A 2 p. 7 (Geraghty)

12/31/79

The foregoing decisions, largely ignored by the
Court's opinion, establish principles that this Court
has applied consistently.

initial question of

~o ~e

standi~

to

1\

sure they in7

~~tion

the

rather

~~~_r-vv~ .

than ~class action~ o

But there is no exception in Article

~
III for class actions ) )the constitutional doctrines of
standing and mootness focus alike on whether a personal
stake is at issue in a live

~ntroversy.) We

have

recognized, however, that when a class has been
certified in accordance with Rule 23 it "acquires a
legal status separate from the interests asserted by
[the named plaintiff]" Sosna v.
399 (1975) .

'

'

Iowa :~

419 U.S. 393,

lfp/ss

12/31/79

Rider A, p. 1 (Geraghty)

This suit was filed by respondent as a class
action while he was serving time in a federal prison.
The District Court denied class&

~

certifica~ion

and

(

granted summary for petitioners.

A

Respondent appealed,

but before any brief was filed he was unconditionally
released from prison.

Petitioners then moved to dismiss

I

\

the appeal as moot, but the Court of Appeals denied
~

1\

that motion , ~versed the judemeat of the District Court ~~~~

liCLAP
and

<

'-.J _)

.x-t
he case for further proceedings.

The

court concluded that despite the conceded mootness of
P"
.~
~
.!~ ./. ~ .
.
~ •• ex~~~~,_,~~
respondent's personal claim, the cl.asg a~ ft--ism
4
remained ai live controversy in which respondent - as
class representative - had sufficient interest to

1 fpjss 1/17/80
, apparently is elevated by the Court's opinion
this case to the status of new doctrine.

If this

is the intent, there is serious tension with the
opinion of Chief Justice Burger for the Court in
Roper, also handed down today.

In Roper, the Court

is careful to explain that allowing the named
plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits to
continue in the case for the purpose of appealing,
within the statutory period, the denial of class
certification rests upon the "critical distinction"
between mootness deriving from a iudgment and
mootness deriving from events extrinsic to the
litigation.

~'

at

, slip op., at 9.

When a

iudgment has been entered the Roper Court holds
that Article III is relevant only indirectly to a
central question of appealability.

Id., at 7, 12.

Roper also expressly notes that the named plaintiff
whose judgment was satisfied retains an economic
interest in sharing litigation costs with the
class.

Thus, it is far from apParent how these two

cases can be reconciled.

Here, mootness did not

derive from a iudgment; rather, it resulted solely
from an extrinsic event - the unconditional release
from prison of the only named plaintiff.

Thus, a

2.

distinction viewed as "critical" by the Roper Court
is iqnored by the Seraqhtv Court.
Althouqh Roper fairly may be criticized
on other qrounds,

~'

at

it carefully leaves

undisturbed the fundamental rule that a plaintiff
who can no lonqer assert a concrete iniury
remediable by iudicial action has ceased to present
a case cognizable in an Article III court.

~ LFP •/11/~V

·~

~
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t

~
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United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he
was serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole."

App., at 17.

The

District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners.

Respondent appealed, but

before ~

~fddl,
£ ilg~

•AY briefs, he was unconditionally released from prison.
A
.

Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot.

The Court

of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment of the
District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Conceding that respondent's personal claim was moot, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could
appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees
with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps.

First,

'd-

t.Q~ ~

1\

says that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may

be adapted as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of
litigation.

Ante at 8 - 12.f econd, the Court holds that the

named plaintiff has a right "analogous to the private attorney

2.

general concept" to appeal the denial of class certification
even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12 16.

Both steps are significant departures from settled law that

rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in
this case.

Accordingly, I dissent.
I

As the Court observes, this case involves the
"personal stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine.

Ante, at 7.

There is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate
plaintiff could present for judicial resolution.

The question

is whether respondent's present interest in the controversy
makes him a proper plaintiff.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the
personal stake requirement with some care.

When the issue is

presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing
to sue, we have held that the personal •stake requirement has a
double aspect.

On the one hand, it derives from Art. III

limitations on the power of the federal courts.

On the other,

it embodies self-imposed restraints on the exercise of judicial
power.

E.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976);

Warth v. Seldin, 422

u.s.

490, 498 (1975).

The prudential

aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine of uncertain
contours.

Ante, at 12.

But the constitutional minimum has been

3.

given definite content:

"[i]n order to satisfy Art. III, the

plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant."
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
(1979).~/

Although non-economic

injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all
attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject - or with
the rights of third parties - for "the concrete injury required
by Art. III."
426

u.s.

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,

26, 40 (1976).l/
As the Court notes today, the same threshold

requirement must be satisfied throughout the action.
8; see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975).

Ante, at

Prudential

considerations not present at the outset may come into play
after the parties have invested substantial resources in an
action and generated a factual record.

But an actual case or

controversy in the constitutional sense "must be extant at all
stages of review." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n. 10
(1974).

Cases that 'no longer "'touc[h] the legal relations of

parties having adverse legal interests'" are moot because
"federal courts are without power to decide questions that
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them."
North Carolina v. Rice, 404

u.s.

244, 246 (1971)(per curiam),

4.

quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300

u.s.

227, 240-241

(1937). The limitation f l ows directly from Art. III.
Odegaard, 416

u.s.

DeFunis v.

312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).l/

Since the question is one of power, practical
considerations do not control.

Sosna v. Iowa 419

u.s.

393, 401

n.9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974);

s.s.

United States v. Alaska

Co., 253

u.s.

113, 116 (1920).

Nor

can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome.
Odegaard, supra, at 316.

See DeFunis v.

Collateral consequences of the

original wrong may supply the individual interest in some
circumstances. Sibron v. New York, 392

u.s.

40, 53-58 (1968).

So, too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so
inherently transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal
course of litigation.
416

u.s.

Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle,

115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219

498, 515 (1911).

u.s.

The essential and irreducible constitutional

requirement is simply some showing of continuing or threatened
injury at the hands of the adversary.

J~i-r-~-1:;;~~~ ~~/
These cases demonstrate that the core requirement of a

v

;\

It

\1

personal stake in the outcome is not flexible.

On the eontrary,

~,

A the personal stake requirement sometimes appears rigidly
formalistic.

See Davis, Standing:

Taxpayers and Others, 35

u.

~

5.

~~
We ~have insisted upon the

Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613-614 (1968).

requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is
embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed

/NIL-

by.~

Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper - and
properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

In this way we have,

until today, "prevent(ed] the judicial process from becoming no
more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests
of concerned bystanders."

United States v. SCRAP, 412

u.s.

669,

687 (1973): see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment): Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.727, 740 (1974).
II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the
Court has applied consistently.

These principles were developed

outside the class action context.
exception for class actions.

But Art. III contains no

Thus, we have held that a putative

class representative who alleges no individual injury "may not
seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the
class."

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).

Only

after. a class has been certified in accordance with Rule 23 can
it "acquir(e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by (the named plaintiff]."

Sosna v. Iowa, supra at 399

6.

(1975).

"Given a properly certified class," the live interests

of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the
personal stake required by Art. III when the named plaintiff's
individual claim becomes moot.
Co., 424

u.s.

Franks v. Bowman Transportation

747, 755-756 (1976): Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.

This case presents a fundamentally different
situation.

No class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff

no longer has any personal stake in the litigation._!/

In the

words of his own lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no
additional personal relief" in this case.

Tr. of Oral Arg., at
~t;:;:;,, .:.., ~

25. Even the lawyer has evinced no interest
esponden , as opposed

~.cM~J&~~s

to ~

Ibid.~/

o :fi.

Lh~-e

eo~ .

in \ represent ~

personJ presently

.
incarcerated ~6-

In these circumstances, Art. III and

But the Court views the case differently and

constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time - and
without attempting to

~econcile

the many cases to the contrary -

that there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness
doctrine":
n.7.

"flexible" and "less flexible."

Ante, at 12 and

The Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the

application of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation.

7.

These cases include Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

u.s.

(1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432

103, 110-111 n.11

u.s.

385 (1977),

and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper,
ante, p.

Each case is said to show that a class action is

not necessarily mooted by the loss of the class representative's
personal stake in the merits, even though no class has been
certified. Ante, at 11.

Sosna itself is cited for the

proposition that the requirements of Art. III may be met
"through means other than the traditional requirement of a
'personal stake in the outcome.'"

Ante, at 15.

The Court

grievously misreads these precedents, for they show nothing of
the kind.
A
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that~
p~QQeew~

adverse parties.
227, 240

(1937).~/

gives legal recognition to additional

Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
And in

Ge~stein,

u.s.

the Court applied a rule

long established by non-class action cases that never

~
~

been

thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome.

Gerstein held that a class action challenging the

constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could
continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions had brought
their detentions to an end.

The action did not continue because

8.

a personal stake in the outcome on the merits was unnecessary.
Rather, the lawsuit fell in "that narrow class of cases" that
are "distinctly

'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"

4 2 0 U • S • , at 1 1 0 n • 1 1 • ]_/
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the
denial of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of
the class representative's claim on the merits.

But neither

case departs from traditional understandings of the personal
stake requirement.

In McDonald, a putative class member

~ ft-1 /)..../-~,; ~ ~-~
intervened~o appeal the certification ruling.
390.~/

432

u.s.,

at

Because the Court found that her claim was not time-

barred, the intervenor in McDonald possessed the stake necessary
to pursue the action.

Indeed, the Court devoted its entire

opinion to showing that the intervenor's claim for relief had
expired.~/

not
is

At most, McDonald holds only that an action which

4u+f-~4...,_

~~l.¥ ~'l!'iH.lQtJ

~~ ~'"'~

by interested partiesi\a..t ali time" does not

"die" in an Art. I II sense , b'il'ii'ii'lli'il gf a ~li"ie£ 4Itte'l!' eel il'\ \Jhich
I'loQlt'R9r the~al

tfte

l'lor-..t.'Re-sJ.~hst :Hnte

par'ey

otet&

preseRt 8efore

10blft~/
.,

eod'tt-ee&'eeo6 in McDonald that the "refusal to

certify was subject to appellate review after final judgment at
the behest of the named plaintiffs.

• .

" 432 U.S., at 393.

~ , 4-.c.H-·<--,
That

&~ee~m A

repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437

u.s.

J

9.

'
t / _4
~ ~
u,~c.
.....,J...tr ¥#J..W.I(
463, 469, 470 n. 15 (1978), , today is adopted as law. Roper

.. ...J4

\

explains, however, that the rule allowing a plaintiff who has
prevailed on the merits to appeal the denial of class
certification rests upon the "critical distinction" between
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness deriving from
events extrinsic to the litigation.
9.

, slip op. at !

Ante, at

When a judgment has been entered, the Court holds that Art(

III is relevant only indirectly to the central question of
appealability. Id., at 7, 12.

~

Roper also expressly notes the /

named plaintiffs' economic interest in sharing litigation costls
with the class - an interest not present here.

Id., at 10 n.

Although Roper may be criticized on other grounds, ante, at
it leaves undisturbed the fundamental rule that a plaintiff wh

w.L~,

can no longer assert a concrete injury remediable by judicial
action has ceased to present a case cognizable in an Art.
court.

~~~--

B

\...a.,_ ·~......, ~£l.lt"' . . ~ Hu,.cj..,w~
1
··~~~~~-;;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~v-----~
The ·~~~~~
exiblt . cases cited by the Cour ~apply
~ ~z:II:. ~;..e.-..c(Ac· .4•·~•
t~• ~Qem@A~al

~1@

) >--

in cases closely analogous to this one.

~

Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420
curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423

u.s.

U~S.

128 (1975)(per

147 (1975)(per curiam);

Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427
(1976).

u.s.

424, 430

As they are about to become second class precedents,

... fp/ss 1/17/80
, apparently is elevated by the Court's opinion in
~ or

this case to the status of new doctrine. IT this
L;;,. , ~._.._.,... ..-....-.. -jL, >

..-- e-.J

~l..p:-/o"'-"-

c

~ ~_h,ere is serious tensionAw~~ the Mv.Jt ~owef
r-e.0Acttr5 ~op~-1 ~
lcfi;
-\n~ ---

~; nj,Qn

MtA a:¢2s;;(Sri&;~~ ~~in

ec

Jil.op~~ -~~ •Jil~ee

eL Jill toela:y>a

In Roper, the Court

a.is careful to explain that allowinq

).i1e

named

~~ ~

plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits

c~M

Case ffir the

t'M£peso of

17i~atatatocy per~ the
~<lUilc af-

appealj~

denial of class

o..

certification xests upoc. .,_. "critical distinction"
between mootness deriving from a iudgment and
mootness

~···eA:zut.
d~tio~ from

litigation.

~,

events extrinsic to the

J·
\

at :_:_:_(slip op., at

i udgment has been entered)-;; Rooer

..

When a
·~cL..Oo

£e"Z ~

:;)

to ~

Article III is relevant onlv innirectlv

~

--s.

1

~l question of appealability.

s~e.~\S

Jil.oper also oeKpressl:y-

~~-~

~

·~

Id., at 7, 12.

<l

th a t

plaintiff

~named

tH>-'f

whose iudgment ~satisfiedl\retainf an economic
interest in sharing litigation costs with the
class.

~~t is far { f .h a parent how these two
\L

_..

---

t\.(_Q

cases can be reconciled.
ti:@y iv~

ftvili a=4m1qm!!!it:,

~wro;

5

itber 1

_

1 he

t

ftu.o ( V(./.UZ_

mootness -Aid Hot
~

resulted

~e ~

~ ?'(~',._,_•lifT>~

from an extrinsic event

U ""'- ~~~;";>/

t

(e

ce

~"·s~ 

-l!om~s~~:~~~~~~l~-~~~~~~~~~ !I'hus, .....,a. .

2.

f.k d 1st inc:tlon v-iewed as

11

cr tt: ical

bv the-~opet Ceta: t

11

~~

iS
"3(;,$e....-(" ;~
is -ignorea- b y tbe ~aqhtyr "Co-urt-;

·

\._~ h .... c.hW~.A
~~LV

Althouq

utu.J 011<

,~j

may be criticized)

-HAo1 ([)/Jtl_
OA etfier

~re~A~Br ~'

~ 1\ot {ltAf(>i1f \
~disturb.-

at

+o

the fundamental rule that a plaintiff

who can no lonqer assert a concrete iniurv
remediable by iudicial action has ceased to present
a case cognizable in an Article III court.

'""'

1 0.

these cases are relegated to a footnote.

~'

at 12 n.7.

But

a· til.. ~ d ~e~LL, ~ ,... ,.,,,-tU(J
the cases are

~i~

recentA decisions of this Court.

They

~?ZL,./

applied long

estaeli~~e~

principles of Art. III jurisprudence.

A

And no Justice who participated in them suggested the
distinction drawn today.

The Court's backhanded treatment of

these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling relevance
to the · issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action
to challenge certain high school regulations.

The District

Court stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate
and that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the
court failed to comply with Rule 23.

After this Court granted

review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had
graduated.

We held that the action was entirely moot because

the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court."

420

u.s.,

'" /

~

at 130.

Since the faulty certification prevented the class from
acquiring separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal.
We reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a third
party. 427

u.s.,

U.S. 308, 310 n.1

at 430-431.
(1976).

See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425

And in Bradford, where the District

Court had denied certification outright, the Court held that the

11.

named plaintiff's release from prison required the dismissal of
his complaint about parole release procedures.
149.

u.s.

u.s.,

423

at

See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and · Spangler may be

distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing
the denial of class certification.

The Court overlooks the fact

that in each case the class representatives were defending a
judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class.

They did not take the procedural route of

appealing a denial of certification only because the district
court had granted - albeit defectively - class status.

We chose

not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class
representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification.

Underlying Jacobs, and .Bradford as

well, is
stake in

~

no one has

a~onal

for third parties, through the

mechanism of class certification or otherwise.11/
rejects that principle today:

The Court

1 2.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness
~

is unprecedented, the content given that concept

.

~~·

startliR~~~~l.

0

~

is~ more

The Court splits the class aspects of this

ction into two separate "claims": that the action may be

ta., . ,. .

t-1-

~ tib ,J- c:t.., u......e. ••c
C. cl
maintained on behalf of ~ class and that the class is entitled
)

~

to relief on the merits.

Since no class has been certified, the

Court concedes that the claim on the merits is moot.
. 15, 17.

Ante,
___.__

at

But respondent is said to have a personal stake in his

"procedural claim" despite his lack of a stake in the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to
respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question.

Instead, respondent's "personal stake"

is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do with any
concrete injury or stake in the outcome.

First, the Court finds

that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a "right,"
"analogous to the private attorney general concept," to have a
class certified.

Second, the Court thinks that the case retains

the "imperatives of a dispute capable of

j~dicial

resolution,"

which are identified as (i) a sharply presented issue, (ii) a
concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested party
actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.

1 3.

The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in
Rule 23 is
may

not~

e ~t~ r sl ¥

~

misplaced.

We have held that even Congress

~ f<tL-e,c,_l, ~

·JUrlsd1ct1on when Art. III does not. Gladstone,

Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
Littleton, 414

u.s.,

u.s.,

at 100; O'Shea v.

at 494 & n.2; see Marbury v. Madison,

Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803).

Far less so may a rule of procedure

which "shall not be construed to extend . • • the jurisdiction
of the United States district courts."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.

Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply
the personal stake necessary to satisfy Art. III.

It serves

only to permit litigation by a party who has a stake of his own
but otherwise might be barred by prudential standing rules.
Warth v. Seldin, 422

u.s.,

u.s.,

See

at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general

concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new
perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness.

Although the

components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III
jurisprudence, they are an aspect of those "policy rules often
invoked by the court 'to avoid passing prematurely on
constitutional questions.'"
424

u.s.,

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.

at 755-756 & n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392

u.s.

14

83, 97 (1968).

0

Such rules operate only in "'cases confessedly

within [the Court's]

jurisdiction~'"

Ibid.

The Court cites no

decision that has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence
of a sharply presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued
case, and I am aware of

none.~/

characteristics is sure to be

Indeed, each of these

presQ~t

4-

in the typical "private

P.·~'-'
~- ·--~
jReQJ:Qo£i;rel dtizen. 1l/

attorney general" action brought by

iiilR

-

-'\

Although we hAve re f used st eadfastly to countenance the "publi c
action," the Court's redefinition of the personal stake
requirement leaves no principled basis for that practice.l!/
The Court reasons that this

9F~~~

departure from

)o
precedent is compelled by the difficulty of identifying a
personal stake in a "procedural claim," particularly in
"nontraditional forms of litigation."
Court has created a false dilemma.

Ante, at 13, 14.

But the

As noted in Roper, class

certification issues are "ancillary to the litigation of
substantive claims." Ante, at

(slip op., at 6).

Any attempt

t o identify a p@rsonll stake in such ancillary "claims" often
must end in frustration, for they are not claims in any ordinary
sense of the word.

A motion for class certification, like a

motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a
i ur y inst e ad of a judge, seeks only to present a substantive
c l ai m in a particular context.

Such procedural devices

v eL........, ~~ ~

~-- .,.,. ..,.,.,_t..

...,..,.,."""1.........
.,..,. #a J~c.4C ·

I

LJII..- ,.

1

~~ .,:::.~ ....... ,

LJ

,_, ~t;:c.c.- ~ ~~~,......, . L.~J~

1 _.LJ 5 •
.... ~

~

generally have no value apart from their capacity to'\ :i,.R'e't'"eas2J _
th~

~~-u:~o/ ~ u.

1 ikel iho~ of succes ~ on the merits.

moving party is neither expected nor

Accordingly, the

re~uired

to assert an

interest in them independent of his interest in the merits. \ A

Iclass

representative is permitted to litigate the class

certification question because it is inextricably entwined with \
I

his attempt to establish substantive claims - not because of any
)independent interest in serving as class representative and
certainly not, as the Court suggests, because Art. III makes an

-------

---

--

xception for "nontraditional" forms of litigatio •
.

, f he class action is scarcely a new idea.
mer ~y

---Rule 23

""='

;) ~ ... • t. ~ ,:....._ "·- ~• .1.
c:£. .,...;.{y J
codifies procedures for dealing with a form of action
1\

long known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions
(1977).

§

1004

That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class

aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned.

But even when we deal with truly new procedural

devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to the
recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300

u.s.,

Aetna

at 240 (1937) (Declaratory

Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace,
288

u.s.

249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).

ootness on the vitality of a device like the class action

- -~

1 6.

which aa2

sigRif~ga~tly adva~ced

~he

agmi~i9tration

of

j~stieo, ~

But it cannot
provide a plaintiff when none is before the Court, for we are
powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation of Art. III.16
IV
In short, we deal with a case in which the putative
class representative -

~~JJe.J-

respondent here - no longer has

interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint.

,.~

No member of

the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified.
The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal personal
stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction
of an Art. III court.

In any realistic sense, the only persons

before this Court who appear to have an interest are the
defendant and a lawyer who no longer has a

client.~/

I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals
and remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
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The Court agrees that respondent has no personal

stake in the ultimate outcome of the case, for it holds that the
case must be dismissed as moot if no class is certified on
~~

remand. Ante, at 15, 17.

~ \ the

Court dQQ J: Ret suggest that

respondent will be affected personally by any ruling on the
class certification question that is remanded today.

In fact,

FN2.

d. ~~
C&~P\ apparently~~ncefd~ that

respondent has no personal

stake - "in the traditional sense" - in obtaining certification.
Id., at 14.
Several prisoners now in federal custody have filed a
motion to intervene as parties respondent in this Court.
Although the Court does not rule on that motion, I note that the
motion was received well over a year after respondent was
released from prison.

In the interim, respondent obtained a

ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his petition for
certiorari in this Court.

Such untimely intervention comes too

late to save the action under United Air Lines v. McDonald, 432

u.s.

385 (1977).

21

Respondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying

that "[t]he mootness question in this case is, from a practical
standpoint, not very significant." If the action is held moot he
Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.

will simply "file a new case."

Except as

necessary to respond to questions, the lawyer thereafter limited
his presentation to a discussion of the merits.

~I+~~
.§_/ TS-@

~ c e ;a;;t

kJ 4C.d .,_ti•.IJL

i "Q.r i ng

U~Q

8lillii11ii1

1\

~/..,_,

'

J f-

represents a

judicial finding that injured parties other than the named
plaintiff exist.

It also provides a definition by which they

~....,JII,cc../
can be identified.

Certification sharpens the interests of
\

unnamed class members in the outcome; only after certification

FN3.

will they be bound by the outcome.

After certification, the

action cannot be settled or dismissed without the approval of
the court and
P. 23(e).

approp~iate

notice to class members.

Fed. R. Civ.

Vigorous ai"'ocacy is assured by the authoritative

imposition on the nameA plaintiffs of a duty adequately to
represent the entire cl.Rss.

If the named plaintiff's own claim

becomes moot, the court can monitor his performance and
decertify the class unner Rule 23 if he defaults in this
?

~~~ ·

~

responsibility./\ Afte l\ certificationr oA o~fie[ \101!'~ the case
is no different in

pri~ciple

from

~

more traditional

s: ..e,q ~-

representative action"' i:A \inie!\ a single party who cannot be 0

~~ - ~
~~the
.,.._r
incompetence is

because

permitt~d

of~ ~~h""'his

to litigate through an appointed

fiduciary. !\

7
I

c;.~~

h'

•

_7/ Th e Court s analys1s, w 1ch emphas1zed that

i\

.

"[p]retrial detention is hy nature temporary" and that "[t]he
individual could • • • suffer repeated deprivations" with no
access to redress, falls squarely within the rule of Southern
Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).

See Roe v.

In similar cases we have noted

that the continuation of the action will depend "'especially
[upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would

;
evade review.'"

Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, , 213 n.11

FN4.

(1978), quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419

u.s.

393, 402 n.11

(1975).

These limitations themselves are inconsistent with the concept
of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of "personal stake"
adopted today.
~/

The individual claims of the original named

plaintiffs had been settled after
a judgment on the question of
I
liability.

432

u.s.,

at 389, 393 n.14.

unnecessary if, as the Court holds today, the intervenor had a
personal stake in the class certification issue itself.

Since

~4-i.....C. ~
the present respondent's claim
~,

~

A

"expired" \'llitlA the
J

passa~e

of

he stands in the same position as a member of the putative

class whose claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of
limitations.

lQI
(1976)

See Baxter v. Palmigiano,

(permitting intervenors to c

despite suggestions of
~ ~

3_()8, 310 n.1
the litigation
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inquiring into

questions of timing).
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dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply
adverseness once the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot.
Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431

u.s.

East

395, 406 n. 12

(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424

u.s.,
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FN5.

754 n.6, 755-756: see Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 129-120
(1977): Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 39 (1974).
Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff's
individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action
is filed and at the time of certification.

Kremens v. Bartley,

supra, at 143 n.6 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting): Sosna v. Iowa, 419

u.s.,

at 402: see Bell v. Wolfish,

u.s.

n. 5

(1979): Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 n.9 (1978).
~/

The Court has twice rejected the contention that a

"spirited dispute" alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 35-36 (1974): Hall v. Beals,
396

u.s.

45, 48-49 (1969)

lll

(per curiam).

The Court's assertion to the contrary

notwithstanding, there is nothing in the record to suggest that
respondent has any interest whatever in his new-found "right to
have a class certified."

Ante, at 15.

In fact, the record

shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole
motivation for his attempt to represent a class.

The class

claims were added to his complaint only because his lawyer
feared that mootness might terminate the action.
Brief for Respondent 23, 33.

App., at 17:

The record does not reveal whether

respondent - as distinguished from his lawyer - now wishes to
continue with the case.

If he does, it is clear that his

FN6.

interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections
described by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits."
Ante, at 14. It is neither surprising nor improper that
respondent should be concerned with parole procedures.
respondent's actual interest is

But ·

~~.-u.~~.~._ ~w~J

indistin~uishable

•

from l\~t

of a

¢

"private attorney general" who mightr bring a "public action" to
challenge tlo@

l!l
moot cases.

-5JtiR<jS o f

tb~parole

system£
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The Court's view logically cannot be confined to
If a plaintiff who is released from prison the day

after filing a class action challenging parole guidelines may
seek certification of the class, why should a plaintiff who is
released the day before filing the suit be barred?

As an Art.

III matter, there can be no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little

~ifference

~ ~ )4-ti'.,C.c•..:/between this action and one filed promptly upon release.
Court has ruled on neither the merits
propriety of the class action.

G~

~Ae

,.._&A .I

.1. .
~ ·~h1s

saae nor the

At the same time, it has vacated

.)
a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in turn
judgment of the District Court.

.!1

is left

u , 4..standing. ~ For

the

No determination on any issue

~- c ......c.~c:::a ..... l ~ 4:.-~···/...H,
every practical purpose, the case must

begin anew. Q espoRdeRt's sonneel himself finds our resolution

~

~Nbe

rf

~;3

moatness.

~ion

of no J"t"a

It is difficult to imagine a case in which the

FN7.

prudential considerations aligned against a finding of mootness
are less compelling.
15

I do not imply that the result reached today is

necessary in any way to the continued vitality of the class
action device.

On the contrary, the practical impact of finding

mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
supra.

See note 13,

And this case may well be typical of class actions

brought under Rule 23 (b)(1) or (2) to seek injunctive or
declaratory relief. Such actions are not subject to frustration
off~

through sequential settlement offers that "pick
intervening plaintiff.
ante, at

each

Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper,

(slip op., at 11-12).

Nor will substitute

plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend
certification of a class under Rule 23 (b)(3).
~~~f•
AI'.~
,< -<
16/ In i.t.s--he~d);eng rtt~h to "save" this action from

-

\

/o

mootness the Court
court.

I

l1

role of a reviewing

It fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court

has erred.

The Court does not address the District Court's

ruling against respondent on the merits or the District Court's
refusal to certify the broad class sought by respondent.

Nor

does the Court suggest that the District Court erred in fniling
to consider the possibility of subclasses sua sponte.

~

!'~./~

)

Nevertheless, respondent is given the opportunity to raise the

FN8.

subclass question on remand.

That result cannot be squared with

the rule that a litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he
has failed to preserve by appropriate objection in the court
below.

The Court intimates that the District Court waited too

long to deny the class certification motion, thus makinq a
motion for subclasses a "futile act."

Ante, at 17.

But nothing

in the record suggests that the District Court would not have
entertained such a motion.

Since respondent sought

certification in the first place only to avoid mootness on
appeal, the entry of an order against him on the merits cannot
excuse him from raising the subclass issue thereafter.

121

I imply no criticism of counsel in this case.

The

Court of Appeals agreed with counsel that the certification
issue was appealable, and the case was brought to this Court by
the United States.

lfp/ss

2/11/80
12a.

Footnote - 12a; - p; - 11 - (Geraqhtv)
In a footnote, ante at 18 n. 11,

the Court states:
"This respondent suffered actual,
concrete iniury as a result of the
putatively illeqal conduct, and this
iniury would satisfy the formalistic
personal stake requirement if damaqes
were souqht. See, e.q., Powell - v.
McCormack, 395 u.s., at 495, 5oo. ( His
injury continued up to and beyond the
time the Dist~ict Court denied class
certification.") .Afl.:t::g; at - 18, -n. lt.
This appears to be a cateqoric claim of
the actual, concrete iniury our cases have
required.
the injury.

Yet, aqain, the Court fails to identify
The reference to damaqes, even if

otherwise material, is irrelevant here as
respondent souqht no damaqes - only iniunctive and
declaratory relief.

Moreover, counsel for

respondent frankly conceded that his client "can
obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in

.this

case.

~
..
1s cla1m1nq

Tr. Oral Aqr. 25 •

If

:b ~ eti

the Court

concrete injury "up to and bevond the

1\
time" class certification was denied, it would

if
indeed be helpful for
spec1' f '1ca 11 y~rtb:
twe

~t

~
lAl~Y

.
1t
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t h at ~

perce1vesn ~
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leA~ ~~-~r TV

A respondent's counsel . die.aerf\,

to identify

~'

er 2/11/80

RE:

No. 78-572 Geraghty
Here are some proposed rsponses to the Court's new

footnote 11.

I do not think the Court makes any telling points

against our dissenting position, however, and if you decide
against responding I will not be insulted.

RIDER 1, P. 2 n.1:
Each of these cases reiects explicitly the view, once expressed

~~

by Mr. Justice Harlan and now apparently espoused by the Court,
that the personal stake requirement lacks constitutional
significance.

~'

at 16 n. 11; Flast - v; -cohen, 392

120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

u.s.

83,

Until today, however, that

view never had commanded a maiority.
RIDER 2, p. 4
4a/

The Court states that "the erosion of the strict

formalistic perception of Art. III was begun well before today's
decision," and that the Art. III personal stake requirement is
"riddled with exceptions."

.91-

Ante, at 16 n. 11.

~

~-~

~~~~e~€~~~~~~ fails to cite a sinqle Court opinion in

'\
support of either statement.

"

To the extent that the decision in

Flast - v; -Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), act!Jlv supports the
position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120, it noes
not survive the lonq line of express holdings that beqan with

o-1(

2.

I

Warth - v; · Seldin, 422

u.s.

490

(1975), and were reaffirmed only
;

last term. Gladstone; · Realtors v; · Villaqe · of Bellwood, 441
91, 99 (1979). See nn. 1

&

n.s.

2, supra.

RIDER 3, p. 8
8a/

In assuming that the class aspects of the action

1\(v

~

continued after the denial of certification, McDonald departed
I"

the principles established in Sosna · v. - Iowa

and Franks v; · Bowma · TransportatioL

See pp. 4-5, supra:

United · Airlines; - Inc. · v; McDonald, 432
(POWELL, J., dissentinq). j7.

u.s.

385, 399-400

~~~ ~~4.<ce.p,.IJ4~~;
'

readinq of Rule 23 may

1\
have caused some prej dice to

in that case. Ibid.

But it created no exception to the Ar • III requirement of a
personal stake in the outcome, for there c

be no doubt that

the McDonald intervenors were interested parti

plaintiff.

RIDER 4, p. 11 •
12a/ The Court notes that respondent may hav
personal stake in obtaininq damaqes for his alleqedly ill qal
detention.

~'

at 16 n. 11.

The relevance of that

observation to the present action for iniunctive and d
relief is not apparent.

If the Court actually

respondent retains a stake in this action for the purpo e of
obtaininq damages, its refusal to consider the merits o
claim is incomprehensible.

~~

3.

~-5. ~.

RIDER 5, p. 11

.,
12b/

~~

The Court attempts to limit the sweeping

consequences that

c.

~ould

flow from a straightforward application

"'
of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13 & n. 15, by asserting
that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own
n. 11.

facts."~,

at 16

But the Court does not expound a l imiting principle of

any kind. Adverse practical consequences certainly cannot
explain today's result, since none would flow from a findinq of
mootness in this case.

See n. 15, infra.

Nor does the

"relation back principle," §inte, at 16 n. 11, further the
analysis.

Although this ~1 fiction may provide a ~ 1

shorthand label for the Court's conclusion, it hardly supplies

-~
~

an explanation.

lfp/ss

2/11/80

~

The Court attempts to limit the

sweeping consequences that could flow from the
application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13
and n. 15, by assertinq that "[e]ach case must be
decided on its own facts", considerinq the
"practicalities and prudential considerations".
Ante, at 17 n. 11.

The Court long has recoqnized a

difference between prudential and constitutional

V
I

(

~tD~
If..

VU~

(Article III) standinq.

AI

am not aware that the

J

Court, until today, has ever merged these
considerations for the purpose of eliminatinq the
constitutional requirement of a personal stake in
the litiqation.
this view.

The Court cites no prior case for

Moreover, the Court expounds no

limitinq principle of any kind.

Adverse practical

consequences, even if relevant to Article III
analysis, cannot iustify today's holding as none
whatever would flow from a decision of mootness.
See n. 15, infra.

Nor does the Court's reliance

upon a "relation back
11, further analysis.

principle",~'

at 18, n.

Indeed, althouqh this mav

provide a shorthand label for the Court's
conclusion, it is hardly a principle and certainly
not a limiting one.

lfp/ss

2/11/80

Footnote · 12a - (Geraqhty)

The Court states that "respondent
suffered actual,

~

con)f;;~

[that]

injury

continued up to and beyond the time the District
Court denied class certification.
11.

1/

Ante, at 18 n.

Apparently this statement is based on the

assumption that "damaqes" were - or could have been
- souuqht.

We need not consider whether the

situation would be different if damaqes had been
(2

souqht,

~

respondent souqht only iniunctive and

declaratory relief.

Indeed, counsel for

respondent, frankly conceded that his client "can
obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in
this case.

Tr., Oral Arq. ~ at 25.

In view of this

cateqoric concession, I invite the Court to
identify the "actual, concrete

iniury'~ suffered

respondent after his unconditional release from
prison.

by

er 2/12/80
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I

Text at paqe 4.

It turns out that Professor Davis' views do not lend
themselves to ready quotation, as the portion of the article
referred to in our opinion was written in a somewhat whimsical
tone that could be misunderstood.

What he sain was that the law

was clear that "standinq may rest upon a trifle, and it is
equally clear that at least a triflinq interest of the plaintiff
is always required.

Since the trifle makes all the difference

between standinq and lack of standinq, the difference between a
trifle and zero becomes more than a trifle!

One may ask:

should the law of standinq be so nonsensical?

Why

My opinion is

that drawinq the line between a trifle and zero is sensible,
loqical, and practical, as I shall try to show."

35

u.

Chi. L.

Rev., at 613-614.
He also said that: "I know of no federal case in which
a plaintiff was held to have standinq without assertinq an
interest of his own • • • • I think it entirely clear that the
Court has always required 'economic or other personal interests'
as the basis for standinq, without exception."

Id~,

at 616.

"Even thouqh the law of standinq is so cluttered ann confused
that almost every proposition has some exception, the federal
courts have consistently adhered to one maior proposition,
without exception:

One who has no interest of his own at stake

always lacks standinq."

Id., at 617.

Finally, he emphasizes

that federal courts have never permitted the "public action."
Id;, at 614, 629-630.
I am not certain what to quote on paqe 4.

How about:

2.

"Indeed, the rule barrinq litigation by those who have no
interest of their own at stake is applied so riqorously that it
has been termed the "one major proposition" in the law of
standinq "to which the federal courts have consistently adhered
• • • without exception."
Others, 35

u.

Davis, Standinq:

fthi. L. Rev. 601, 617 (1968).

Taxpavers and

~

We have insisted

upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standinq

"

cases because it is embedded in

II
In Rider 1, on p. 2, I believe that the views
expressed in Richardson fall in the same cateqory as Justice
Harlan's view in Flast:

they never commanded a maiority, and,

as we say in Rider 2, have now been rejected by Warth and its
proqeny.

We could add a "see also" to the citations in Rider 1,

citinq Richardson (POWELL, J., concurrinq).
iqnore Richardson.

Or we could simply

I tend to think that Richardson is not

sufficiently qlarinq a precedent to require our callinq
attention to the inconsistency.

On the other hand, you are

perfectly entitled to sav that your past views have been
rejected repeatedly by the maiority and now ouqht not to be
resurrected.

I am on the fence on this one.

er 2/12/80

No. 78-572 Geraghty

RIDER 1, p. 2 n.1:
Each of these cases reiects explicitly the view, once expressed
by Mr. Justice Harlan and now apparentlv espoused by the Court,
that the personal stake requirement lacks constitutional
significance.

Ante, at 16 n. 11: Flast v. Cohen, 392

120 (1968)(Harlan, J., dissenting).

u.s.

83,

Until today, however, that

view never had commanded a maiority.
RIDER 2, p. 4
4a/

/

The Court states that "the erosion of the strict

formalistic perception of Art. III was bequn well before today's
decision," and that the Art. III personal stake reauirement is
"riddled with exceptions."

Ante, at 16 n. 11.

It fails,

however, to cite a sinqle Court opinion in support of either
statement.
392

u.s.

To the extent that the decision in Flast - v. Cohen,

83 (1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the

dissent, id., at 117-120, it does not survive the lonq line of
express holdings that beqan with Warth v. Seldin, 422

u.s.

490

(1975), and were reaffirmed only last term. Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441
supra.

u.s.

91, 99 (1979). See nn. 1

&

2,

Even before Warth, a leading commentator observed that

this Court had adhered to the personal stake reauirement

2.

"without exception."

Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35

U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 616, 617

(1968).

RIDER 4, p. 11.
~~~ .,_;
12a/ The Court states that "respondent suffered

actual, concrete injury

[that] would satisfy the

formalistic personal stake requirement if damaqes were souqht."
Ante, at 18 n. 11.
___._

We need not consider whether the situation

would be different had respondent alleged a claim for damages,
as respondent never has asked for anything but iniunctive and
declaratory relief.

App. 3-16.

Indeed, counsel for respondent

frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no
additional personal relief" in this case.

Tr. Oral Arg. 25.

In

view of this categorical concession, I invite the Court to
identify the "actual, concrete iniury" that continued after
respondent's unconditional release from prison.

RIDER 5, p. 11
12b.

The Court attempts to limit the sweeping

consequences that could flow from the application of these
criteria, see infra, at 12-13 and n. 15, bv asserting that
"[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis of
"practicalities and prudential considerations".
11.

Ante, at 17 n.

The Court long has recognized a difference between the

3.

prudential and constitutional aspects of the standinq and
mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra.

I am not aware that the

Court, until today, ever has merged these considerations for the
purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a personal
stake in the litigation.

The Court cites no prior case for this

view.

Moreover, the Court expounds no limitinq principle of any

kind.

Adverse practical consequences, even if relevant to

Article III analysis, cannot iustify today's holdinq as none
whatever would flow from a findinq of mootness.
infra.

See n. 15,

Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back

principle",~'

at 18, n. 11, further analvsis.

Althouqh this

fiction may provide a shorthand label for the Court's
conclusion, it is hardly a Principle and certainly not a
limiting one.

z.' tf, r2- '3
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATHio1roulated: FEB 1 3 1aal
No. 78-572
United States Parole Commission) On Writ of Certiorari to
et al., Petitioners,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Third
John M. Geraghty.
Circuit.
[February -, 1980]
Mn. JusTICE PowELL, with whom Mn. JusTICE STEWAR'l'
aud Mn . .JusTICE Rr.;HNQUIST join, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class com.posed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed , he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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I
As the Court observes, this case involves t.be "personal
~take" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7.' There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand. it derives from Art. III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III. the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the C'.A>urt has re~
jected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete
See, e. g.. Dulce Powe1· ro. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hou~ing
Dev. r'orp . 429 LT. S. 252, 260-261 (1977) ; Wa1·th v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975) ; Lmda. R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973).
1

Earh of t heH' caHr" rejrct:s £•qtlir itl:,. tlw view, once rxpressed by Mr. Justice Harlan and now appareutl~· p,.:,pou~l'U by the Court, that the personal
stake rf'quir<'mcut la('b eou;;titutiollal ::;ignifieanrr. Ante, at 16~n.
11·
FIMt ,.. Cohl'll, ;m ~ U. S. 83, 120 (190R) (Harlan, J., dis::<rntiug). Until
today, however, that Yicw never had commanded <t majority.

78-572-DISSENT
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3

in.iury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org. , 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976). 2
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record. 3 But an actual
case or co11 troversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be extant at all stages of review.'" Pre·iser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.
395, 401 (1975) , quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459 , n. 10 (1974) . Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot afl'ect the rights of litigants in the
case before them." North Carolina v. "Q,ice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Hawort h, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (19"74) (per curiarn).4
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review eannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393,I 401,
2 See, e. g.. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227
(1974) ; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge
No . 107 v. Jrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167 (1972) ; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U. S. 727, 73fr-738 (1972) ; Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)
(per curiam) . The rule is tlw same when the quest,ion is mootness and a
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the ca<:>e. Ashc1'oft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per

CUI'iam) .
3 See 1:3 C. Wright,, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, itt. 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974).
~See . e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC
v. Medical C'omrn. for Human Rights, 404 U . S. 403, 407 (1972); PoweU
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969) ; Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375.
U. S.:301, 306, n. 3 (1964) .

78-572-DISSENT
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. Sibron v. New Yorlc, 392 U.S. 40,53-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 ~
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 21qru. S.
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposition" in the law of standing "to which the federal ·courts have
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617
(1968). 0 We have insisted upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em5 The Court stn te. that. "thr erosion of the strict formalistic perception
of Art. III wa;.; begun well before today'::; drci:sion," and that the Art. III
prrsonal stakr requiremrnt i;: "riddl('d with exe(•ptionf'." Ante, at 16, n. 11.
It faib, howrwr, to eite a ~inglr C'omt opinion in support of either sttLtemrnt. To the rxtent that the clrci~ion in Flast v. Cohen, :~92 U. S. 83
(l!J68), support:; tho po"ition a.~cribrcl to it in t.hr cli:ssent, id., at 117-120,
it do<>,; not ~urvivr tlw long line of Pxpre"s holdings that began with
Warth v. Seldin, -!22 U. 8. 490 (Hl7.1) , and wen' reaflirmrd only last
Trrm. Gladstone, Uealtors v. Village of Bellwood. 441 U. S. 91, 99
(1979). 8re 1111. 1 & 2, supm. Evrn hrfore Warth. a IIJidiq§ cownenta-+e>r ob:<rrwd that thP per:soual ::;tak!' requirrment had no exer 1tions.
Davis, iStanillll!!l Ttt.IJlt19 or ttl!EI 9lhtiS, Bli U: t;;hi: Is: lli)f 8QI, 616, 617,

(1968).

\
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bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seld-in, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., conCUtTing in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974) .
II
The foregomg decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the cla s." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by !the named plaintiff]." Sosna v.lowa, ~:>'Upra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may· supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman 'l'ransportat'ion Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. 1owa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been ct>rtified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
perso11al stake in the litiga tio11 .G In the words of his own
G. -o OIH' ,;uggrst~ that rrspondPnt could bP affrctrd per,.:onall~, by any
ruling ou thr cia;;,; certifieation qurstion t.hnt is remanded today. In fact,
the Court apparently <·onerdrs that rr:-~pondrnt ha~ no prrsonal stake-"in
the traditional ~Pn;o;r ' -in oLktming certification. Ante, at 14.
Several pri~oner~ now 111 frderal ru::;t{)dy have filed a motion to inter-
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per~
sonal relief" in this case. 'rr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111. n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class representative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III
vene as partieR r<'~pondent in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a. ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for certioran in thi::; Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too bte to save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432
U. S. 385 (1977).
1 RrsJJondent '~ lnwycr openrd his argum('nt. by sa:ving that "[t]he
mootne~s question in this case is, from a pructical standpoint, not very
significm1t." lf the artion is held moot he plans simply to "file a new
case" 011 brhalf of prisoner;; ,;erving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.
On the ba~i,:; of thi::; represPntation by counsel, there is reason to believe
tha.t. member~ of the ]Hit.ativr cla~<s at i:,;sue ultimately will be included in a
clas · action thnt will not moot out.
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may be met "thwugh means other than the traditional require~
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.
A

In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937). 8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality 'Of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plai11tiffs' convictions
had brought their detentions to al1 end. The Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
8 Certification is no merr formality.
It represents a judicial finding
that injured partie,; other thau the named plaintiff exist. It also provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed class members in the outcome; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification,
class members cau be crrtain that the action will not be settled or
dismis.~rd withouL appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H.
Newberg Cla~:~s A(·tion~ § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the Precertification State: Is 1\otice Required?, 56 N. C. L.
Rev. :303 (19i8). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the nam!:'d plaintiff. of a duty adequately to repr!:'sent the entire
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examme his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it be found wantii1g, the Court may seek a substitute
representative or even dE>certify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ( 1),
23 (d); f:'t'e 1 H. NewhPrg, supm, § 2192; Comment., Continuation arid
Repre~entat.ion of Clas.~ Actions Following Di~missa.I of the Class Representative, Hl74 Duke L .•J. 573, 58!+--590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no cliffcrPnt in principle from more tra.dit.ional represPntative actions
involving, for example, a ~ingle pa.rty who ce~nnot participate himself
beeau;;e of hi::; incompetence but i:s permitted to litiga.te through an appointed fiduciary
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was unnPcessary. The action continued only because of the
transitory nature of pretrial Jetention, which placed the
·c laim wi thin "that narrow class of cases'' that are "disti11ctly
'capabk of repetition, yet evading review.~" 420 U. S., at
110. n. 11. 0
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class cPrtification notwithstai1ding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. But neithe1· case holds
that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal
stake in the outcome. In ·McDonald, a putative class member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certifieation ruli11g. 4:32 (T. S .. at 3~0.
Because the Court found
that her claim 'vas not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intrrvPnor's claim for f('liPf had not expired.n At most,
M cDouald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties v.·ithin prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify
10

9 Tlw

C'omt ',- Gersll,in :1 n:t1~ · ,;1 ~, whirh E>mphatiizf'd that. " rp]r<'trial de~
tention is hy nature trmpomry" and tlmt " rtJhe individual could ...
:,utTer repratrd drprivation~" with uo acce:;..,; to rE-dress, falls squarely
wit.hin the mlr of Southern Pac . Terminal v. JCC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911). SPe Roe"· Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we haYc nott•d that the ('Ontimmtion of the actiou will depend "'es pe~
rially I upon] thp reality of the claim that, otherwise the i~ue would evade
review."' Swtshe1' v. Brady. 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. iowa, 419 U. S. 30:3, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitutjons are
incon,;i~tent with t.he concept. of "fl exible" mootness and the redefinition of
"personal ~ta ke " adoptrd today .
10 The ilHliYidual <·lailll" of tlw ori!(inal nanwd plaiutjffs had bern settled
after judgmrnt on th<• qur:-;tion of liability. 432 P. S., at ;{89, :~93, n. 14.
11 Thi., rxtPnsin· inqnir~· II'OIIld lwvp heP n uma·cL,>':>ary if, a,:; thf' Court
holds today, the iutervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
is~ue it"elf. Sin('e tlw prrsent respondent '~ claim long since has "expired,"
he stands in the &tmo position a" a member of the putative class whose
claim has "expired" by rear:,on of the statute of limitatiolll),
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. J n
Roper, the Court holds that a tl1tft1~ phtinti'tt"'W1w 1i'as pre
vailed on the merits may appe the denial of class certifica
tion because of a "eritical distinction" between mootne
deriving from a judgment and mootuess resulting from event
extrinsie to the Ji ·~ation. Ante, a t - (slip op., at 9). When
a prevailing
rty seeks review of a ruling collateral to the
judgme1 , oper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirect!
to t
q uest1o11 of appealability. I d., at 7, 12. Roper als
s gests that a named plaintiff whose judgment is satisfie
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation cost
with the class. ld., at 10, n. 8.
It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision ill this
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing
costs herf' . Moreovrr, since respondenes claim was mooted
by an extrinsic event-his unconditipmtlrelease from prison
the distinction Hlentificd in Jl,<Jper as "critical" is absent i
this case. l d. , at n.
P need not accept that distinctim
as sound to cone P that Roper affol·ds only illusory suppor
for the Court'~" ruling h 'rc.

B
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctriue in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 P. S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradj01·d, 423 F. R. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to bf'come second class precedents,.
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12·, n. 7. But
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the cases are rpccnt and carefully considered decisions of thi~
Court. They applied long' settled principles of Art. III juris~
prudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded trea~
ment of these "less fiexibie" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
tstated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130. 12
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431,. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n. 1 ( 1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
12 The Yitalit~r of 1h0 Jacobs result is undf'r;.:cored by the repeated
dictum tha.t a properly CPrtified class is necessary to supply adverseness
OJWP the named plaintiff's <"iaim becomes moot.
East Texas Motor Freight
v. Rodriguez , 431 r . s. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); /!'ranks V. Bow·man TransportatiOn Co .. supra. 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756: sf'e K1'emens v.
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); R-ichardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (197 4) . Conversely, we ha.ve often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filf'd a.nd at the time of certific<ttion. Kl'emens "· Bartley. s·upm, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN . ,J., clis:,enting) ; Sosna v.Iowa, 419 U.S., at 4,02, 403; Sfile
Bell v. Wolfish, U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki~. Redhail, 434
s. 374, ~82, 11. 9 (1978) .

u.
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423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spanqler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs beca.use we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise. 13 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a
stake in the merits.
18 In some drcnmslanees, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of
third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 11:3 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953) .
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and accompanying te.·t,
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The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification q uestion. 14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake"
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute cap·able of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. 1 "
In a footnote, aniP, at 18, n. 11, the Court states:
"Thi,.; rf'spondput ~ufi'Pred aetna!, concrete injury as a result of the
putativf'l~· illegal conduct, and this injury would sa.t.isfy the formalistic
pPrsonal stak<' n•quirrmr•nt if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v..
McCormack, 395 U.S., at 495-500."
This nppenrs to be a categoriea.l claim of the actual, concrete injury our
Ctlf'<'::i have rpquitwl. YPt, again, t.he Court fail;; to identify the injury.
The n>ferenrfl to damages i;:; irrelevant here, a;; respondent sought no
damagf,;-only injunctive and dfclaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for
rc:;pondent frankly conc·eded that his client "can obtain absolutely no
additional per:-;onal rPlief" in thi~ rase. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court
SPriou"ly i:; (•laimiug eoncret.p injury "at all stagPS of review," see p. 3,
supm, it would ~ h<' helpful for it to identify specifically this injury
that was not. apparc•nt to re:;pondent's counsel.
1 " The Court. attempt~> to limit t.hc sweeping consfquences that could flow
from the application of thPse criteria, sec infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by
a:;sprting that "[e]ach cn;:;e mw;t, be decided on its own fa.cts" on the basis
of " pract.ira.!ities and prudential con:>iderations." Ante, at 17, n. 11. The
Court long has reeognized a differpnce between the prudential and constitutional aspect<'! of tlw ~tanding and mootness doctrinPs. See p. 2, supra.
I am not. aware that the Court, unt.il today, ever has mergf'd tht'se considerationR for the purpor,;fl of eliminating the Art. III requirfmfnt. of a personal ,;takP in th<~ Jitigati011. The Court cites no prior case for this view.
Morrovrr, t ht> Court. PXpoumb no limiting principle of any kind . Adver:;e
practical con~cqu<'ll<'ei:i, eveu if relevant to Art. III analysi8, cannot. ·ju:stify
14
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend . . .
tho jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of At't. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence. they operate only in "'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.,." Franks· v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8. quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none. 16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
today',; holding as nonr whaleYer would flow from a finding of mootness. \
See n. 15, infra. Nor doe:-: the Comt':; reliance upon a "relation back
prineiplr," ante, at lR, n. 11, further the anuJy:;is. Although this fiction
may provide a ,.:horthand labrl for the Court';; conclusion, it is hardly a
principle nncl ('c>rtainly not. a limiting one.
16
The Court often ba~ rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute"
alone is sufficient to ronfer juri:srliction. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418

U. S. 24, 35-36 (19i4); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (pel'
c·uriarn) ..
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action brought by a public spirited citizen. 17 Although we
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice. 18
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
17 The Court~ a:<,-ertmn
to tllfl contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the rrcord to suggr~(. that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found " right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that re"pondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for hi• att<'mpt to repre,;ent a class. The class claims were added
to his complaint only beeause his lawyer" feared that mootness might
terminate the actiOn . App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wi~h es to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his interest hal> nothmg to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the ''primary benefits of cla.ss suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surpming nor impropPr thnt respondent. s110uld be concerned with
parole procedure:;. But ·respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generali~ ed mterest of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public aetwn" to improve the operation of a parole system.
18 The Comt ,.: ,·irw lo11:i<·ally eannot be confined to moot cnses.
If a
plaintJJf who is relensed from prison the day after filing a class actwn
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the cla~;s, why should
a plaintiff who is released thr day before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III mat1rr, thrrc can l.Je no difference.
Even on prudential ground~, there is little difference between this action
and one filed promptly upon relea<:<e. In the present ca~;e , this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At
the same time, it. has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in
turn reversed thr judgml'nL of the Di:>trict Court. No determination on
any issue is left :'itanding. For every practical purpose, the action must
begin anew-thi;:; t1me without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations,
in favor of a findmg of mootness could scarcely be more compelling,
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stake in such ancillary 11 claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act). quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 V. S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration. 111
10 I do not. imply that the rrsuit'. reached today i:; necessary in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
See note 13, supm. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to fntst.ration through sequential settlement offers
that "pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
(slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute
Bank v. Roper, ante, at plaintiffs be deterred b)· the notice costs that attend certification of a class
under Rule 23 (b) (3).
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
pf Art. III. 20

IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class reprehere-no longer has the slightest .in-.
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court·; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21
I would vacate the decision of the Court· of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
~entative-respondent

20 The Court'~ rffort ~ to "save" this artion from mootnes.~ lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing
is said about the Dist.rict Court's ruliz}g on the merits or its refusal to
certify the broad class sought by respondel).t. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in fajling
to consider the pos~>ibility of subclasses s·ua sponte. Nevertheless, respondent-or his lawyer-is given the opporturuty to raise the subclass
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a
litigant may not rajse on appeal those iS~>ues he has fa.iled to preserve by
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus
making a motion for subrlastles a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertajned
such a motion . Since respondent sought certification in the first place only
to avoid mootncss on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the
merits cannot excuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the
Distriet Court thereaftrr.
~ 1 I imply no critici,;m of rotm:;el in this case. The Court. of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and th&
'case was brought to this Court by the United States,
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In Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff whose judgment is
satisfied may retain a personal stake in sharing litigation costs
with the class.

Ante, at

(Slip Op. at 7 n. 6, 10).

Finding

..

that Art. III is satisfied by this continuing economic interest,
Roper reasons that the rules of federal practice governing
appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural
rulings that are collateral to a generally favorable judgment.
id., at 7, 9-10.

See

The Court concludes that the denial of class

certification falls within this category, as long as the appellants
"assert a continuing stake in the outcome of the appeal."

Id., at
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personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III.

Here, there is

not even a speculative interest in sharing costs, and respondent
positively denies that any of his individual interests will be
affected by the appeal.

See p. 6, supra.

Thus, a fact that was

critical to the analysis in Roper is absent in this case.

One need

not accept that analysis as sound to conclude that it affords no
support for the Court's ruling here.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirements with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have held that the perii!rctl st!tlte requirement has a
.double aspect. On the one han , it derives from Art. III ·
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies self-~mposed restraints on the exercise of judicial
power. E. g., &ngleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The prudential
aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine of uncertain
contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional minimum has
been given definite content: "[i]n order to satisfy Art. III,
the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatene9. injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete
injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Bastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976). 2
1 See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Mlington Heights v. M etropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp. 429 U . S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973).
2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. R eservists to Stop the Wm·, 418 U. S. 208, 227
(1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge
·No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may come into play
after the parties have invested substantial resources in an
action and generated a factual record. But an actual case
or controversy in the constitutional sense "must be extant at
all stages of review." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452,
459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are moot
because "federal courts are without power to decide questions
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation flows directly
from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odega,ard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974)
(per curiam) .8
Since the question is one of power, practical considerations
do not control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 , n. 9 (1975);
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974); United States
v. Alaska S. B. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920). Nor can public
interest in the resolution of an issue replace the necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. Odegaard,
supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong
may supply the individual interest in some circumstances.
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53- 5-8 (1968). So, too, may
the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently transitory
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)
(pe1· curiam). The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a
litigant can assert no moro than emotional involvement in what remains
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per
curiam).
8 See, e. g., Pre·iser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC
v . .Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375
u.s. 301, n. 3 (1964) .
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that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of litigation.
Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. llS.
(1974); Southern P,ac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498,
515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional requirement is simply ~~showing of continuing or threatened
injury at the hands of the adversa.ry.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the persona.! stake requirement sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601,
613-614 (1968). We nevertheles have insisted upon the requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democra.tic society;"
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative elass representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
23 can it "acquir [e] a legal status separate from the interests
aserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at

I
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399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the persona.l stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the litigation. 4 In the words of his own
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 5 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently and constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
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The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The~ cases
inel~ Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975),
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and
today's decision in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper,
ante, p. - . Each case is said to show that a class action is
not necessarily mooted by the loss of the class representative's
personal stake in the merits, even though no class has been
certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itseif is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III may be met "through
means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal
-stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. · The Court grievously
misreads these precedents, for they show nothing of the kind.

A
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. A~tna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
( 1937) .6 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
6 Certification is no mere formality.
It represents a judicial finding
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed cla13s members in the outcome; only
after certification will they be bound by the outcome. After certification, the action cannot be settled or dismissed without the approval of
the court and appropriate notice to class members. F ed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 (e). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on tho named plaintiffs of a duty adequa.toly to represent the entire
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot, the court can
monitor his performance and decertify the class under Rule 23 if he
defaults in this responsibility. After certifica.tion, the case is no different
in principle from more traditional representative a.ctions involving, for
example, a si11gle party who cannot participate himself because of his
incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary .

..

...
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·established by nonclass action cases that never has been
thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome. Gerstein held that a class action challenging the
constitutionality of pretrial detention pro()edures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions had brought their
detentions to an end. The action did not continue because a
personal stake in the outcome on the merits was :unnecessary.
Rather, the lawsuit fell in "that narrow Class of ()ases" that
are "distinctly 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' "
420 U. S., at 110, n. 11. 7
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case departs
from traditional understandings of the personal stake requirement. In McDonald, a putative class member intervened
within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification
ruling. 432 U. S., at 390.8 Because the Court found that
her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired. 9 At most,
The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could .. .
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'especially [upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade
review."' Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitations themselves are inconsist.e nt with the concept of ":flexible" mootness and the
redefinition of "personal stake" adopted today.
8 The individual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been settled
after a judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393,
n. 14.
9
This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
7

':
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McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
g·ratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In
Roper, the Court is careful to explain that a named plaintiff
who has prevailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class
certification because of a "critical distinction" between mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from
events extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, at (slip op., at
9). When a judgment has been entered, Roper concludes,
Art. III is relevant only indirectly to the question of appealability. !d., at 7, 12. Roper also suggests that a named
plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied may retain an economic
interest in sharing litigation costs with the class. I d., at 10,_-r?"'-z>-.:r--n. 8.
It is far from apparent how lu:!se tw8 case;t can be recon .. .
ciled. The Court does not identify an economic interest in
this case. Moreover, since this case was mooted by an
extrinsic event-the only plaintiff's unconditional release from
prison-a "critical distinction" identified in Roper is absent
here. That distinction fairly may be criticized. Ante, at
- . But the fact remains that Roper does not purport to
disturb the fundamental rule that a plaintiff who can no
longer assert a concrete injury remediable by judicial action
has ceased to present a case cognizable in an Art. III court.
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired,"
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class whose
claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations .

,....
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B
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and therefore less authoritative-established Art. III doctrine in cases
0losely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School Comm'rs v.
Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1075) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 ( 1976).
As they are about to become second class precedents, these
cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But the
cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class a.ction to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130.'10
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431. Sec also Ba.1:ter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bmdford, where
10 In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of
third parties in snpport of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953).
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid., see n. 2, supra, and accompanying text.

I
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the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spangler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact. that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise. 11 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
11 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated
dictum that a properly certified class is necessa ry to supply adverseness
onc-e the named palintiff's claim becomes moot. East T exas Motor Freight
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756; see Kremens v.
Bartley , 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named pla.intiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402; see
Bell v. Wolfish,- U. S. - , --, n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. R edhail, 434
U.S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978) ,

I'
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disturbing. The Court splits the class asn cts of this action
into two separate "claims": t hat the acti01 may be maintained
by respondent on behalf of a class, and hat the class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has been certified,
the Court concedes that the claim on the merits is moot.
Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a personal
stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a stake in
the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question. Instead, respondent's "personal stake"
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do with
any concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ...
tho jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general

12

1

concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurispru- ~dence, they E.re an aspect of those "policy rules often invoked~
4 .. ~
by the court 'to avoid passing prematurely on constitutional "'Y" vl9questions.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
rl.~ -~./"
U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S.
1'- ~83, 97 (1968). Such rul~ operate only in "'cases confessedly
vc.. ~Jt'
.,_wl
within [the Court's] junsdiction.'" ~~tlbid. The Court cites
~
no decision that has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharp1y presented issue in a concrete and vigorously
argued case, and I am aware of none. 12 Indeed, each of these
~
- ·
characteristics is sure to be present in the typical "privat
attorney general" action brought by a public spirited citizen. 13
Although we have refused steadfastly to countenance the
"public action," the Court's redefinition of the personal stake
requirement leaves no principled basis for that practice. 14

rv.

/.6

12 The Court has twice rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute"
alone is sufficient to confer juriRdiction. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per cu1iam).
13 Tho Court's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there ·is
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-foun'd "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respondent's interest in tho merits was the sole motivation for his a.t tempt to represent a State. The class claims were a.dded
to his ·complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as dist.inguished from his
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
p:u~le procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
14 Tho Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot cases.
If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action
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The Court reasons that bQis departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III master, there can be no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the case must
begin anew-this time without a plaintiff. It is difficult to imagine a
case in which the prudential considerations aligned against a finding of
mootness are less compelling.

·,,

.
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questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different " 'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration. 15
But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. III. 1 6
15 I do not imply that the result reached today is nPce~8ary in any
way to the continued vitality of the rla~s-action device. On the contrary,
t.he practical impact of finding mootnP~s in this case would be slight indred.
SPe note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seck injunctive or declaratory rPliPf. Such
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential srtt lPmcnt offers
that "pick off" cnch intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
Bank v. Roper, ante, at (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class
under Rule 23 (b) (3).
16 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootnesR lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal rolr of a reviewing court. Thr Court
fails to identify how, if at all , thr Di~t.rict Court has erred. Nothing
is said about the District Court's ruling on the mrrits, or its refusal to
certify the broad class sought. by respondent. Nor does the Court suggest that the District Court. erred in failing to con~ider the possibility of
subcla~ses sua sponte. Nevcrthcle~s, respondent-or his lawyer-is given
the opportunity to raiFe the subclns:; question on remand. That result
cannot be squared with thr rule that a litigant may not raise on appeal
those issues he has failed to preserve by a.ppropriate objection in the
court below. The Court intimates thnt the District Comi waited too
long to deny the class certification motion, thus making a motion for
subclnsses a "futile act." Ante, a.t, 17. But nothing in the record Puggests that. the District, Court would not have entertained such a motion.
Since rePponclt'nt seught certification in the first. place only to avoid
mootness on appeal, the entry of an order againt him on the merits
cannot excuse him from raising the subclaBs issue thereafter.

-
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IV
n short, ~9al with a case in which the putative class
representative-respondent here'-no longer has the slightest
interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendant and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 17
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
17 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case.
The Court of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the
case was brought to this Court by the United States .
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·..

1-24-80

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

l

No. 78-572

Uuitcd ~ tates Parol<' Commission On W.rit of CPrtiorari to
ct a.l., Petitioners,
tlw Gnited Stat<'s ( 'ourt
v.
of Appeals for the Third
John l\IJ. Ut·raghty.
C'ireuit.
[February - , 1080]

MR.

J1 r ~rrLC~}

PowELL, diss<'IIting.
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The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First. it says
that uwotness is a "flexible'' doetrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to " uontraditional' ' forms of litigation. Ante, at
8- 12. Srcond. the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney g<'ll<:'ral concept''
to appeal th0 dt>nial of class C(•rtification evc11 when his personal clain1 for relief is moot. A11te, at 12- W. Both steps
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Accordingly, 1 disse 11 t.
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I
As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal
stake" aspect of thr mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. · There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff
could present for j uclicial resolution. · The question is '"·hether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may- through counsel-continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirrment with some care. When the issue is presented at thr outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have held that the persoua] stake requirement has a
double aspect. Ou thr one ham!. it derives from Art. III
limitations on thf' power of tlw federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints ou the exercise
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. ~. 106, 112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The
prudential asp0ct of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
of uncertain contours.
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the drfendant. " Gladstone, Realtors v.
llillage of Helhoood, 441 F R. !H, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, thP Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract collcem with a subject-or with the rights of third parties- for "the concrete
injury required by Art. III.'' Simon Y. Easterr1 Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 4261!. R. 26. 40 (1976). 2
1 Se<>, e. q .. Duke PnweJ' C'n. v. Carolhw Environme11tal Study Group,
Inc., 4:38 l'. S. 59. 72 (1971') ; Ar!i?Lyton lfeiyhts \' . Jletropolitan llou8ing
Dev. Corp . .J-:2\J F. 8 . :25:2, :.W0-:2(i1 (1977): lVnrth \'. 8rldiu, .J-2:2 lf. S.
490 . .J-09 (1975): [,i-!1(/a H . .S. v. llicharrl D .. -J.l() l'. S. (i1-J., 617 (1073).
2
St'P, e. r; .. Schli!siur;er \'.Reservists to Stop the War, -J.li'\ U. 8. :208, 227
(197-!) ; O'Shea \'. Littleton , 414 11. R. 4~~, -J.!J-J. (1\IH) ; Jfoose Lodge
No . 107 v . Uvis, 407 1J. 8.16:3, 166- 167 (1972) ; .S1:ara Club v. Nfortou, -!05,
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As the Court not<>s today, the same threshold requirement
must b(• satisfiPd throughout thr action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 4H) F. R. 393, 402 (1975). Pmdential collsiderations not prrsPnt at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which aft0r the parties have in vested substantial resources in an action and generatNl a factual record."
But an actual case or controversy in the constitutional sense
"must he <>xtant at all stages of review." Steffel"· Thompson,
415 1T. S. 452. 459, n. 10 (1074). Casrs that no longer
"'toucfh I th0 legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests' " arc moot brcause "frderal courts are without power
to decidr questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in
the case b(•fore them." !\'orth Carolina\'. Hice, 404 'U.S. 244,
246 ( H)71) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. R. 227. 240-241 (10:37). The limitation
flows directly from Art. J[[. DeF'Uizis Y. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per w .n'am).'1
Since the question is one of pow·er, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna Y. Iowa, 410 P. S. 3n3. 401,
n. 9 (1975); Richardson"· Ramirez, 418 F. S. 24. 36 (1074);
Utzited States, .. Alaska S. S. C'o., 253 r. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public iuterest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcomP. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual intPrest in some circumU. S. 7'27, 7:36-7:~~ ( 1!17:2): '1'11eston Y. [ '/luuw, :n~ l ' . 8 . .J-.J-. -Hi (Hl.J-:n
(per cul'iam) . Tht> ruh• i~ th<' ~amp wlwn tlw <flll'><fion i>< mootn<'S>< and tL
litigant. r·an a><><<'rt no mon· than l'motioual invoJwmPni in what remain><
of the <·a.~e. Ashdoft \'. Matti~S . .t:H ll . S. 171, 17:2-173 (1977) (pe1'
curiam).
3 SP<' 1:~ C. ·wright, A :\Tiller, and E. C'oopN, F<·<lPral Prartieo and ProccdurP § :35:{:~, at :2H5 (1D75): XotP, The ..\foofnP:<R Dodrine in the
Supn•m<• Court , !-X Han·. L. HPv. :{7:3, :3/ti-:377 (1U7.J-).
4
SrP, e. (f .. i'l'e1~~er v. Neu•kil'k, 422 lJ . S. :395, .J-01-1-02 (1975): SEC
v. Medical Comm . jol' llu111an l?ioht:;, .J-O.J- U. 8. -40:3, .J-07 (HJ7:Z); J>oll'ell
v. Mr·Comwck , :3!-.l.'i l'. 8. -1-l<fj, -l9U, u. i ( Wti\!) ; Line1· r Jajcu , Inc ., a75
U . S. :301 , :30ti, n. 3 (JOG-!).
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staHces. Sibr-on v. New York, 392 U.S. 40. 33-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated futur<' injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigatio11. Super Tire Enuineering Co. Y. McCorkle, 416 U.S.
115 (1974); Souther// Pac. Terminal Uo. v. ICC, 219. U. S.
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducihk constitutional
requiremeu t is simply a non frivolous shov,:ing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view toclay, that the core requirement of a JWrsonal stake in the
outcorne is not "flexible." Indeed , the personal stake requirement sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. G01,
G13- G14 (1968) . \Ve nC'vertheless have insisted upon thC' requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin , 422 e. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, u11til today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ke·ntucky ·welfare Rights Urg., s·upra, at 60 (Bm~NNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974) .

II
The foregoiug decisions C'stablish principles that the Court
has applied consiste11tly. These principle's were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class. " O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a cla~s has beC'n certified in accordance with Rule
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
aserted by [the named plaintiffj ." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the perso11al stake required by Art. Ill when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff uo longer has any
personal stake in the litigation.r. In the words of his own
lawyer, rPsponclent "call obtai11 absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg .. at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in conti11uing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons prPsently incarcerated. Jbid. 0 ln these circumstances, Art. III and the precede11ts of this Court require
dismissal. But th<> Court views the case differently, and con5 Xo OllP ~ugg<•:;t~ that rC'~pondent C"onld lw alfl'et<>d prrsonall~· by any
ruling on t IH· C"ia~,; rrrt ifiration qul'stion t.hat i~ n·maJJdrd today. In fact,
the Court. apparr11tl~· <·onr<·de~ that n•,;pondent ha~ 110 Jl<'l'l'iOil!tl ::;tah~'·jn
the traditwnal ,.;('11~(·"-ill oLt.aining certification. Ante. at 14.
Several pri::;oner,.; now in fPderal eu,;tody han' fil<'d a motion to intervene a:> partit•,.; re"pondent. in thi" Court. Although tiH• Court. do<·~ not,
rule on thal motion, I note that tlw motion wa:s rcc<·ived well over 11
year aft f'f re~pond<·nt. wa,.; relea:;ed from pri,.;on. In the interim, rcsponclPnt. obtained a ruling from the Court, of App<•;tl,; <llld filrd hi::;
petition for eertiorari in thi,.; Court. Such untinH'l~· intrrvention <·omes
too lat n to savp tiH' adion undPr l'·nited Ai1 1 Liuel! Y. J1cDonald, .f32
U. S. 385 (1977).
6 Hr~poncJPnt '~ Jaw~·(')' Opl'nNJ hi,; argtll11<'11 f IJ~· ~a~· iug that " (f) he
mootne,;,; rpJl':';t ion in thi,., C'a,.;<· i,.;, !'rom a pract ira! ,.;land point., 110l Yery
significant.'' H the aetion i~ lwld moot he plan~ ~imp]~· to "file a new
ca~e" on lwhalf of prisoner~ "<'n·ing longPr t<'l'm~. On thP ba,;i~ of thi:;
re])l'l't<Pntation b.'· <·oun,.;pl, tlH•rn i,; n•ason t.o bPii<'V<' that member,; of the
putativ<' C"la,.;~ at i~;:;IH' ultimaf .rl~· will br indudl'<l in a cia~,; action that will
not moot oul. Tr. of Oral Arg . 25.
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-aJ](l without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III moot11ess doctri11e":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible'' mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are .i11clude Gerstei·n v. Puyh, 420 U. S.
103, 110- 111, n. 11 (HJ75). United Airlines, Inc.\'. McDonald,
432 'G. R. 3~5 (1D77). and today's decision in Deposit Guarauty
Nat. Bank "· Hoper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not n1ooted by the loss of the class representative's JWrsoHal stak(' in th0 outcome. Pven though 110 class
has bef'n certifiNl. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself is cited for the
propositio11 that the requirements of Art. II f may be met
uthrough. means other than the traditional req ui reJtWll t of a
'personal stake in the outcome.'" A1de, at 15. The Court
grievously misr<'ads these precedents, for they show nothing
of the kind.

A
In Sos11a, th<' Court simply aekuowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse par·ties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. Y. Haworth, 300 F. S. 227, 240
( H.J37) : And in Gerstein , the Court applied a rule loug
7 Crr1ification j, no mPn' fonnnlit~· .
H rrpre~<'u(~ rt .itH.lieiHI fill(ling
tha.t injured parliPs othPr tha!l tlw lHtlllPd pla.i11tiff Pxi"t. It al~o ]ll'ovide~
a definition b~· whieh thP.v c·ar1 be ideJl(.ifiPd . C!'rtif"icnt ion identif"ic•f; and
sharpens tht• inl!'r!'st:; of unn:mwcl cla;.;::; mPmlwr>< in the mttc·onw ; only
after tl't'li.ticntion will tlw~· he bouml h~· thP outeornP . After c·c·rlifiea~
t.ion, c·la"" nwmhrr~ c·ttn lw <'rrtain thnt the netion will Hot he ~ettlrcl or
cli;:mi:<sc·d without. approprintc· Jlolil'e . Frcl. Hulc CiY. Proc. :2:~ (('): :-) H .
KewbC'rg Clas. Action~ § ,')050 (Hl7'i); ef. Allll<IIHI Srtnillg Hulc• :2:) Cle~"s
Artions at. the l'rc•c·ertification Rtatc: Is :\'otie<> H<'quirPd'!, .'i(i Y C. L.
Hev, 303 ( lUi.S) . Yigorou,.; achoc·ac·J· i::; n:<,.:ured by the authoritative impo:;i-
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established-outside the class actio11 contf•xt--Ly cases that
never have bN•n thought to erode tlw rPquirement of a personal stake in th(' outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of prc•trial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought thPir clcteu tions to an end. The• Court did not
suggest that action a personal stake in the outcome 011 the
merits was unnecessary. The action continued 01dy b<•cause
of the transitory natun' of pretrial detention, which placed
the lawsuit within "that narrow class of cases'' that are "distinctly "capabl<' of repetition , yet evading review.'" 420
u. R.. at llO. II. 11.8
McDonald and Roper sanction sonw appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds
tion on the llHilll'd plaintiff:< of a dnt~· adPqiiHIPI~· to I'<'J)I'f'>"<'lll· thP r11tire
clas:;. If t,Il(' ll:llllC'd pia in tiff'" own <·Ia irn be rom<'" moot a 1'tl' l' <·Ntifil'a tion,
the conrt. <·an r<·-<·x<~minr hi:-' aiJilit~· to reprr~l'llt thP inl<•rr~l" of cla~s
mrmhrr~ . Should it. b<' foulld wanting. thr Court ma~ · ~<'rk a ;.;uh:;titute
rrpr<'"<'nlalii'P or <'V<'Il. d<·<·Prtil\ thl\ <·las". FP<l. fhllc C'iv. l'ro<· . 2:) (e) (1),
28 (d) ; ~rr I H . X<·wberg, supm. § 2Hl2; CommPnt , Continuation and
TIPJll'f'"<'nta t.ion of Cia"" Actions Following Di~mi"'~al of I h<· Cia"" H.rprcsl'ntativ<', Hli4- DukP L . .T. 5i:~, 5kH-5!10, (i0:2-Go:3. After e<'rtitil':ttion, the
ca:;e i~ no ditl'Pr<'nl in prinl'iple from mor<' 1nulitioJt:il repn'"PJIIativP action~
involving, for <·xample, a ~in~IP party who ennno1 partieipnt.<• him~<'lf
beran~r of hi~ inrompl'tPnee hnl i,; IJ<'rmit.ted to litigate through an appoiniPd fidnciHry.
8 The Comt ',.; Gerstl:'in an:d.,·~i~, which rmpha~izNl that. "rplrclriHI deten lion iH b~· n:ttnn· tr·mpontry" and tha.t " I t]hl' individual <·onld ...
suli'cr n'pl'at('([ clepriva tion"" wi I h no Hl'<'l'~" to redre,..,~, fall" ~qua rely
wit.hin the rule of •"vuthem Pac . 1'enninal ' . ICC, 2Hl U. S. -!D~, 515
(1911). Sl'r Rtw \' . Wade. 4-10 ll . S. 11:3, 125 (1!1i3) . [n ~imilar ca:;es
we have noll'd that tlw eontinu:Liion of the a<'lion will dP]JPnd '' 'e~pe
cially fupon] th<• l'Palit~· of tiH• l'laim that. oth<·rwi"<' tht• i":;m• would pvadc
rr,·ic·w.' " Swisher u. Rnuly. 4-:)K l'. S. 204, 213, 11. 11 (19i~), quoting
Svsna r . lotCa, 4-Hl F . 8. ;ma, 4-02, 11. 11 (19i5). Thl'"C' limitations nn•
ineon"i~l< ·nl with ihr cmwPpl of "flexiblo" mootnl'i$~ Hml thr n·clrfinition of
"pcr:;onal t't<rko" adopted today
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that Art. ITT may bf' satisfie<..l in tlw abs('nC(' of a personal
stake in tlH' outcome. In J.I!IcDonald, a putative class member
intf'rvenE'd within thP statutory timC' li1nit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 e. s .. at 3DO." Bf'caUS!' thP Court found
that her elain1 was not tiuw-barred, the intrrwnor in ~!cDmiA.kld
possessed the stak(' IH:'Ct>ssary to pursue the action. lndef'd,
the Court fkvoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relif'f had not rxpirPd."' At most,
McDo·nald holds only that an action which is kPpt alivP by
illt('rested partiPs within prescribPd periods of lit11itations does
not "die'' in an Art. III sense.
Therp is dietum in Jfc/)ollald that the "rrfusal to certify
>vas subject to appellatP revit-w aftt>l' fi11al judg11Jent at the
bPhest of thP nanl<'d plai11tiffs .... " 432 r. S.. at 393. That
gratuitous senklle<'. rt"peatPd in C'oopers & Lybmnd v. Livesay,
437 r. R. 46:3. 4()!"J. 470. n. 15 (1978). apparently is elevated
by thf' Court's opi11ion in this case to tlw status of 1ww doctriiH'. Tlwr<> is sPrious tension between this new doctrine and
the llluch narrower reasoning adoptee! today in Hoper. Tn
Roper, tlw Court holds that a 11amed plaintiff who has prevailed on the uwrits n1ay apJwal thf' d<'llial of class ('ertification becausr. of a "critical distinction'' lwtwePil mootness
resulting from <'wnts <'xtrinsic to the litigation. A 11le, a t (slip op., at 0). \YIH'n a pr<'vailillg party sePks r<'Vi('\\' of a
ruling collateral to the judgment. Hop er concludes, Art. IJ[
is relevant only iudirectly to the quPstion of appealability.
!d., at 7, 12. HoJ!er also suggests that a nalllrd plaintiff whose
judgllwnt is satisfit>d may rPtain an economic intPrPst in sharing litigation costs with the class. I d., at 10, n. 8.
9 Tlu~ indi,·idual c·laim,.: of th!' original nanwd plaintiff,: had bP<'I1 >:rttkd
nfl<·r a. judg11wnt on thr qur,.:tion of li:thilit~·. -n.? r. ~., :1t :)r.~J, :\n:l. 11 . 1~.
1<> Thi~ t•xl<'ll:<i\'t' inquir~ · \\'ould ha,·r hP!'Il urnH 't'<'~sa r~ · if. a:< tlw C'omt
hold:; today, Lht• intNvenor had :1 per:<oltal ;-:tnkc in thP elu,;;-: <·Prtificatiou
i:<:>U<' il,.:<'ll'. ;-;irH'<' t lu· pn·:<<'nl l't'><Jlolldt•nt ',.: l'laim long :;iu<·!' ha .~ "Pxpired,"
he ,:land,; .in tlw ,.:aJlH' po:;itiou a~ a memlwr of till' putati,·<· ('Ia,:,; \\'h0:-<0'
claim ha:; "t'Xpin·tl'' hy n':l.~on of tll(l ,:Ia t 11 t <' of limi tal iou~ .
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It is far from apparent how Roper can br rrconciled with
this case. The Court does not identify an economic interest
here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted by an
extrinsic event-his unconditional release from prison-a "critical distinction" identified in Roper is absent in this case.
That distinction fairly may be criticizrd. /d., a t - (PowELL,
J., clissrnting). But the fact remains that Roper does not
purport to disturb thc• fundamental rule that a plaintiff who
can no longer assert a concrete injury remediable by judicial
action has ceased to prest•nt a case cognizable .in an Art. Ill
court.
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible ''-ancl therefore less authoritatiw-apply established Art. llf doctrine in
·cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 4:20 U.S. 128 (1975) (per cur-iam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 4:23 D. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City Boar·d of Hducation v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424. 430
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents,
these cases arr rrlegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12. n. 7. But
the cases arc recent and can'fully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And 110 Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue preseutecl here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
stated 011 the record that class treatment \Vas appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives. but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review . we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. \Ye held that the action was e11tirely moot because
the "class aetio11 was never properly certified nor the class
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properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130. 11
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status. Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 r. s., at 430-431. See also Baxter Y. Palmigiano, 425 F. S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). Alld in Br.adford, where
the District Court had denied certificatiou outright, the Court
held that the named plaintiff's release from1>risou required the
dismissal of his complaint about r>arole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & 1-'Fater Div.
v. Craft, 436 e. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spang'ler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment 011 the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification 011ly because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the ora1 certification order in
Jacobs because we recoguized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
11 The vita lit_,. of the Jacobs result is under~('on•d by t.Jw l'P]WHtPd
dictum tlmt. a propc•rly certified clas,; i~ ne<:e~~ary to :suppb· adverseness
once the namPd plaintiff';-; ('!aim hrromC'~ moot. East Te.ta8 Motor l<'reiyht
v. Rodriguez. -t:H F . S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977) ; Prauks v. Bowma'll 'bau~;1J01'tation Co .. suwa, 4:24 U. S., at 754, n. (i. 755-756; SPl' K1'emens v ..
Ba·rtley, 4;31 l 1 . S. 119, 129-120 (1977) ; Richardsou v. Ramirez, 418 P. S ..
24, 39 (HJ7-1-). Couver,;ely, we hnve oflC'n ,;tated that the named plaintiff':s individual claim must be a live one both at. the timr the action is
filed and at the tunC' of certification. Kremens v. Bartley. supra, at 143,
n. 6 (B~tKNNAN, J .. di~~rntin~) : So~;na. Y. Iowa, 4Hl 1'. 8 .. at· .J-0:2, -1-0:3: ~ee
Bell v. Wolfish , - ll. S. - , - , n. 5, (197,1)) ; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434U. S. 37'4,. 3il2, n. 9 ( 197.8).
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well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class ce>rtification or otherwise.'" The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's 1ww concept of "flexibl0" mootness is
unprecedent0d, the content given that coucept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two s0paratP "claims'': (i) that tlw action may be maiutaiued by rcspomh'nt 011 lwhalf of a class. aud (ii) that the
class is eutitled to relief on the merits. Siuee no class has
been certified. th0 Court coucecles that tl1e claim o.n thr merits
is moot. Ante, at 15. 17. But r0spondent is said to have a
personal stake in his "procedural clai111" despite his lack of a
stake in the n1t>rits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be rrdressed by. or any benefit to respondeiJt that may accrue from. a favorable ruling on the
certification q u0stion. lnstrad, respond0n t 's "persoual stake"
is said to derive from two factors having nothiug to do with
any concrete iujury or stake in thr outcome. First, the
Court finds that the Fcd0ral Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a cla s certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains tlw "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution." which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
party actually contesting the case. A11te, at 14--15.
The Court's reliance on some new "right'' inhereut in Rule
IH some ('in·um~i.;mC'<'><, li1i~un1~ nrr IH·rmitic•cl to ar~~:uc• 1he righ1:; of
third partie>< in :-~upport. of th<'ir claim~. E. y., 8iuyleto11 v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106 , ll:3 (J!JiO) ; Bnrrotc8 ''·Jackson, a.Jti U. S. 249, 255-25ti (1953) .
In <'aeh ~uch ra:sr, hom:> \'Cr, tlw Court ha:; idPnt ifird a eorH·rl't!', ill(!ividual
injur~· ,;uffrrrd by rlw litigant hitn><!'lf. Ibid .; >'CC Jl. 2, Sll]n·o , and accompanying text.
12
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23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congr-ess may not
confer federal cour-t jurisdiction when Art. Ill dO('S not.
Gladstone, Realtors Y. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. 8 .. at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. 8 .. at 494. and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Crauch 137, 175-177 (180:3). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extrnd . . .
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .. , }i"cd.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the pcrso11al stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to per-mit litigation by a
party "vho has a stake of his o·wn but otherwise might be
bar-r<'d by prud~:•ntial standing rules. ~ee Warth v. Seldin,
422 T.. S .. at .)01; Sierra Club v. Nforton, 40.) U. ~-.at 737-738.
Since ueither Rule 23 nor the private attomry general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. llf requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete advPrseness. Although the components of the test are 110 strangers to our Art. Ill jurisprudence. th<>y operate only in " 'cases co nfessedly ·w ithin I the
Court's I jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bow111at1 Trans-portation
Co., 424
at 755- 756, and Jl. 8, quoting Flast Y. Cohell,
3D2 U. f-\. 83. 07 (Hl68). The Court citrs no derision Lhat
has prrmised jurisdiction upon tlw ban• existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concretP and vigorously ar-gu<•d case. ami
I am aware of none.'~ Indeed, Paeh of thesP character-istics is
sure to be present in the typical "pr-ivatE' attorney g~:•neral"
action brought by a public spirited citizell.u Although we

r. s..

Thr C'ourt oftc·n has rpjrctrd tlw ronlt'JI(,ion I hat a "::;pirikd d1~put<'"
nl01w j,; "uflki!'nt to C'OIIfC'r juri:;di<"t.ion . E. g., Hirlwrdson \'. Hamil'ez, -Ht>
U. S. 2-J., :35-:~6 (HJ7.J.) ; Ilall \'. Beals. :396 U. 8. 4:5, 48-·Hl (1Uti9) (per
13

curiam).

Tlw Court '~ a",.:p rtion to thn ront.rar~· nutwith"fandinl-( . llwn• i,;
nothing in tlw n ·l·ord to ,;uggp,;t. t.hat no,~pond<'llt has any inlPre"t what<'Yer
in his n<>w-found '· right. fo han' a (']a"s <'rrfified." A-nti", af 15. In fad ,
the l'Cl'Onl ~how,; that. rp,;pondr!lt',.: inll'rc,;t. in the IUE:'rit>< wa,.: the "olt' motinttion for hi:; altE:'mpt to repre,.:cnl a State. The tla~:; claim:; wPre addE:'cl
11
·
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have r0fuscd steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves 110 principl('d basis for that practice.u;
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As noted in Hoper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Anle,
at (slip op .. at 6). A11y attempt to irle11 tify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion fur class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
to his c·omplmnt. only lwenu~c his l aw~·er fean'<.! that, mootnP~~ might
termiuato th<• ac·tion. App., at. 17; Bripf for HPpoudrnt. :2:3, :~:3 . The
record doe:; not. !'<'veal wlwthcr re~pondent-aH di~tingui~lwd from hi ~
lawyer-now wi:-<he::; to C'ontimw with t.Jw <'a"'<' . If he doe"', it i:-< ei<'ar that
his inten·"'t ha~ nothing to do with the pro<·L•dural protetlion:> dr;,;<·riiJed
by thr Court. as the ''primary b<'nPfits of cia&; ::mit~. " Ante. at 1-J.. Hi~
neither :-<urpri:;ing !lOr improper that n·:-<pondl'nt. :-<houlcl be <·onc·L'flll'd with
parole procedure:-:. Hut n•spomlent'~ aetual irlt<'re~t i~ indi"'tingui:-<hable
from the g<•rwralizNI in1cn•"t of •L "private at .tome~· geJl<•ral'' who mighL
bring n '' public aetion " to improve the OJWrat.ion of a paroiP :;y~tem.
' 5 ThL· Court ',; \·i<'w logical!~· cannot. he confined to moot. ea~<'"'.
]f a
plaintiff who is released from pri~;on the day a ftcr .tiling a elm;~ ad ion
challenging parole guiclelim•:; may "e<'k C<'l'titieation of the ela:-<>', why Hhould
a plainti.tl.' who i:s rnl<'nsrd the clay bPfore filing Lhc :;uiL be barred'? As an
Art. III matter , hen· can I><' no difference .
EvPll on prudential grouncb, tlwre is little difft•n•n<·L· lw!w<'en thi~ <t<.: tion
and onf1 filf•d promptlr upon rPIC<k'e. Ln the pre~Pnt. <'as<', thi,; C'omt
has ruled on neith<'r the m<·rits nor tlw propriety of th<• <"Ia.~;:; act ion . At
the same timr, it, ha,.: va<"<tt<•d a judgml:'nt b~· tlw Court of Appeals that in
turn rever,;ed tlw judgment of the Di:;trict. Court . ?\o d<'l<·r·mination Oil
any i"~llP i" IPft "tanding. For <'ver~· practical Jllirpos<', tlw action nlllsi
begin nnl'w- thi" tim<' without. :t plaintiff. The· prudPntial eon,;id<'l'ations
in favor of a finding of mootnP~"' cou ld ::;can·ply be more compelling.
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colltext. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly. tho moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert au iutorest in them
indf'pendent of his iuterest in the merits.
Class actions may ad vane£' siguifican tly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. IJI(lecd, the class action is
scarcely a new idf'a. Rule 23 codifies. and was illtended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Xewherg, Class Actions ~ 1004
( 1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to tlw class aspect of litigation invoh·itJg: i11di\·idua.l <'hLillls lias lle\·er bern
questioned. But even when we deal with truly 11ew procedural devices, our freedom to «adapt'' Art. HI is limited to
the recognition of different " 'mea11s for prest:•n ting a case or
controversy otherwise coy·nizable by the federal cvurts.'"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S .. at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 2S8 P. S. :249. 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a rPlevan t prudeu tial considPra tion. ' 0
But it ca11not provide a plaintiff when none is bcforP the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. I1L 11
lG I do not. imp!!· th:1t thP rr~nlt rE>nc·hrd toda_,. i" nrrr>Nlr~ · in any
way to tlw continued vitalit~· of the ela.,~-action dr1·il·e. 011 thr eonlrar!·,
the practical impact of finding; mootnt-.·s in thi~ l'a~r would be ~lig;ht indeed.
See note 1:3, HUpra. And thi;, tna~· well be typical of cia,.;.-; adionR broug;hL
under Hult- 23 (b) (1) or (2) to Reek injunl'tiv<• or declaratory rdirf. Such
artions are not ;;uhjl'd to fru~t mt ion through ~l'C!UPnt ial ,;pt1lrment ofl'er
that. " pick off" caeh intPrwning plaintiff. Cf. Depu~it Guaruuty Nat .
Bank v. Rupl'r, ante. at (~lip op., at 11-12) . Xor will Hub~titute
plaintitfs lw d<'ll·nwl by 1he notieC' l'O:-;ts tlwt attPnd cPrtification of a cla"s
undt'r Hulc· 2:3 (IJ) (3) .
17 Thr Court '" pffort:s to ' ·~avC' " this action from mootm•,;,. kad it to
drpnrL ~trikingly from t lw normal roll' of a n•\'il'wing; eomt. Tlw Court
ft~il::> to idclltify how , if aL all, the Di,trict ( 'ourt ha~ erred . Xothing
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IV
In short, this is a case in which thC' putative class representative-respondent here-no longpr has the slightest interest in the injuries allegt>d iu his complaint. No m<'mbt>r
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prPrequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendant ami a lawyer who no longer has a cliPnt.'"
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructioJlS to dismiss the action as moot,.

is said about. thr Di,;trid. C'ourt'~ rulin~ on thP mrrits or it~ rl'fu><al to
errtif\ the broad rla~~ :<ought b~· n•,.:pomlrnt. .:\'or dor,.- thl' Court adopt
the Court of Appl'al:;' ronrlu~ion that thl' Dist ric·t Court !'l'rrd in failing
to eon:-;idrr t,hr po:<sibili t ~ · of ,;ttl)('la~:,;p::; sua ~ponte . XPvl'rt helc·~:-:, rcf'poncknt-or hi,.- law.n' r- i:-: gin•n thc' opportunity to rai;-;c• t hr suhr]a,.:,.:
qup;-;tion on n'mand. That r!',.-ttlt cannot IJp squar'('(] with tlw rut(• that a
litigant. ma~· Jtot. rai:-:e on HJlJH'al tho~<· is..;up,.- hP ha:< faiiPd to pnw'rvP by
::tppropritttr objt•ct ion in t hr trial eomt. TIH• Comt intima t<'" that t hl'
Di;;t rirt Comt wait Pd t.oo loltp; to dc·n~ · t lw eht>'S ePrt itica t ion mot ion, t hu:-;
makin~ a motion for :-;ubrla"" a "futill' aet. " Anti'. at 17 . Hut nothing iu
the rrrord suggr:-:t,.; that thP Distri!'t Court. would not hav<• Pntl'rtai.rwd
such a motion . Sin<·c re~poudPut "ought rertifiratiou in thP first pla<·P on!~ ·
to avoid moollH'""' on appl'al. the· c·ntr~· of an ordl•r ag;ain"t him on the
mrrit~ <'HilllOi· <·xr·usP him from prPHPnting hi,; suiJf'la:-::< propo:<al to the
Di:<trirt Court i:-::-:11<' t lwn·aft<•r.
18
I imp!~· no l'ritici:-:m of rouu,<·l in t.his ra:<P . TIH' C'omt of Appl'als
ngrcrd with rouno<el that thr c·prt ifieation i,;;-;up wa,.; app<•alable, and the.'
ca::;c wa:> brought to thi,; Cou.rt by th e 1' nitf'd State,;,
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MR. JusTICE PowELL) dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he- was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this casK
Accordingly, I dissent.

'18-572-DISSENT
U "ITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

2

I
As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, \\·ho has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may- through counsel-coutinue to litigate it.
Recent drcisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is preseuted at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, wr have held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand. it derives from Art. III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112
(1976) ; Warth v. Seld·in, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The
pruden tiaJ aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertam contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III, t11<' plaintiff must show that he personally bas suffered
some actual or threatened iujury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91. 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejectf'cl all attempts to substitute abstract concem with a subjectr-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete
injury rt>qmred by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rtghls Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976). 2
See, e (! .. Duke Power Co. v. CaroUna. Envii'Omnenlal Study Group,
Inc., 438 \ ' S. 59 , 7'2 (1978) ; Arlington II eights v. Met1'opolitml Housing
Dev. Co rp . 4:!0 U. R. 252, 260--261 (1977); Wa1'th v. Sl'ldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (Hli5J : Linda R . S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. tH4, 617 (1973).
2 ScP, e. u. . Sc hll'l3inyer v. Ilest>roists to Stop the Wa1', 418 lf. 8. 208, 227
(1974 ): () '8h ea 1 . Littleton, 41-1: U. S. 488, 494 (1974) ; Moosl' Lodye
No . 107 v l!'ms, 407 U, S, 163, 166- 167 (1972) ; Sie1'ta Club v Morton, 405-·
1
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sos·na v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record.a But an actual
case or coutroversy in the constitutional sense 'fnust be. extant at all stages of revie~" ASteffel v. 1'hornpson, 415 U. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal intE:>rests' " are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that caunot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before thE:>m." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiarn). 4
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393. 401,
n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United S tates v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumU. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44 , 46 (1943)
(pe1· cwriam L The rule is the same when the question i:s mootnes:s and a
litigant can al:isert. no more than emotional involvt>ment. iu what remains
of the ra:<e Ashdoft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per

curiam) .
a See 1;3 C. Wright, A. Miller, ttnd E. Cooper, Federal Practic(• and Procedure §a5a;~ , at. 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Suprenw Court, 88 Harv. L. Hev. 373,376-377 (1974).
4 See, e. g., Preise1' \'. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 4D1-402 (1975) ; SEC
v. Medi('a/ Curnrn. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 4D3, 407 (1972) ; Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 375
u.s. 301 , aoo, n. 3 (1964) .
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stances. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,53-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S.
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Termin..al Co. v. ICC, 219, U. S.
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is uot "flexible." Indeed, the personal stake requirement sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis,
Standing : Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601,
613-614 (1968). We nevertheless have insisted upon therequirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
Constitution , "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRI!)NNAN, J .. concurring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself OJ' any other member of
tlie class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488. 494 (1974).
0nly after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
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'23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintifi''s individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. 7owa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has a.ny
personal stake in the litigation.5 In the words of his own
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest iu continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons presently incarcerated. 1bid.6 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con5 No ow· :::uggests t.hat respondt-nt could be affected personally by any
ruling on the class certification question tJ1a.t is remanded today. In fact,
the Court, apparently concedes that respondent has no per:>onal stake-"in
the t.radiuonal sense"-in obt~tining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several prisoners now in federal cwstody have 'filed a motion to intervene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, · I note that the motion was received well over a
year after re:spondent was released frorn prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruli11g from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for !'erlioraii in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too late to save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432

U. S. 385 (1977) .
6 Re,;poudeut's lawyer oprned his argument by saying that. " [t]he
mootnt>:s:l qtwstion in this case is, from a practical sta.ndpoint., not very
significant .'' lf tlw action i:s ht-ld moot. he plans si
· to "file a new
case" on behalf of prisonrr,; serving longer terms. On the basis of this
representation by counsel, tlwre is reason to believe that members of the
putative elass~~' ~ssue ultimate~ be included in a class action that wil
uot moot out. ~ of Oral Arg. 25. )
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977), and today's decision in Depos'it Guarwnty
Nat. Ban/1, v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action "is not mooted by the loss of the class re Jresentative's personal stake in the outcome of the ~ , even
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III
may be met "through means other than the traditional requirement of a 'persOI1al stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.
A

In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Lite Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. ·227, 240
(1937) .7 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
7 Certification is no mere formality.
It repre::;ents :1 judicial finding
that injun·d parties other tJum the named plaintiff exist. It al::;o providel:i
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed class member~ in the outcome; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcomr. After crrtification,
ch1::;s mrmbPr~ can be certain that the action will not be ~;ettl<'d or
di~>missrd wiil10ul. appropriate 11oticc. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc . 23 (c); 3 H.
Newberg ClM:> Actions § 5050 (1977) ; cf. Almond, Settling Hulr 2;~ Clas~
Actions ltt the Precertifira.tion State: Is Notice Hequired ?, 56 N . C. L.
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorou~ advocacy i::; a~>sured by the a.uthorita.tive imposi~
tion on thr nmned plaintiffs of a duty adeqmttely t.o r!;!prei:ient the entire·
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established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the lllerits
wa.s unnecessary. The action continued only because o~ the (
transitory nature of pretrial <letention, which placed the lf\w...
wi\ within "that naTrow Class of cases" that are "distinctly
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 420 U. S., at
110, n . 11.8
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial

of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds
that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal
class. If t.hp named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the int{'res(t; of class
member:;. Should it be found wanting, thr Court may seek a substitute
representat.ivc or even decertify t.h(1 class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2:3 (c)(1),
23 (d) ; see 1 H. Newberg, supta, § 2192; Comment., Continuation and
Representat.ion of Class Actions Followi1~ Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, '589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
ca::;e is no differrnt in principle from more traditional reprrsrntative actions
involviug, for example, a single party who cannot participat{' himself
because of his incompetence ·but is permitted to Htiga.t e through an appointrd fiduciary.
s The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that " [p] retrial de~
tention is by nature temporary" and fhat "[t]he individual could .. .
suffer repeated deprivation;;" with no acces:; to redress, falls squarely
within the rule of So'uthem Pac. 'l'erminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend "'especially upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade
review ."' Swishm· v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna. v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjous are
incon:;i:;ten t with the conct>pt of '·flexible" mootness and the redrfinition of
"personal -;(akA" adopted today.

r

~
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stake iu the outcome. In McDonald, a puta.tive class member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U. S .. at 390.0 Because the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the interveuor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expirecl. 10 At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in M cDO'I'wJd that the "refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand Y. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 ( 1978) , apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff' who has prevailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certification because of a "critical distinction " between mootness
deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, a t - (slip op., at 9). When
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling collateral to the
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirectly
to the question of appealability. !d., at 7, 12. Roper also
suggests that a 11amed plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs
with the class. I d., at 10, n. 8.
u The indJ vi uual chims of the original namPd plaintiff,; had been settled
aft pr judgnwnt on the que;tion of liabilit~· . 432 U . S., at 389, 393, n . 14.
10 This extensivr inquiry would havP brrn lllll1t1Ces:sary if, a ~ tlw Court
holds today, t he intervenor had a per:sonal :stake in the da:ss certification
i:ssue it;;p)f. Since the present re;;pondent's claim long since hm; "expired,"'
he stands in t he same position as a nwmber of the puta tive cia.:;::; whose
claim ha.:; " exp ired" by rea<;on of the statute of limitations.
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'he Court in Roper c ates novel Art.
c
ich 1 disagree. Y
_t is not apparent how Roper supports
ec1s10n 111
IS c ie.
There is not eveu a speculative
interest in sharing costs here. Moreover, since respondent's
claim was mooted by an extrinsic event--his unconditional
release from prison-the distinction identified in Roper as
"critical" is absent in this case. ld., at 9. One lleed not
accept that distinction as sound to conclude that Roper affords
only illusory support for the Court's rulir~g here.

B
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per c:ur'iarn); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976) . As they are about to· become second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives. but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified 110r the class
properly ideutified by the District Court." 420 U. R., at 130. 1t
n The dtality of the Jacobs resulL is underscored by the repeated
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Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir·
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., a.t 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spang·ler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representa.tives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class repre·
sentative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
dictum llmt a properly certified clas::; is necessary to supply adversenel:ls
once the named plaintiff'::; claim becomes moot.. East Texas Motor Freight
v. Rodr-ig·u<'z , 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bownwn Transportation Co., supra, 424 U. S., ut 754, n. 6, 755-756; see K1'emens v.
Bartl<'y, 431 F. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
~4, 39 (1974) . Conversely, we ha.ve often stated that the named plaintiff'l:i individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action ii$
filed and at the timr of eertifieation. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., clisSE>utiug); Sol!na \'.Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see
Bell v. Woljilih, U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redltail, 434

u. s. 374, 382, 11. 9 (1978).
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stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise.' 2 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action 1nay be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief 011 the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a
stake in the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question. Instead, respondent's "personal stake"
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do with
~ concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of ~ dispute capable of judicial
resolution ," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
12 In some circumst<.~nces, litigaJltR are permitted to argue tJJC right8 of
third parties in support of their claimH. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U. S. 106, 11:3 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, :346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953).
In each such case, however, the Court. has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffered by the lit.i gant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supm, and accompanying text.
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23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Fa.r less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ...
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case. and
I am aware of none.J 3 Indeed. each of these characteristics is
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizeu.1o1 Although we
1

a ThP Court. often has rejected t.he cuuteut,iun tlmt a "spirited dispute"
alone is sulficiPnt. to confer juriBdict.ion. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418

U. S. 24, a5-a6 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1909) (per
curiam) .
u The Court's assertion to the contrary notwith:;tauding, there is
nothing in the record to sugge-::;t t.ha.t rc::;pondent hus any intere1.>t whatever
in hi:; new-found " right to have a class cl'rtifiPd." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respond<'ut'::; inte-n·st in the merits was the sole motivation for his attempt to repr<'~ent a class. The cla::;s claim~ were added
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have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action ,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves uo principled basis for that practice. 15
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary uclaims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
to his complaint only becHIJSC his lawyE-r fearro that mootnrs:; might
tenninate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Ht>pondent. 2:~, 33. The
record does not reveal whether r«>spondent-us distinguished h·om his
lawyer-uow wi~hes to continue with the case. lf he does, it is clear that
his interest has nothing (.o do with t.he procedural protections de~cribed
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class :;uit:;." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surprising nor improper that re:spopdent should be concerned with
parole procedure~. But respondent':; actna1 interest is indistinguishable
from the genemlized intere..st of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
1·5 The Court's view logically cannot. be confined to moot, ca:<!:'S . If a.
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filiug a class action
challenging parole guidelines may ::;eek certification of the clas~, why ~;hould
a plaintiff who i:s released the dny before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III matter, here> can be no difference.
Even on prudential groundi:i, there is little difference between thi:; action
m1d one filed promptly ttpon rele<tse. In the prPsent ca:::e, this Court
ha:; ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the cla.':lll action. At
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in
turn rever::;ed the judgment. of the District, Court. No determination on
any ii:itiUC is left :;tanding. For every pra.ctical purposr, the action must
begin HJlew-t.hil:! tjmc without a. plaintiff. The prudential contiiderations
ln frwor of (t finding of mootne~:; could t;Cttrcely be more compelling.
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context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
"neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different " 'means for presenting a case or
controversy othenvise cognizable by the federal courts.' "
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R . Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of moobH'SS on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a relevant prudential consideratiou.1(1
But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. 1Tl. 17
I rlo not imply that thr ret;ult. reached todny is necessary in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
t.h e practical imvacl of finding mootne~:; in thiti case would be slight indeed.
Sre note 1 ~1, supra. And thi:s may well be typical of cln::;<; actions brought
under Rulr 23 (b) (1) or (2) to srek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to fru st-ration through ~equential settlement offer~
tha.L "pick off" e<Lch intervening plaintiff. Cf. Depo~it Gual'anty Nat .
Ba1tk v. ' Ro71e1·, ante, at (slip op., at 11-12) . r or will sub -titute
plaintiffs he det-erred by the notice eosts that attend certification of lt claS/3
nndPr Rule> 2:3 (b) (3).
17 The Court':s efforts to ",;a vr" this action from mootnes, leau it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the Di;;J,ri!'t Court ha» erred. No thing36
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IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class represeutative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of ap Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to })ave au interest are
the defendant;.(iii1d a lawyer who no longer has a ohent. 111 ~
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.

is said about. tht> Dist.rict Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to
0ertify t.he broad class sought by respondent. Nor dot•s the Court n.dopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court errPd in failing
to consider the po~S::;ibility of subcla::;.,;e~; sua sponte. Neverthelei'S, respondent-or his lawyer-i;: given the opportunity to raist> tht> subclass
qurstion on fl'UHUld. That result. ca.nnot br squared with th r rule that a
litigant. rna~·. not. raise on appeal tho::;e> issues he has fa.ilf'<l to preserve by
appropriat<' obj('rt.ion in the trial court. TI1e Court. intinm.teH that the
District. Court waited t.oo Ion~ to deny the cla!iS certification mot.ion, tlm:s
making :1 motion for subrlasse::; a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing iu
the rceord ,;ugge,;ts that the Di,;trirt. C'ourt, would not hn.ve entertained
such a mot ion. Sinrc r<'spondeut :sought certification in t.hr fir::;t. place ouly
to avoid mootuP~~ on appeal, the cnt.ry of an order again~L him
the
merit:; rHJJilOL <·xcHse him from pre~enting his ~>ubcla:;:; propo~>ul to tho
Di><t rict Comt thereafter.
18
I imply no critici,o:m of counsel in tJ1is case. The Court of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification i:s:sue ww> ap)X'nlablc, and the·
r;t:>e wa. brought to this Court by the Uuited St:~trs.

ou
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-572
United States Parole Commission] On Writ of Certiorari to
et al. , Petitioners,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Third
John M . Geraghty.
Circuit.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Peti tioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12- 16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources ami. generated a factual record. 3 But an actual
case or controversy in the constitutional se11se "'must be extant at all stages of rev iew.'" Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.l
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth , 300 U. S. 227. 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. De.Punis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam). 4
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of reviev.· cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401,
n. 9 (1975); Richardso·n v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
Un·i ted States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See De.Punis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wron g may supply the individual interest in some circum(per curiam) . The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a
litiga.n t can a:,;:sert. no more than !'motional involvement in what remains
of the ca~e Ashc1Joft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (pe1·
c·urium) .
See 1:~ C'. Wright, A. Miller, unci E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 35a:3, at. 265 (1975) ; Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Suprt>nw Court, HR Harv. L. Hev. 37:3, 376-377 (1974),
'1 Se(', e. g., Prezser v. Newkirk. 422 U. S. 395, 4D1-402 (1975); SEC
v. Medical Comrn. for Human Riahtl3, 404 U. S. 4D3, 407 (1972); Poweu·
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 4R6, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 375.
301, aoo, n a (1964).
3
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stances. Sibron v. New York, 392_ U.S. 40,53-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S.
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219, U. S.
498, 515 (1911). T\he essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible."· Indeed, the personal stake requirement sometimes appears rigidly formalistic. See Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601,
613-614 (1968). ViTe nevertheless have insisted upon therequirement in mootness and standing ·cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
Constitutio11, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 F. S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment) ; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no·
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the litigation. 5 In the words of his own
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons presently incarcerated. Ibid. 6 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and conG No one suggt-:;ts t.hat respondent. could be affected personally by any
ruling on the clat'S certification question that is remanded today. In fact,
the Court. apparrntly concedes that respondent has no personal stake--"in
the t.ra.cht.ional :;eH8e"-in obt~tining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several prisoners now in federal custody have filed a motion to intervene as partie:; respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after re:;pondent was released from prison. In the interim, repondent obtained a mling from the Court of Appeal:; and filed his
petition for certiorari in thi:; Court. Such untimely intervention comes
loo lat e to save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43Z
u. s. 385 (1977) .
0 R e:>J10ndent.'::; lawyer opened his argument. by saying that " [t]he
mootne:;s question in this case i:s, from a practical standpoint., not very
significan t." If the nction is held moot he pla.ns simply to "file a new
<:a~<'" on hdt<tll' of prisonrr;; ~e rving longer trnn;;. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 ..
On tho hn~t,.. ol' thi::; rPprr~eutatioJt by couu;;el, ther!:' i:; reason to believe·
that memhPr~ of the putativP ria~:; at i:ssuc ultimat!:'ly will be included in a:
cia "H actiou thut will not moot out.
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class representative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III
may be met "through means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. ·. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.

A
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification g1ves legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937) .1 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
7 Certification il> no mere formality.
It represents a judicial finding
that injured par1tc.- other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens tlw interests of unnamed class members in the outcome; only
thereaft er will they be bound by the outcome. After certification,
class membrr::- can be certain that the action will not be settled or
dismissed without, appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H.
Newberg Cia~~ Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the Prerertification State: Is Notice Required'!, 56 N. C. L.
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire-
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·established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Oerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutibnality of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their dete·n'tions to ail end. ''the Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
was unnecessary. The action continued ouly because of the
tra~1sito? .natur~of pretrial tletent~on, which pla?e~ the
claim w1thm 11 th~arrow class of cases" that are "d1stmctly 1
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " 420 U. S., at
110, n. 11.8
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds
that Art. Ill may be satisfied in the absence of a personal
cluss. If t.he named plaintiff'~ own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court ran re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute
representat-ive or even decertify the class. Fed. Ruie Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1),
23 (d); ~o 1 l'I. Kewberg, s·upl'a, §2192; Comineht., Continuation and
Represent a lion of Cia~, Actioilll Following Di:::missal of the Class Representativr, 1974 Dukt> L. J. 57:3, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no different in principle from more t rarlitional representative actions
involving, for example, a single pa.rty who cannot participate himself
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litiga.te through an appointed fiduriary .
8 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ...
suffer repeated deprivations" with no accCI:iS to redretlS, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U . S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'especially [upon] the reality of the clajm that otherwise the issue would evade
review.' " Swisher 11 . Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 ( 1978), quoting
Sosn(l; v. Iowa, 419 U. S. :39a, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitations are
inconsistrnt. with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition 6i'
"personal 't.ake" adopted today.
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stake in the outcome. In McDonald, a putative dass member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U. S.. at 390. 9 Because the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDO'nald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired. 10 At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U.S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certification because of a "critical distinction" between mootness
derivillg from a judgment and mootness resulting from events
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, a t - (slip op., at 9). When
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling collateral to the
judgment. Roper concludes. Art. III is relevant only indirectly
to the question of appealability. ld., at 7, 12. Roper also
suggests that a named plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied
may rbtain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs
with the class. I d., at 10, n. 8.
The iudividual clnims of the original named phti.ntiffs had been settled
after judgment on the qu{':Stion of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
10 Thi,; exten~ive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court
hold:; today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
issue its<'lf. Since the pre::;ent re..,poncleut'i:! claim long since h;u; "expired,"'
he stands in the same positiOn as n member of the put-ative class whose·
'claim bas "expired" by reason of the sta.tute of limit;~tions ..
9
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It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision in this
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing
costs here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted
by an rxtrinsic evC'nt-his unconditional release from prisonthe distinction identified in Roper as "critical" is absent in
this case. !d., at 0. One need not accept that distinction
as sound to conclude that Roper affords ouly illusory support
for the Court's ruling here.
B
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
·cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
C01mn'rs '·Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City Board of Education \'. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12. n. 7. But
the cases are rece11 t and carefully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we ~ere informed that the named plaintiffs had grad-·
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130. 11
The vitality of the Jacobs result is under::>cored by the repeated
dictum tha.t a proper!~· certified cla::;,: is tJece;;::mry to ~>upply adversPness
once the ntmwd plai.ntiff':s elaim h.ecomes m.oot. Ea~t 'l'exa~ Motor Freight
11
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Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., at ~30-431. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
held that the named plaintifl''s release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S .. at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spang'ler may be distinguished because the plaintifl's there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintifl's/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechav. Rodriguez , 431 r. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks V. Bowman Transportation Co ., SU]Jra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756; see K1'ernens v.
Bartley, 431 U . S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (1974) . Collver~ely, wf' have often stated that the named plaintiff':; individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification. Krernens v. Bartley. supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BH'"NNAN , .T. , di~::-~nting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S ., at 402, 403; see
Bell v. Wolfish, U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U: S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978).
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nism of class certification or otherwise. 12 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a
stake in the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to·
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from. a favorable ruling on the·
certification question. Instead, respondent's "personal stake"·
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do·
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the· 1
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"'
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
In . ome eirC'Utn~t~mces, litiga.n ts arP permitted to argue t.he rights of
third partie::; in ~upport of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 11:3 (1976); Barmws v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953).
In each such <'ilSP, however, the Court. has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffrrrc! hy the litigant himself. Ibid.; ::;ee n. 2, supra, and. accom..panying tex t •.
12
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confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall' not be construed to extend ...
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the .i urisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. ITI requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence. they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. 'Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 F. S .. at 755-756, a.ud n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court t)ites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none. 13 Indeed. each of these characteristics is
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizen.14 Although we
a The Court often has rejected the coutent,ion tha,t a "spirited dispute"
alone is suffieicnt to confer jurisdiction. ·E. g., R-ichardson v. Rarn'irez, 418
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); HaLl v. Beals1 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (pe1·
1

cw·iam).
1<1 The Court's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the record t.Q sugge<>t that re.;poudent has any interest whatever
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record ~how~ that re<>pondent's intere;;t in the merits was the sole motivation for hi;.; attempt to repre~ent a cla:ss. The class claims were added
to his compbinL only because his lawyer feared that mootness might

78-572-DISSENT
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

13

have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice.15
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the ·case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for H.epondent 23, 33. The
record doe:; not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wishes to continue witl1 the ca.-;e. If he does, it is clear that
his interes1. has nothing to do with the procedural protection1:1 described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suit::;." Ante, at 14. It is
neit.her ::;urpn::;ing nor improper that re::;pondent should be concerned with
parole procedure;;. But respondent's actual interest is indi::;tinguishable
from the generalized intere::;t of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public action'' to improve the operation of a parole system.
1 " The Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot ca::;es.
If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action
challenging parole guidelines may 1:1eek certification of the cla~:~s, why should
a plnintiff who i::; released the day before filing the suit be ba.r red? As an
Art. III matter, here can be no difference.
Ewn on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action
and one filed promptly upon release. In the pre::;ent case, this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the cla:;s action. At
the same time, it has vact~ted a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No detennination on
any is~ue i::. left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must
begin aJlew-this tjme without a. plaintiff. The prudential considerations
in fayor of n fi11ding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling,

78-572-DISSENT
14

UNITED STATF.B PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independen t of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealillg with a form of action long
known iu equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
(1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigatiotJ involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different "'meaus for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Aetna Life Ins .. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. ro. V. Wallace, 288 u.s. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration. 16
But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. Ill. 17
w I do not. imply that tho rpsult rPachPd today is necessary in any
way to the continu Pd vitalit~r of the clas.,;-action device. On the contrary,
tho practical impact of finding mootnes~:~ in this case would be slight indeed.
See notP 13, sup ra. And this may well b e typical of class actions brought
und<•r Hule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
;lction,.,; are noL ~:~ubj ect t.o fru~tration through ~equential settlement offers
that "piek off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit G'Uamnty Nat.
Bank v. Rope1·, ante, at (:-;lip op., ai 11-12) . Nor will substitute
plaintiffs bl:' d!:'terred by the notice costs that at.tend certification of a class
under Rule 2:3 (b) (3) .
17 The Cou rt 's effort · to "~avE'" this action from mootness lead it to
depart ~Lrikingl y from the normal role of a. reviewing court. The Court
fail s to identify how, if at all, Lhe Dist.riet Court hal:l erred. Nothing·
ifl sH id abou1. the Dist.rict Court's ruling on t.hp merits or its refusal to.
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IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class representative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.' 8 I
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.

certif~· the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in fa.iling
to con:>ider t.he po~sibility of :;ubcla8~e:s .sua spoute. Nevertheless, respondent-or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass
question on rrmnnd. That rr::;ult. rannot be :squared with the rule that a
litigant. may not raiHe on appeal those issue:; he has fa.iled to pre::;erve by
appropriatP object.ion in the trial court. The Court inti1m~tes that the
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the elass certification motion, thus
making a motion for :subrlas:se:; <t " futile act." Aute, at 17. But nothing in
the record :-;uggest::; that the Di:4rict Court. would not ha.ve entertained
such a motion . Since respondent sought certifica.tion in the first place only
to avoid mootne:>t< on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the
merit:> cannot rxcuse him from prr:>enting his :subclass proposal to the
Di~trict Court thPreafter.
18 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case.
The Court of Appeals
agre(•d with ronn~Pl that the certific<Ltion i. · ·ue \\'as appealable, and the
,case was brought to this Court by the United States.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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I
As the Court observes, this case involves the upersonal
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III
limitations on tl1e power of the federal .courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed .restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975)". · The
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." · Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 u: S. '91 , ·99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic inJuries can confer standing, the Court has re.iected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject-or w1th the rights of third parties-for "the concrete
injury required by Art. III.". Simon v. Eastern Kentucky·
Welfare Rights Org.; 426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976) .2
See, e. (J ., Duke Powd C'o . v. Carolina Envi1'Dnmental Study G1·oup,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan. Housing
Dev. Corp . 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975) ; Linda R. S. v. Richard D ., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973),1
2 See, e. g., Schle.swger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227'
(1974) ; O'Shea v. Ltttleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge
No . 107 v. Uvis, 407 U. S. 163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton , 405
(]~ S. 727:, 73&-7a~ (Hl7.Z' ; 'l'ile::;f.Km v.. Ullman ; 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)!
1

•
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record. 8 But an actual
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be extallt at all stages of review.'" Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.,
395, 401 ( 1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 2M,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. lli. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam)."'
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401,
n. 9 (1975) ; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum(per cu1·iam) . The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a
litigant cau usl:>tlrt no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the case Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per
curiam) .
8

See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, a.t 265 (1975) ; Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-377 (1974) .
4
See, e. g., Preiser v. N ewkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC
v. Ml3dical Cormn. for Hu·man Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); PoweU
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n 7 (1969) ; Line1· v. Jafco, Inc., 37&
U.S. 301, 306, n . 3 (1964).

78-572-DISSENT
.,

---

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

stances. Sibron v. New York, 39~ U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S.
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Go. v. ICC, 219, U. S.
498, 515 (1911) . 11he essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requ~·uent of a p~rsonal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible."• .Jntleed, e persona s a e reqmre11
ment sometimes appea s rigidly formalistic~~ See Davis,
:...:.~----~:).l.arftttl"flg'i--J...Jaxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601,
..,..-....__~--~ 13-614 (1968 .
insisted upon ~
qw~Sl"MR: ts in mootness and standing ·cases because it is em. bedded i'a the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
ConstitUtion, "founded in concern about the proper-and
l)•operly limited- role of the courts in a democratic society."
W arth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment) ; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. 1'hese principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no·
exception for class actions. 'f'hus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
,Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule·
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the litigation. 5 In the words of his own
lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. 'l'r. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons presently incarcerated. Ibid. 6 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con5
No one :suggest~ tl1<tt respondent could be affected personally by any
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact,
the Court apparE'ntly concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in
the trachtional ::;E'n:se"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several pri8oner;:; uow in federal custody have filed a motion to intervene a:s parties re;:;pondenL in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule 011 that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after re~Spondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obta.ined a mlmg from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too late to t:>ave the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43Z
385 (1977)
0 Ret:lpondent's lawyer opeued his argument by saying that "[t]he
mootne~SS que8tion in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very
significa.nt." If the a.rtion is held moot he plans simply to "file a new
ea~(\ " on lwhall' of prismwrs sPrving longrr tE'rm,.; . Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 ..
On iho lHt t'JH of ilus rrpre~entntion by coum;el, therE' i~S rE'ason to believe·
tlmt nwmber;:; of the putatiw rla::;s at issue ultimatE'ly will be included in a:
cla::;t> artwr1 thul will not moot <>ut.

u. s.
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structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class represeHtativ~ ' s p~rsonal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even I
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III
may be met ''through means other than the traditional require~
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. ·. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.

A

Tn Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Tns. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937) .7 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
7 Certification i:, no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed clns.'l members in the outcome ; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification,
cla:ss membrn; can be certain that the action will not be settled or
dismis:sed Without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ; 3 H.
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977) ; cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at tlw l'recertification State: Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L.
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named pla mtiffs of a duty adequat('ly to represent the entire-
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·established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of ~ personal stake in the outco~e. G·etstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their det~·ntions to an ena. 'the ' Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
was wmecessary. The action continued only because of the
tra~1sito~y . natu~~of pretrial c1etent~on, which pla?e~ the
da1m w1thm 11 tu';'.narrow class of cases" that are "d1stmctly 1
'capable of repetition, yPt evading review.'" 420 U. S., at
110, n. 11.8
M cDoncild and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. l3ut neither case holds
that Art. Ill may be satisned in the absence of a personal
class. If t.he named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it. be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Tiuie Clv. Proc. 23 (c) (1),
23 (d) ; ~e 1 B:. Newberg, sitpl'a, § 2192; Comineht., Continuation and
Representation of Class ActioiUJ Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DukP L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no d1fferent in principle from more traditional representative actions
involving, for example, a single pa.rty who caJ1not participate himself
because of his incompetence but is permit.ted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary.
8 The Court's Gen1tein analysi:;, which emphasized that "[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could .. .
suffer repeated deprivations" with no acces:; to redress, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973) . In similar cases
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'especially [upon] the reality of the clajm that otherwise the is:;ue would evade
review.'" Swisher v. Brady, 468 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. iowa, 419 U. S. 396, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitaUons are
inconsistent. w1th the concept of "Jicxible" mootness and the redefinition of
"personal Bt.ake" adopted today.
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stake in the outcome. In McDonald, a putative class member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U. S., at 390. 9 Because the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire. O:J?inion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expire(}.ltl At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. ·s., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certifica-·
tion because of a "critical distinction" between mootness
deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, a t - (slip op., at 9). When
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling collateral to the
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirectly
to the question of appealability. !d., at 7, 12. Roper also
suggests that a named plaintiff whose judgment is satisfied
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs
with the class. !d., at 10, n. 8.
0

The iudividual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been settled
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U.S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
10 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
issue i1. ~ elf . Since the present re,;pondent's claim long since has "expired,'~·
he i:ltanili! in the wme position as a member of the put.a.tive cla.ss whose·
•claim has "expired" by rea.-;on of the 8tatnte of limit1~tions ..
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It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision in this<.
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing
costs here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted
by an extrinsic event-his unconditional release from prisonthe distinction identified in Roper as "critical" is absent in
this case. I d., at 9. One need not accept that distinction
as sound to conclude that Roper affords only illusory support
for the Court's ruling here.

B
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12. n. 7. But
the cases are receu t and carefully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad- ·
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130. 11
The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated
dictum tlw.t lL properly certified class is nece~:>:;ary to supply adverseness
(>noo the named plm.n tiff's claim h,ecomes m.oot. East 1'exas Motor Freight·
11
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Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir·
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., at ~30-431. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U. S., at 149. See also Memphis Liyht, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978) .
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Span(fler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. 'The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose·
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Uncferlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, IS the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechav. Rodr-iyuez, 43 1 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977) ; Franks v. Bowman Transpor-tatiun Co., supra, 424 U. S., aL 754, n. 6, 755--756 ; see Kremens v.
Bm·tley, 431 U. S. 119, 129- 120 (1977) ; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 ( 197 4). Conversely, we ha.ve often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification . Kr-emens v. Bartle·y, ~'Upra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENN AN, .f., dis:,:enting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, 403; see
Bell v. Wolfi~h,- U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979) ; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U: S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978) .
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11ism of class certification or otherwise.1 2 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of 11 flexible" mootness is:
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate 11 claims'' : (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a
personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a;
stake in the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to·
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the·
certification quest~ Instead, respondent's "personal stake"'
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do·
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the· 1
Court finds that the .Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a 11right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,".
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution ," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii ) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested·
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.
The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not

L

12

In some circumst.ances, litigants are permitted to argue tJ1e rights of
third par tie.- in support of their claims. E . g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U. S. 106, 11 :3 (1976); Ban·ows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953) .
1n eu,ch "uch case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury .;uffererl by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and. accompan 'ing text.
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confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, ·441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall' not be construed to extend ...
the jurisdiction ·of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise' might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule '23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. HI requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in "'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court -cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none. 13 Indeed, each of these characteristics is
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizen. 14 Although we
13 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute"
alone is suffieicnt to confer jurisdiction. ·E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U. S. 24, a5-a6 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per

curiam).
H The Court 's assertion
to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the record to suggest U1at rc;;pondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found "right to have a cla,;s certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for hi~ attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added
to hi:; complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might
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have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the petsonal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice.15
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
terminate the t~ction. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his i11terest has nothing Lo do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neiLher surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
parole procedures. But respopdent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
1 5 The Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot cases.
If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As liJl
Art. III matter, here can be no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At
the same t.ime, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must
~egin anew-this time without a plaintiff. The prudential consideratione
in favor of a. finding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling.
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apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolutibn
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate oases. . Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
( 1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of difi'erent " 'means for presenting a case or
coutroversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, ·300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Jutlgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. ~Vallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The efi'ect
mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may · be a relevant prudential consideration. 16
But it caunot provide a plaintiff' when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. III. 11

of

lij J do not. imply thaL the rf'sult reached today is necessary in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
Lhe practical 1mpact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Hule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to "Seek injunctiw or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subjf:'ct t{) frustration through sequential settlement offers
tha.t " pick off" C<Lch intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
Bank v. Roper, ante. aL (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class
nJJder Rule 23 (b) (3) .
17 The Court's effort:; w ":;ave" this action from moot,ness lead it to
depart stnkmgly from the norma] role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing·
is said ah011t, the DiRtnrt Court '::; ruling on t.hf' merits or its refusal to•.
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IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class representative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 18
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.

certify the broad rlas::; sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court. of Appeals' conclusion tha.t. the District Court erred in failing
to consider t.he po~sibility of subclasses S'Ua S]Jonte. Nevertheless, respondrnt--or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass
question on remand. That result. cannot. be squared with the rule that a
litigant may not mise on <tppea1 those issues he has failed to prl'l>erve by
appropriate object,ion in the trial court. The Court intimates that the
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the class certification motion, thus
making n motion for subcla:sses a "futile act." Ante. at 17. But nothing in
the record suggests that the Di:;trict. Court, would not h<we entertained
such a motion. Smce respondent sought certification in the first place only
to <wmd mootues;; on appeal, the ent.r y of an order against him on the
merits cannot rxcuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the
Di><t rirt Court thereafter.
18 I imply no cnhcism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals
agreed with coun::;el that the certification issue was appealable, and the
c<LSe wa :;; brought to this Court by the United Stafeb.
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded .t hat respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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. I
As the Court observes, this case involves the ''persona:!
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue whi~h an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, ·nevertheless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have nekl that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III
limitations on the power of the federal .courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed .restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E. y., Singleton v. Wulff 1 428 U. S. 106, 112
(1976); Wa·r th v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975Y, · The
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been giveR definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." · Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 u: S. 91, ·99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject-ot· w1th the rights of third parties-for "the concrete·
injury required by Art. III.". Simon v. Eastern Kentucki['
Welfare Rtghts Org., 426 U. S. 26; 40 (1976) .2
1 See, e g., Duke Powm~ Co. v. Carolina Envi1'0nmental Study Gt·oup;
Inc ., 438 U. S. 59, 7.:.! {1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropol-itan. Housing[f
_
De·v. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
INSE~I
490, 499 (1975) ; Liuda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973) .
2 Sre, e. y., Schl&smyel' v. Rese1·vists to Stop the Wm·, 418 U. S. 208,· 227·
(1974); 0'8hea v. Ltttleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 {1974); Moose Lodge
No 107 v. Uml$ 1 407 U S. 163, 166-167 (1972) ; Sierra Club v. Morton1 405
U\ S. 7'27';, 7.3Q-7a8 {197.2,; Till'stKm v.. Ullman1 :318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)ti)
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INSERT 1, p. 2 n.1:
Each of these cases reiects explicitly the view, once expressed
by Mr. Justice Harlan and now apparently espoused by the Court,
that the personal stake requirement lacks constitutional
significance.

~'at

16 1 n. 11; Flast v; - Coheq, 392

120 (1968)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
view never had commanded a maiority.

u.s.

83,

Until today, however, that
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As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record. 8 But an actual
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be extaut at all stages of review.'" Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. \
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 2ti4,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth , 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).'
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401-n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual iuterest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, S'upra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circum(per curium) . 'l'he rule is the same when the question is mootneas and a
litigant can i18&ert no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the Cit.\l<l. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per
C'uriarn) .
8

See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974).
4 Sce, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC
v. Medical Comrn. !o1· Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Poweu·
v. McComtack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jajco, Inc., 37&
U.S. 301 1 3061 n. 3 (1964).
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stances. Sibron v. New York, 392, U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Go. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S.
115 (19'14); Southern Pac. Terminal Go. v. ICC, 219, U. S.
498, 515 (1911) . The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
tNS£12-7 1outcome is not It flexible.'"f7fffifeecH~:;ef;i;mtJ:84~e=remlffi~-1 /N ~)
11
some 1
ars
\..!
tanding: Taxpayers and
13-614(1~9~6~-U~~~~~~~~~~~~~

iremen in mootness and standing cases because it is ei~
bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by tlie
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited- role of the courts in a democratic society.''
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (19?3); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III con ains no·
exception for class actions. 11hus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
,Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule

y

tNStRT 3

INSERT 2, p. 4:
Indeed, the rule barrinq

litiqatio~

by those who have no

interest of their own at stake is applied so riqorously that it
has been termed the "one maior proposition" in the law of
standing "to which the federal courts have consistently adhered
• • • without exception."

Davis, Standinq:

Taxpayers and

Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617 (1968).~/

We have insisted

upon the personal stake requirement
INSERT 3, p. 4
~/

The Court states that "the erosion of the strict

formalistic perception of Art. III was bequn well before today's
decision," and that the Art. III personal stake requirement is
"riddled with exceptions."

~,at

16 1 n. 11.

It fails,

however, to cite a sinqle Court opinion in support of either

,

statement.

To the extent that the decision in Flast - v; - Cohen,

~

l

392

u.s.

83 (1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the

I

I

dissent, id;, at 117-120, it does not survive the lonq line of
express holdinqs that beqan with Warth - v; - Seldin, 422

u.s.

490

-

(1975), and were reaffirmed only last term. Gladstone; - Realtors
v. -Villaqe - of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). See nn. 1

&

2,

supra. Even before Warth, a leadinq commentator observed that
the personal stake requirement had no exceptions. Davis,
Standinq: Taxpayers and Others, 35
(1968).

u.

Chi. L. Rev. 601, 616, 617
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23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman 'l'ranspo1'tation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any ~
personal stake in the litigation.X In the words of his O'W.D-----lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other J}
persons presently incarcerated. lbidj In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and con-

~o

..., I

one ::mggests tlHLt respondent could be affected personally by any
ruling on the class certification question that is re!Jlli,nded today. In fact,
the Court apparPntly concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in
the traditional sen:;;e"-in obt~tining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several prisoner,; now in federal custody have filed a motion to intervene as parties re:;pondent in this Court. Although the Court does no-r--'
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for cPrtiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too late to save t.he action under United Ai1·lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43Z

u.S. 385 (1977) .

;!..J---JRespondent's lawyer opPned his argument by saying that "[t]he
mootness question in thi:> case is, from a practical standpoint., not very
significaJlt " 1f the iLction is held moot he plans simply to "file a new
C<l:l(\" on uehalf of prisonpr:; l;('fVing longPr t~rm~.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 .. '
On thl~ basil" of thi:; rE>pre:;entation by counsel, therp i::; reason to believe
that member:; of the putativP ria::;>: at I:lSlW ultimately will be included in lli
clal:i:s arta)ll thu t will not moot out.

78-572-DISSENT
6

lJNITED STAT~ PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

structs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are ~wo categories of "the Art. III mootness dQc_trine":
"Hexible" anti "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. 'l'he
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate tl;le application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U . S. 385 (1977) , and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class represeutative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though JJO class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. ~
may be met " through means other than the traditional require~
ment of a 'persona! stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. ·. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.

I

'

A

:J-

In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual cla.ss
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Tns. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937) .~ And in Gerstei1L, the Court applied a rule long

i Certification i::, no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed class members in the outcome ; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification,
class membPro can be certain that the action will not be settled or
dismissed Without, app-ropriate notice. Fed. H.ule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H.
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977) ; cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the !'recertification State : Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L.
Rev. 303 (1978) . V1gorous advocacy i::; assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plamtiffs of a duty adequatRly to reprel:lent the entire-
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·established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcon~e. 'Cl'e'rstein held that a class action
challenging the eonstitutibnality 'of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought 'their det~m'tions 'to an end. '1'he Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
was uunecessary. The action continued only because of the
tra~sito~y . natur~ of pretr~al detent~on , which pla~e~ the
cla1m w1thw 11 t~ narrow class of cases" that are "d1stmctlyl
'capable of repetition , yPt evading review.'" 420 U. S., at
110, n. 11.
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial

of class certincation notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative1s claim on the merits. "But neither case holds
that Art. Ill may be satisned in tbe absence of a personal
clas:i!. If t.he named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it. be found wanting, the Court ma.y seek a substitute
representat.ive or even decertify the class. Fed. Ruie Clv. Proc. 23 (c)(l),
23 (d) ; :>ee 1 B: 'Newberg, sup1'a, §2192 ; Coi'iiineht,, Continuation and
Representa tiOn of Clas:; Actiohs Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L . J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions
involving, for example, a single party who cru111ot participate himself
becau~e oi hi:i! mcompetence bnt is permitted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary.
'f The Court's Gerstein analysi::;, which emphasized that " [p]retrial detention is by nature temporary" and that " [t]he individual could . . •
suffer repeated deprivations" with no acces::; to redretll:!, falls squarely
within t he rule of So'Uthern Pac. Te1·minal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'especially [upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the is.sue would evade
review.)" Swisher v. Brady, 4::!8 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975) . The~:;e limitations are
incon,;;ist ent With the con ct>pt of '' flc>xibl e" mootnes:;; and the redefinition o¥
"personal st.akn" adopted toda .
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stake in the outcome. In M cDonaZd, a putative class member
I
intervened within the statutory time limit to a
al the cer- J.!}
tification ruling. 432 U. S., at 390.
ecause the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McD011ald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
/
the Court devoted its entire. O:J?inion to showing that the
J!/
intervenor's claim for relief had not expire'd.~t most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is· kept alive by
interested parties .within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III _sense:
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify
was subject to appellate review after final judgment at tre-behest of the named plaintiffs ...." 432 U. ·s., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. I5 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In
Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff who ·has prevailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class certifica..-·
tion because of a "critical distinction" between mootness
deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, a t - (slip op., at 9). -when
a prevailing par·ty seeks review of a ruling collateral to the
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only indirectly
to the question of appealability. ld., at 7, 12. Roper also
suggests that a named plaintiff whose 'judgment is satisfied
may retain an economic interest in sharing litigation costs
with the class. ld., at 10, n. 8.
10

.li"The individual claims of the original named plaintiffs had been settled
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
lf;M(This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
issue itself Since the present re;;pondent's claim long since has "expired,••·
he st.a.nds in the same position as a. member of the putative class whose, claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations.
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H .is uot apparent how Roper supports the decision in thif'
case. There is not even a speculative interest in sharing
costs here. Moreover, since respondent's claim was mooted
by an extrinsic event-his unconditional release from prisonthe distinction identified in Roper as "critical" is absent in
this case. !d., at 9. One need not accept that distinction
as sound to conclude that Roper affords only illusory support
for the Court's ruling here.
B
The cases cited by the Court as "less fiexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
'Cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. Bu.!.--,
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad- ·
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class .... 1
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.w. !!I
IJi.The vitality of the Jacobs result is undertKJored by the repeated
dictum that a properly certified class is nece&;ary to supply adverseness
QllOO the named. plai.nt.i1f's claim h,ecomes mpot.
EaJJt 'l'exas Motol' fi'l'eight'

78-572-DISSENT
10

t 1 ' ITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquir~
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431. See also Ba:xter v. Palmig'iano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Di~
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978) .
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Span(/ler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. ·The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits ftom which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury tliat could be redressed by
adequate certification. Uncferlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechav. Rodrig'uez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n . 12 (1977) ; F1·anks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 75&-756 ; see kremens v.
Bartley, -!31 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977) ; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintift"s individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BttEN N AN, .f., d1ssenting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, 403; see
Bell v. Wolfish, - U. S - , - , n. 5 (1979) ; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U: . 374, 38'2.; n. 9 (197 ).
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nism of class certification or otherwise.f
that principle today.

ll

The Court rejects

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims'': (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a;
personal stake iu his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a;
stake in the merits.
~The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to·
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to res ondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the·
certification ques 1on. Instead, respondent's "personal stake"·
is said to derive from· two factors having nothing to do·
with coucrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the·l
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"'
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15._(
---T"he Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
JS;(n borne drcum:st.ances, litigants are permitted to argue tJ1e rights of
third parties in :support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 113 (1916) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953).
ln each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffered by the lit.jgant himself. ibid.; :see n. 2, supra, and. accom.,.
J?anying tc"t..

1.1/

E

(NS£iZT

4

1~£er s

~

INSERT 4, p. 11.
!!/In a footnote,~' at 18 n. 11, the Court
1
states:
f "This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury
as a result of the putatively illeqal conduct, and
this injury would satisfy the formalistic personal
stake requirement if damaqes were souqht.
e.q., Powell v. - Mceormack, 395

-------

u.s.,

See,

at 495-500."

This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete
injury our cases have required.
identify the injury.

Yet, aqain, the Court fails to

The reference to damaqes is irrelevant

here, as respondent souqht no damages - only injunctive and
declaratory relief.

Moreover, counsel for respondent frankly

conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no additional
personal relief" in this case.

~

Tr. AOral Arq. 25.

If the Court

seriously is claiminq concrete injury "at all staqes of review,"

3.

see p. 3, supra, it would indeed be helpful for it to identify
specifically this iniury that was not apparent to respondent's
counsel.
RIDER 5, p. 11
15/

The Court attempts to limit the sweepinq

consequences that could flow from the application of these
criteria, see infra, at 12-13 and n. 15, by assertinq that

1

"[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis of
"practicalities and prudential considerations".
11.

~'

at 171 n.

The Court lonq has recoqnized a difference between the

prudential and constitutional aspects of the standinq and
mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra.

I am not aware that the

Court, until today, ever has merqed these considerations for the
purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a personal
stake in the litigation.

The Court cites no prior case for this

view.

Moreover, the Court expounds no limitinq princiole of any

kind.

Adverse practical consequences, even if relevant to

Article III analysis, cannot iustify today's holdinq as none
whatever would flow from a findinq of mootness.
infra.

See n. 15,

Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back

principle.."

~'at

18, n. 11, further the analysis.

Althouqh

this fiction may provide a shorthand label for the Court's
conclusion, it is hardly a principle and certainly not a
limitinq one.
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confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
· v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall-not be construed to extend . . .
the jurisdiction 'of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwi~' might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule '23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional· gap, the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at .755-756, a.nd n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court -cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
resented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none.
Indeed, each of these characteristics is
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizen.) Although we
/

1

~The Court often has rejected the conteut.ion that a "<>pirited dispute"
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. ·· E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418.
U. S. 24. 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per
curiam) .

tr111 The

Court's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found "right to have a cla.ss certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for hi~> attempt to represent a cla~SS. The class claims were a<:lded
to hi:; conrplain.L only because his lawyer feared that mootneBI:l migbt
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have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice:f
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
tem1inate the action. App., at 17; Brief for llepondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
luwyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his iJJt<'rest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
ncit.her surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
parole procedures. But respopdent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from lhe generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who. might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
#&The Court's view logically crumot be confined to moot cases. If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action
challenging parole guidelmes may seek certification of the class, why should
a )lain tiff who i1:1 released the day before filing the suit be barred? As lW
Art. III matter, 1ere can be no difference.
Even on pru entia! grounds, there is little difference between this action
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in
tum revertied the judgment of the District Court. No determination on
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must
}?egin anew- this tjme without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations
in favor of !l. finding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling,

-
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apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expe(lted nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits. .
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate oases. . Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
( 1977) . That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.' "
Aetna Life Ins. .. Co. v. Haworth, ·300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), ·quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
mo?tness Oll the vitality of a device like the
The eft'ect
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration._r-1fut it ca11not provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art

of

~-

'II.I)

~ 1 du not imply tha.t the result reached today ·is necessary in any
wuy lo the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
St'e note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Rule 23 (b )(1) or {2) to seek injunctive or aeclaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers
tha.t " pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
'Bank v. Ropet·, ante, at (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute
plnintiffs be deterred by the notice costs 1hat attend certification of a class
under Rule 23 (b)(3) .
~The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the Distriet Court has erred. Nothingis ·aid ahont. the District Co11rt's ruling on the merits or its refusal t().

rtf
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IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class representative-respondent here--no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client.w-rI would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with justructions to dismiss the action as moot.

certify the broad dass sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court, of Appeals' conclu8ion t.ha.t. the District Court erred in failing
lo comilder t.he possibility of ·ubclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, responden tr-o r his lawyt>r-is givPn the opportunity to raise the subcl!IBS
question on remand. Tha.t result cannot be squared with the rule that a
litigant may not raise on appeal tl10se issues he has fa.iled to preserve by
appropriate object.ion in the trial court. The Court intimates that the
Di:;trict Court waited too long to deny the cla.ss certification motion, thus
making a motion for subcla8ses a. " futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in
tpe reeord suggests that the Di8trict. Court would not h<we entertained
such a motwn. Smce respondent sought c~rtifica,tion in the first place only
to avoid mootnes::; on appeal, the ent.r y of an order against him on the
merit8 cannot excuse him from pn•senting his 8UbclaS8 proposal to the
Di,.trirt Court thereafter.
--,I imply no crit1cism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification iS8ue was appealable, and the
ease was brought to this Court by the United States.
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MR. J usTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusrrcE STEWART
and MR . .JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
j udgmeut for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
1noot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class ·certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his per.. sona1 claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case. /
Accordingly, I dissent.
/
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As the Court observes, this case involves t.pe "personal
t3take" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7.' There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, ·nevertheless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E. g., Sin(/leton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975): The
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III. the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has re~
jectecl all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subjectr-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete/

/

1 See, e. g.. Duke Powe1• C'o. v. Carolina Envi1'onrnental Study G1·oup
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Met1'opolitan Housin
Dev. Corp . 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975) : Linda R. S. v. Richa1·d D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973).

Each of the~e ca,.;e, rejects wpljntl.1 tlw view, once expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan nnd now apparent]~ t>;;pou~ed by the Court, t.ht~t the personal
-,take rpquin·mer.rt , lack::; cor~ ~titutioual. ~ignifieanrP . An~e, at . 1~,~;
Flast \ , C'vhell, .ml F. S. ~3, 120 (19U8) (Hurlau, J ., dJ~entmg~. Until

tod"y, bowm•·, ti»d. Ykw nmr hod rorn•nunrlOO "majodty/

~ olSo
~t'\;+tJ s~~

;

v~ RidAtlrJSdV\ J

~t ~
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injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976). 2
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the a-ction. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the 01..1tset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record. 8 But an actual
case or coutroversy in the constitutional sense "'must be extant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Tho'rnpson, 415 U. S.
452, 459 , n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them." North Carolina v. ~ice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam) , quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240--241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. lii. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam). 4
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of reviE>w cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 39~, 401, ,--2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227
(1974) ; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Uvis, 407 U. S.163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972) ; 7'ileston v. UUman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)
(per c·uriam) . The rule is the same when the questiop is mootness and a
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the case. Ashc1'o!t v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per
curiam).
8 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974).
4
See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC
v. Medical Comrn. for Hurnan Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powe,~ _/"
v. McConnack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 37Y
U. S.:301, 306, n. 3 (1964).
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Rarnirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,53--58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 ~·
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219jU. S.
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threate11ed injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposition" in the law of standing "to which the federal ·courts have
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617
(1968).G We have insisted upon the personal stake re~
quirement in mootness and standing cases because it is em-~

-r

5 The Court stntei' 1hat, "thr erosion of the strict formalistic perceptio
of Art. III wa s begun well bPforr tod11y's decision," and that tlw Art. III
personal st11k<> rPquin.. ment i~:< "riddled with excc•ptionR." A11te, at 16, n. 11.
H fail~, howevPr, to eitt> a ~ingl<· Comt opinion in support of either state
mrnt. To the rxtent that the d<>ci,;ion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83
(1068), supports the po::;ition a;o;cribPd to it in tJw di;,;sent, id., at 117-120,
it" do(':-; not ~urvivr the long line of PXJlrr~s holdings that began with
Warth v. Seldin. 422 U. S. 490 (Hl75) , and were reaffirmed only last
...--:.ccrm. Gladstone , Realtors v. Village of Bellwood. 441 U. S. 91, 99
(Hl79). ~ ce nn. 1 & 2, suwa. Ev<>n before Warth, ~eadil'l, cetltftt@Rt~
kolo .ob~Nwd . that the personal ~take r<>qu~rrme~1t had no excep~ions.
Dav1s, Sl:nndmg. Cfet.ttlll' tt,; .mtl Othus, fl5 l. Glu. "b, :21l'C 6Qt-JU'IG,
(1968) .

-
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bedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial ptocess from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENl'fAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974) .
II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
23 can it uacquir rel a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by l the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975 ). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the- 1itigation.6 In the words of his own~
6 No onr ·uggestH that rrspondent could bt- affected personally by any
ruling on the rlass cert.ification question that is remanded today. In fact,
the Court. apparently concedes that respondent ha,o,; no personal stake--"in
the traditional ~ense "-in obt.aming certification. Ante, at 14.
Several priROnl'l'S now in ferleral cu:;tody have filed a ruotion to inter- /

·,

/
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lawyet, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guara;nty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class representative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III

•

vene as parties re~ponclent in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after re:>ponclent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too bte to sav<-' the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432
U. S. 385 (1977) .
7 R(•spond<>nt 's lawyer opened hiR n.rgumcn1 by saying that "[t]he
mootne:;s quf'slion in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very
significant." lf the action is held moot he plans simply to "file a new
case" 011 behalf of prisoner~ serving longer terlllls. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.
On the bal'i;; of thi::; represf'nlation by counsel, there is rea::;on 1o believe
thttt. mcmb(•rt-: of tlw put.utive class u,t i~ue ultimately will be included in a
class action that w11l not moot Ol1t.
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may be met "through means other than the traditional require·
ment of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.
A

Iu Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937). 8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their detentions to a11 end. The Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
8

Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial fincling
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It al~o provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the intere::;ts of unnamed elass members in the outcome; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification,
clas, members cau be certain that the action will not be settled or
di::;missecl without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H.
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the Precertification State: Is :Kotice Required'?, 56 N. C. L.
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire
clas::l. IJ' the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it be found wantil1g. the Court may seek a substitute
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ( 1),
23 (d) ; see 1 H . Newberg, s·up1'a, § 2192; Comment., Continuation and
Repre:;entat.ion of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 19i4 Duke L. J. 573, 58\l-590, 602-603. After certification, the
rase is no diffNent in principle from more tra.dit.ional representative actions
involving, for example, a single pa.rty who crumot participate himself
be<·ause of hi,; incompetence but b permitted to litig~tte through an appointed fiduciary
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the
transitory nature of pretrial deteution, which placed the
·claim within "that narrow class of cases" tha.t a.re "distinctly
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.''' 420 U. S., at
110, 11. 11. 9
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial

of class certification notwithstai1ding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds
that Art. III may be satisfied in 'the ·absence of a personal
stake in the outcome . . In McDonald, a putative class member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390.H' Because the Court found
that her claim 'vas not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
lntrrvenor's claim for relief had Hot expired.n At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify~
9 Tho Court '>< Gerstein annl~·si~'<, which emphasizrd that. "rpJrrtriaJ detention is by naturr temporary" and that "l"t]he individual could . . .
uffer reprated deprivations" with no acce.-;..,; to rrdre::;.:;, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911). See Roe'- Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we have nott•d that the contmuation of the action will depend "'especially iuponJ tlw rrality of the claim that. otherwise the is,;ue would evade
review.'" Swishe1' v. Brady. 4:3 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 39:3, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitutjons are
inconsi~ienL with the concept of '·tJcxible" mootness and the redefinition of
"personal stake" adopt('d today.
10 Tho individual !'!aim,.; of' thr original namPd plaintiffs had bePn ;;ettlecl
after judgment on th<• qurstion of liability. 432 tT. S., at :~89, :m3, n. 14.
11 Thi.-: rxtrn,.;iv\' i11quiry would huvp lll>Pn llllll('CP~iiary if, as the Court
hold~:> today, the wtervenor had a personal sta.ke iJ1 the class certification
issue it ·elf. Siuce th!' pre::;ent re.~pondent's claim long since has "expired,"
he Rtands in the same position as a member of the putative class who~a
claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations.
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers&: Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper.
Ropm, th
urt-tw as a a name p am 1 w o as evailed on the merits may appeal the denial of class ce lfication because of a "eritical distinction" between
ootness
deriving from a juqgment and mootuess rf'sultiug . m events
extrinsic to the litigation. Ante, a t - (slip op. t 9). When
lateral to the
a prevailing party seeks review of a ruling
judgment, Roper concludes, Art. III is relevant only iudirectly
to the question of appealability. ld.,
7, 12. Roper also
suggests that a named plaintiff who judgment is satisfied
may retain an economic interest · ( sharing litigation costs
with the class. !d., at 10, n. 8.
It is not apparent how Roper supports the decision in this
case. There is not even I! speculative interest in sharing
costs herf'. Moreover, si 1ee respondent's claim was mooted
by an extrinsic event-+his unconditional release from prisonthe distinction ide-ntified in Roper as "critical" is absent in
this case. I d., at, 9. Ont> lle<'d not accept that distiuction
as sound to conclude that Roper affol'ds only illusory support
fol' the ourt's rulin,. here.
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply establislwd Art. III doctrine in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis Schoo/
C01mn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 F . S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 P. S. 147 (1975) (per c'uriam); PasadenJ1 City Board of Eduwtion v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976) . As they are about to become second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12·, n. 7. But
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In Roper, the Court holds that a named plaintiff whose judgment is
satisfied may retain a personal stake in sharing litigation costs
with the class.

~,at

Finding

--·

that Art. III is satisfied by this continuing economic interest,
Roper reasons that the rules of federal practice qoverning
appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural
rulings that are collateral to a generally favorable iudgment.
id., at 7, 9-10.

See

The Court concludes that the denial of class

certification falls within this category, as long as the appellants
"assert a continuing stake in the outcome of . the appeal."

Id., at

1 0.

It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to
support the decision in this case.

Indeed, the opinion by the

CHIEF JUSTICE in RoEer reaffirms the obligation of a federal court
to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain the personal
stake in the outcome required by Art. III.

Here, there is not even

a speculative interest in sharing costs, and respondent positively
denies that any of his individual interests will be affected by the
appeal.

See p. 6, supra.

Thus, a fact that was critical to the

analysis in Roper is absent in this case.

One need not accept that

analysis as sound to conclude that it affords no support for the

Court's ruling here.

~

~
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the cases are recent and carefully considereg ~ecisions of thi~
Court. They applied long' settled principles of Art. III juris~
prudence. And no Justice who partiCipated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. · The Court's b,ackhanded trea~
ment of these "less flexibie" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. .The District Court
:stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130. 12
Since the faulty certi~cation prevented the class from acquir~
ing separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by . the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., at 430--431. See also Baxter v. Palmi~
giano, 425 U.S. 308, 310, n._l (1976).. And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Cour.:.....---held that the named pl~intiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
Tlw vitality of the Jacobs result is umler,;cored by the repeated
dictum tha.t a properly. certified class is necessary to supply adverseness
onoe the named plaintiff'::; rlaim becomes moot. East Texas Motor F'reight
v. Rodrig uez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n . 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra. 424 U. S., at. 754, 11. 6, 755-756; see K1'emens v.
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 ( 197 4) . Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, s·upra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., dis:,enti ng) ; Sosna y. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403 ; s~e
§ell v. Wolfi-sh, - U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki t . Redhail, 434
·a74, '$82, n. 9 (1978).
/
12

u. s.

/
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423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Span{fler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechauisltl of class certification or otherwise. 18 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
~
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at 15, 17. But respondent is said to have a...,..........personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a
stake in the merits.
18 Tn some rircnmstancPs, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of
third parties in ,;upport of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953).
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury ::mffPred by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, s·upra, and accom-

panying text,
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The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question. 14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake"
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right,'' "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
~
1
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. :;
~
14

In a footnote , ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states:

"Thi~

respondent Htff(•red actual, concrete injury as a result of the
putativPiy illPgal conduct, and this injury would sat.isfy the for!1illlistic
prr:;onal stake rrquin'ment. .jf damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v .
McCornu.u:k , :395 U.S., at -195-500."
Thii:i appe>:trs to be a rategorical claim of the actual, concrete injury oul'
casrs have requin•d. Yet, again, the Court. fails to identify the injury.
The rPferenre to damages is irrrlevant here, as respondent sought no
damages-only iujunetive and drclamtory relief. Moreover, counsel for
respondent fraukly conc·eded that his client "can obtain absolutely no
additional JWrsoual reltef" iu this cusP. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court
/ Priously i:; (•!aiming roncretf' injury "at all stages of review," see p, 3,
supra. it would i~ be helpful for it to identify specifically t.his injury
that was not. apparent to re::;pond('nt's counsel.
15 The Court attempt::; to limit t.he sweeping consequences that could flow
from tht1 applica.tion of the"'e eriteria, see infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by
assrrting that "ll'Jarh case must be decided on its own fa.cts" on the basis
of "practicalities and pntdential con::>iderations." Ante, at 17, n. 11. The
Court long has recognized a difff'rf'nce between the prudential and constitutional aspects of thf' ;;tanding and mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra.
I am not. aware that the Court, unt.il today, ever has merged these considerations for rhe purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement. of a persOJutl stakP in thH litigatio11. The Court cites no prior case for this view.
Morro\'<'!' , tlw Court rxpound:,; no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse
practic·al con~(· qttenre:;, even if rrlcvant to Art. III analysis, cannot: justify
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ...
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of At't. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in "'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks· v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply ~
presented issue in a concret~ and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none. 10 Indeed, each of these characteristics is
sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
today':; holding '" · none whatever would flow from a finding of rnootness. \
See n . 15, infra. Kor dot:>" the Court's reliance upon a "relation back
prineiplr," ante. at 18, n . 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction
may providP Lt ~hurt hu ncl labrl for the Court':; conclusion, it is hardly a.
principle :md cwtninly not. a limiting one.
10
The Court oftPn has rejected t hr contention that a "spirited dispute':
/
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E. g., Richardsr:m v. Ramirez, 418__............U. S. 24, 35-36 (19i4); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per

curiam) .
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actio11 brought by a public spirited citizen. 17 Although we
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim:," particularly in "nontraditional forms
____of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
.false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues....,........-are "ancillary to 't he litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
1 7 The CourtH asserhon
to tlw contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the r!i'cord to sugg!i'~t. that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found '·right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record show~ that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added
to his complaint only because his lawyer' feared that mootness might
terminH te the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not rew•al whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wi~hes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surpri:>ing nor improper that respondent s110uld be concerned with
parole procedures. But Tespondent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generalized mtcrest of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public actwn " to im11rove the operation of a parole system.
1 8 Tlw Court " \ ' JI:'W logicall~ eannot be confinl:'d to moot cases.
If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action
challenging parole guideline:; may seek certification of the cla::ss, why should
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III mat1 rr, thrre can bl:' no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action
and one filed promptly upon relea.se. In the present case, this Court
hail ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the cla8s action . At
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeal" that in
turn rever-ed the judgml:'nt of the District Court. No detennination on
any issue is left ;;tanding. For every practica.l purpose, the action must
begin anew-tlu,; tJme without a plaintiff. The prudentia.l considerations,

in favor of a Jlndmg of mootn"' oould """'IY be """ o n m p e l l i /
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stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge. seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different " 'means for presenting a elise or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like th,~
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.1/
I do not. impl y that the r<'sult. reached t.oday is nece:ssary in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Rule 23 (b)(1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers /
that " pick off" eac·h intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
Bank v. Roper, ante, at (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a claS&
under Rule 23 (b)(3).
10

./
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
pf Art. !IV0

IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class reprel)entative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest .in..,
terest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court·; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21
I would vacate the decision of the Court· of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.

20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to
certify the broad class sought by respondel).t. Nor does the Court a.dopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing
to consider the possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, re-spondent-or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass
que~iion on remand . That result cannot b!.' squared with the rule that a
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by
appropriate object.ion in the trial eourt. The Court intimates that the
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the class certification motion, thus
making a. motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the
merits cannot excuse him from presenting 'his subclass proposal to the
District Court thereafter.
21 I imply no critici~m of rounsel in this case.
The Court. of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appeaJable, and the"case was brought to this Court by the United States,
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTicE STEWART
ttnd MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifieation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceed·s in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible"· doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional". forms of litigation. Ante, at
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named· plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot.. Ante, at 12=-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case~
.Accordingly, I dissent.
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I
As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal
stake" aspect of the mootness 'doctrine. Ante, at 7. There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue whi<Jh an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may-through. counsel-continu~ to .litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as ,a question of standing. to
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. - III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, -112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). ·The
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In ·order to satisfy
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result oJ the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject-or with the rights of third parties-for uthe concrete
See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc ., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp . 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977) ; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975) ; Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1Q73).
Each of these ca;.;e~ rejects the view, once expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan
and now apparent ly espoused by the Court, that the personal stake
requirement lacks constitutional significance. Ante, at 16, n. 11; Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, .J., dissenting); see also United \
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (PowELL, J ., concurring).
Until today, however, that view never had commanded a majQrity.
1

78-572-DISSENT
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

3

injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
-Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).2
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record. 3 But an actual
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be extant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.
395, 401 (1975) , quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them.'' North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).'
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna v. fowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401,
2 See, e. g., Schlesin{ler v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227·
(197.4) ; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Jrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167. (1972); Sierra Club. v. Morton, 405.
U. S. 7'/.7~ 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) ,
(per curiam) . The rule is the same when the question i~ mootness and .a
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 {1977) (per

curiam) .
3 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-977 (1974) . ,
, .,
4 See, e. g., Preiser. v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC .
v. Medical Comm. for H.uman ,. flights , 404 .u. S. ·403, 407 (1972) '; Powell
v. MCCormack, 395 U. S. 486, , 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc ., 375
U.S, 301, 306, n. 3 (196.4).
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. Sibron v. New York, ~92 U.S. 40, 5S.:.58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so ·inherently
transitory that ·it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v.' McCorkle, 416 U. S.
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S.
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposition" in the law of standing "to which the federal courts have
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617
(1968). 5 We have insisted upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
e The Court states that "the erosion of the strict formalistic perception
of Art. III was begun well before today's decision," and that the Art. III
personal stake requirement is "riddled with exceptions." Ante, at 16, n. 11.
It fails, however, to cite a single Court opinion in support of either statement. To the extent that the decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83
(1968), 8Upports the position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120,
it does not survive the long line of express holdings that began with
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. "490 (1975), and were reaffirmed only last
Term. Gladstone, Realtors v, Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. ·91, 99
( 1979). See nn. 1 & 2, supra. Even before Warth, Professor Davis
observed that the personal stake requirement had no exceptions. Davis,
s•ttpra, at 616, 617 (1968),
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Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see S-imon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975) . "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976) ·;
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. Ne
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the litigation. 8 In the words of his own
8

No one suggests that respondent could be affected personally by any
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact,
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several prisoners p.ow in federal custody have filed a motion to inter-
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from o.t her
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
•dismissal. But 't he 'Court view8' the caSe differently, and .constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time~and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, ·and n. 7. - The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to c1ass action litigation: The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Gua'l'anty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre·sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Artr. III
vene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too late to. save the action under United Airlines, Inc . v. McDonald, 43~
u. s. 385 (1977).
1 R~pondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying that "[t]he
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very
significant." If the action is held moot he . plans simply to "file a new
case" on behalf of prisoners serving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.
On the basis of this representation by counsel, there is reason to believe
that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included in ;a

· -r •

~~'class":taction that will not moot --eut.
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may be met "through means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' If Ante, at 15. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.
A

In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937) .8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
8 Certification is no mere formality.
It represents a judicial finding
· that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It ~lso provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies arid
sharpens the interests of unnamed class · members in the outcome; only
thereafter will t hey be bound by the outcome. After certification,
class members can be certain that the action will not be settled or
dismissed wit hout appropriate notice. Fed.· Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3· H.
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the Precertification State: · Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C: L.
· Rev. 303 (1978) . Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a ·duty adequately to represent the entire
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) ( 1),
23 (d) ; see 1 H . Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions
involving, for example, a ·single party who cannot participate himself
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary.
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed ·the
claim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 420 ·u. S., at
110, n. 11.9
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. · B!lt neither case holds
that Art. III may be sa~isfied in · the·absence of a personal
stake in the outcome. In ·M cDonald, a·ptitative class member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390. 10 Because the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired. 11 At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify
9 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that ."[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ...
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, '125 (1973). In similar cases
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend "'especially [upon] the reality of the claJm that otherwise the issue would evade
review.'" Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjons are
inconsistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of
"personal stake" adopted today.
10 The individual claims of the original named plaintjffs had been settled
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
11 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired;"
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class who,st}

~·,

"c~~im

has

"ex~ired"

by reason of the statute of limitations,
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In
Roper, the Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims
have been paid may retain a personal stake in sharing anticipated litigation costs with the class. Ante, a t - (slip op., at
7 n. 6, 10). Finding that Art. III is satisfied by this alleged
ec0110mic interest. Roper reasons that the rules of federal
practice governing appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural rulings that are collateral to a
generally favorable judgment. See id., at 7. 9-10. The Court
concludes that the denial of class certification falls within this
category, as long as the named plaintiffs "assert a continui11g
stake in the outcome of the appeal."· Id., at 10.
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to support the decision in this case. Indeed, the opinion by THE
CHIEF JUSTICE in Roper reaffirms the obligation of a federal
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Ibid.
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs,
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake
or personal interest in the outcome of this appeal. See p. 6,
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper
is absent in this case. One need not accept that analysis as
sound to conclude that it affords no support for the Court's
ruling here.
B
The cases cited by the Court as 11less flexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein~Stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-
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dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to peco~e second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at'12, n. 7. But
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of' this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less ~exible" cases ig:irores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented liere.
,
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. . The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never ·properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130.12
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status, Art.' III required a· dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U.S., at 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palm_igiano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness
onoe the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. East -Texas 'Motor Freight
v. Rodriguez , 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 1'2 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424 'U. S., at 754, n. ·6, 756-756; see Kremens v.
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 "(1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., diEsenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see
Bell v. Wolfish,- U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.s. ·374, :a~, n. 9 {1978).
12

" ·
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held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that lacobs and Spangler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. ·They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only beca-use the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the ora1 certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise.18 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims": (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at l5, 17. But respondent is said to have a
18 In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of
third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953) .
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and accom·panying ·text.
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personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a
stake in the merits.
The Court makes no . effort to identify any injury .to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question. 14 Inst~ad, respondent's "personal stake"
is said to derive from two fa:ctors having nothing to · do
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, · the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a. "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives ··of a· dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-inter~sted
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. 1 5
14

In a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states:
"This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalist-ic
personal stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v.
McCormack , 395 U. S., at 495-500."
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete injury our
cases have required. Yet, ·again, t.he Court fails to identify the injury.
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no
damages-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for
respondent frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court
seriously is claiming concrete ·injury "a.t all stages of review," see p. 3,
supra, it would be helpful for it to identify specifically this injury that
wa.~ not apparent to respondent's counsel. Absent such identification, the \
claim of injury is indeed an empty one.
15 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by
asserting that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis
of "practicalities and prudential considerations." Ante, at·17, n. 11. The
Court long has recognized a difference between the prudential and constitutional aspects of the standing and mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra.
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged· these consid' 'erations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a per-
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend . . .
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, a.nd n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none. 16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is
sonal stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view.
Moreover, the Court expounds no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot justify
today's holding as none whatever would flow from a finding of mootness.
See n. 15, infra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back
principle," ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction
may provide a shorthand label for the Court's conclusion, it is hardly a
principle and certainly not a limiting one.
16
The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute"
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E . g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418.
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sure to be prest}nt in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizen. 17 Although we
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice. 18
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a. "procedural claim," particula.rly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As no~d in Roper, class certification issues
U. S. 24,

~5-36

(1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per

curiam) .
17 The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his interest has nothing ·to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
18 The Court'~ view logically cannot be corifined to moot cases.
If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III matter; there can be no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action·
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in ·
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on ·
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must
begin anew-this tjme without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations,
in· favor of a finding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling,

78-572-DISSENT
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

15

are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.19
I do not imply that the result reached today is necessary in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Rule 23 (b) ( 1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers
that "pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
Bank v. Roper. ante, at (slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute
10
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. IIV0

IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class representative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a clll8B
under Rule 23 (b) (3).
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing
to consider the possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, respondent-or his lawye~is given the ~pportunity to raise the subclass
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a
litigant may not rajse on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the
District Court waited t.oo long to deny the class certification motion, thus
making It motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the
merits cannot excuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the
District Court thereafter.
21
I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals·
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the'Ctule was brought to this Court by the United States.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, diss nting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless· concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certifieation. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceed·s in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible"' doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional". forms of litigation. Ante, at
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named' plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12:..16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case~
Accordingly, I dissent.
/
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I
As the Court observes, this case involves the "personal
stake" aspect of the mootness 'doctrine. Ante, at 7. There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue whi'(lh an appropriate plairttiff
could present for judiciai resolution. Tne question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may-through· counsel-continu~ to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as .a question of standing. to
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art.- III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise
of judicia] power. E. g., Sin{fleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, -112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). ·The
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result oi the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subjectr-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete
See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1Q73).
Each of these ca!:ie!:i rejects the view, once expres ed by Mr. Justice Harlan
and now apparently espoused by the Court, that the personal stake
requirement lacks constitutional !:iignificance. Ante, at 16, n . 11; Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, .J., dissenting); see abo United\
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 180 (1974) (PowELL, J ., concurring).
Until today, however, that view never had commanded a majority.
1

78-572-DISSENT
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGIITY

3

injury required by Art. Ill." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
-Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976). 2
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record. 3 But an actual
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be extant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'" are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them.'' North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).'
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna v. lowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401,
See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227·
(197,4); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge .
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167. (1972); Sierra Club. v. Morton, 405.
U. S. 7'),7~ 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943) ,
(per curiam). The rule is the same when the question i~ mootness and .a
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per
curiam) .
3 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 376-~77 (1974). ,
,,
1 •,
•See, e. g., Preiser. v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC .
v. Medical Comm. forlf.u11ULn.l;Ughts·, 404 .u. S.-403, 407 (1972) '; Powell
v. MCCorfiULck, 395 U. S. 486, , 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jajco, Inc., 375
U.S, 301 1 306, n. 3 (196.4).
2
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. Sibron v. New York, q92 U.S. 40, 5s.:-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so 'inherently
transitory that ·i t is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v.' McCorkle, 416 U. S.
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S.
498, 515 (1911) . The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposition" in the law of standing "to which the federa.l courts have
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617
(1968). 5 We have insisted upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
5

The Court states that "the erosion of the strict formalistic perception
of Art. III was begun well before today's decision," and that the Art. III
personal stake requirement is "riddled with exceptions." Ante, a.t 16, n. 11.
It fails, however, to cite a single Court opinion in support of either statement. To the extent that the decision in FlMt v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83
(1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120,
it does not survive the long line of express holdings that began with
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. ·490 (1975), and were reaffirmed only last
Term. GladiJtone, Realtors v, Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99
(1979). See nn. 1 & 2, supra. Even before Warth, Professor Davis
observed that the personal stake requirement had no exceptions. Davjs,
s'(lpra, at 616, 617 (1968),
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Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Ken·
tucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con·
curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S,
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live in.
terests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976) ·;
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. N0
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the litigation. 6 In the words of his own
6 No one suggests that respondent could be affected personally by any
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact,
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several prisoners p.ow in federal custody have filed a. motion to inter·
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from o-ther
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 1 Iri these circum·stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
~dismissal. But 't he 'Court views' the ca8e differently, and-constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time--...:and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
11
flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, ·and n. 7. - The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to c1ass action litigation.- The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
·432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Gua'T'anty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class repre·sentative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Artr. III
vene as parties respondent ·in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too late to. save the action under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 43~
u. s. 385 (1977).
7 Respondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying that "[t]he
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very
significant." If the action is held moot he . plans simply to "file a new
case" on behalf of prisoners serving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.
On the basis of this representation by counsel, there is reason to believe
that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included in ;a
•elass'<a' ction that will not moot.Qut.
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may be met "through means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.
A

In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937). 8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their detentions to an end. ·The Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
8 Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding
· that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It ~so provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed class · members in the outcome; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification,
class members can be certain that the action will not be settled or
dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed.· Rule Civ. Proc. '23 (c); 3' H.
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the Precertification State: · Is Notice Required?, 56 N . C: L.
Rev. 303 (1978) . Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a · duty adequately to represent the entire
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c)(1),
23 (d) ; see 1 H . Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions
· involving, for example, a single party who cannot participate himself
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary.
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed 'the
'Claim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" 420 ·u. S., at
110, n. 11.9
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. · Bpt neither case holds
that Art. III may be sat~sfied in · the ·absence of a personal
stake in the outcome. In M cDoriald, a·putative class member
intervened within _the statutory time limit to -appeal the certification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390. 10 Because the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired. 11 At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is· kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify /

~

9 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that. :'[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ...
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Te1'minal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'especially [upon] the reality of the claJm that otherwise the issue would evade
review.'" Swisher v. Brady, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjons are
inconsistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of
"personal stake" adopted today.
10 The individual claims of the original named plaintills had been settled
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
11 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired;,.
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class who.s~
..w.;m b., "ex~i.ed" by ,_n of tho 'tatute of limitations.
. /
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 ( 1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new do.cj~·tnmcl_____
the much narrower reasoning ado ted toda m Roper. In
Roper, the Court holds that named plaintiffs Gv.;,hi1'rno~~~ifd~--
h81: r I . ; l'ttiel litftJ'Y retain a per-soual stake in s 1aring anticipated litigation costs with the class. Ante, a t - (slip op. , at
7 n. 6, 10). Finding that Art. III is satisfied by this alleged
economic interest. Roper reasons that the rules of federal
practice governing appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural rulings that are collateral to a
generally favorable judgment. See id., at 7. 9- 10. The Court
concludes that the denial of class certification falls within this
category, as long as the !lamed plaintiffs "assert a contiuuillg
stake in the outcome of the appeal."· /d., at 10.
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to support the decision iu this case. Indeed, the opinion by THE
CHIEF JusTICE in Roper reaffirms the obligation of a federal
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Ibid.
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs,
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake
or personal interest in the outcome of this appeal. Ree p. 6,
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper
is absent in this case. One -H~HIU 11 0 t &!!!!€ ])~ that analysis a.ssoHm:l *'~ conclude that ~aftords no support for the Court's
Lfii'ling here.
B
The cases cited by the Court as 11 less flexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
____Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-r
15tein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-

G
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dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to lJecome second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at'12, n. 7. But
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of' this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence, And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinctio~ drawn today . . The Court;s backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases igitores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
,
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action .to
challenge certain high scpool regulations. . The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never ·properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U. S., at 130.12
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate ,legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by · the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U. S., at 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palm.igiano, 425 U. S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Cour~

12 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness
onoo the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. · East Texas Motor Freight
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, ·424 lJ. S., at 754, n. ·6, 755-756; see K1'emens v.
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 '(1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., diosenting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see
Bell v. Wolfish, - U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
• · U.S. -374, :3S2, n. 9 (1978).
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held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
tdismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that lacobs and Spangler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. 1'he Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. ·They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively--class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the ora1 certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise.18 ·The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
·disturbing. ·The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims": ('i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at l5, 17. But respondent is said to have a/
In some circumstances, litigants are pennitted to argue the rights of
third parties in support of their claims. E . g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953).
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see ·n. 2, supra, and accom·panying ·text.
18

~

78-572-DISSENT
12

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a.
stake in the merits.
The Court makes no . effort. to identify any injury .to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question. 14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake"
is said to derive from tw~ fa:ctors having nothing to · do
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, · the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives 'of a· dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are ·identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-inter~sted
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.15
In a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states:
"This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the forirullistic
personal stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S., at 495-500."
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete injury our
cases have required. Yet, ·again, t:be Court fails to identify -the -injury.
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no
damagef>'-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for
respondent frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court
seriously is claiming concrete ·injury "at all stages of review," see p. 3,
supra, it would be helpful for it to identify specifically this injury that
was not apparent to respondent's counsel. Absent such identification, the \
claim of injury is indeed an empty one.
15 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13, and n. 15, by
asserting that " [e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis
of "practicalities and prudential considerations." Ante, at ·17, n. 11. The
Court long has recognized a difference between the prudential and constitutional aspects of the standing a11d mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra.
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged· these consid'· 'erations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a per•
14
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when· Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ...
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra <:Jlub v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none. 16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is
sonal stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view.
Moreover, the Court expounds no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot justify
today's holding as none whatever would flow from a finding of mootness.
See n. 15, infra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "relation back
principle," ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction
may provide a shorthand label for the Court's conclusion, it is hardly a
principle and certainly not a limiting one.
16 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute"
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E . g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418.

'\
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sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizen. 17 Although we
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
false dilemma. As no~d in Roper, class certification issues
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per
curiam) .

The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his interest has nothing ·to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
18 The Court.':; view logically cannot be confined to moot cases.
If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the Clay after filing a class action
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why shoulcf
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III matter, there can be no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action·
and one filed promptly upon release. In the present case, this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in ·
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on ·
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must
begin anew-this time without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations.
in· favor of a finding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling,
17
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are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
( 1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.' "
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration. 19
I do not imply that the result reached today is necessary in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
the practical impact of finding mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
See note 13, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Rule 23 (b) ( 1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers
that "pick off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
(slip op., at 11-12). Nor will substitute
Bank v. Roper, ante, at 19
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. III. 20

IV

In short, this is a case in which the putative class representative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a elMs
under Rule 23 (b)(3).
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing
to consider t.he possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, respondent-or his lawyel'-is given the ~pportunity to raise the subclass
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus
making 11, motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 17. But nothing in
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the
merits cannot excuse him from presenting his subclass proposal to the
District Court thereafter.
21
I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the'Cas'e was brought to this Court by the United States.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE,

MR. J usTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join,
dissenting.
Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he wa8
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federai prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that respondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8- 12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally can- /
not be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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I
As the Court observes, this case involves the 11personal
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There
is undoubtedly a 11 live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, never. theless may- through counsel-continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have ·held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E . g. , Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The
prudential aspect of standing aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete
See, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978) ; Arlington Heights v. M etropolitan Housing
D ev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977) ; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975) ; Linda R . S. v. R ichard D ., 410 U. S. 614, 61'7 (1973) .
1

E ach of th rsr e a ~ e~ rr jerts the view, once e xpre~~e d b~· ::\[r. Justice Harlan
a nd 11 ow appar ent!~ · ~.,;po u~ ed by thP Court , tha t thr per~ onal stake
requin•ment la ck» ro n ~ titution a l signifi ca nce. Aute, a t 16, n. 11 ; Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. x;l, 120 (196S) (Harlan, .J. , di ,.;~c nting) ; ~re al;;o ['nited
States v. R ichardson, 418 U. S. 166, 180 (197-1) (PowELL, .J., concurring) ,
U nt\1 today, however, that view never had commanded a major~ty.
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injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976). 2
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; see
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Prudential considerations not present at the outset may support continuation
of an action in which the parties have invested substantial
resources and generated a factual record. 3 But an actual
case or controversy in the constitutional sense "'must be extant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse .legal interests' " are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aet'!W Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam). 4
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401,
See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227
(1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Jivis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)
(per curiam). The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 {1977) (per
curiam).
8 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proeedure § 3533, at 265 (1975); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974) .
4 Sec, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975) ; SEC
v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969} ; Liner v. Jafco, Inc:, 375
U.S. 301; 306, n. 3 (1964).
2
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n, 9 (1975) ; R-ichardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v.
Odegaard, supra, at '316. Collateral consequences of the orig. inal wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. Sibron v: New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire 'Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S.
115 (1974) ; Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S.
498, 515 (1911) . The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases 'demonstrate, contrary to the · Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the nile barring litigation
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposition" in the· law of standing "to which the federal courts have
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Standing : Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. -ltev. 601, 617
(1968) .5 We have insisted upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the

~

The Court states that "the erosion of tbe stricy formalistic perception
'}
of Art. III was 'begun well before toda.y"'s decision, and that the Art. II1
[
per::>onal stake requirement is "riddled with exceptions." Ante, at l~t-n-. .,..,
11..-- t fails, however, to cite a single Court opinion 'in support of either statet. ' To the extent tbat tbe decision in '/l'lCUlt v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83
(1968), supports the position a ~Scribed to it. in the dissent, id., at 117- 120,
it does not :;urvive the long line of express holdings that began with
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975) , and were ·reaffirmed only last
Term . Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99
( Hl79) . See nn . l & 2, supm Even beforp Wa1'th, Profp:;::;or Davis
ob::wrved that tlw per:;onal 8take requirement had no exeeptwn:s. Davis,
'w pra, a1 til 6, 617 (1968).

'7
\

_)

78-572-DISSENT
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

5

Constitution, "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 68'7 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S,
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions e~tablish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "may
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, .414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974) .
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interests
~tsserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975) . "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the litigation.6 In the words of his own ~
6 No one suggest~:> that respondent could be affected personally by any
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact,
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several prisouers now in federal custody have filed a motion to inter- /
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lawyer, respondent 11 can obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
persons presently incarcerated. lbid. 7 In these circumstances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
.dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
. there are two categories of 11 the Art. III mootness doctrine":
11
fiexible" and 11 less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of 11 fiexible" mootness to class action litigation. · The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U.S. 385 (1977.), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class representative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though no class has· been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III /

/

vene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, 'I note that the motion was received well over a
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too late to save the action under United Airlines, Inc . v. McDonald, 432
u. s. 385 (197!7).
7 Respondent's lawyer opened his argument. by saying that "[t] he
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint., not very
significant." If the action is ~ moot e pans Simply to "file a new
case" on behalf of prisoner,; se rving longer terrru;. Tr. of Oral Arg~ [
On the ba~;is of this repre~entation by counsel, tl1cre i~; rea~;on to believe
that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included in a
·
class action that will not moot out.

J,ts tvlt 5s..eJ
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may be met "through means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal stake in the outcome.'" Ante, at 15. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedent.."i.
A
In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, .240
(1937) .8 And. in Gerst~in, the Court. applied a rule long
established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of pretri"al detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits /
8 C',ertificatiun is no mere formality.
It represents a judicial finding
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides
a definition by which they can be identified. certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed class .members in the outcome; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. · After certification,
class members can be certain . that ~he action will not be settled or
dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H.
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the Precertification State: Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L.
Rev. 303 (1978) . Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire
clalls. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1) ,
23 (d); see 1 H. Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J . 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions
involvii1g, .for example, a single party who cannot participate himself
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an a~./
p(,ihtt>d fidu-ciary.
./
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed the
daim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " 420 U. S., at
110, n. lL9
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on· the merits. But neither case holds
. that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal
stake in the outcome. ·In·McDonald, a putative class member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U.S., af390. 10 Because the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired. 11 At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within 13rescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. Ht sense.
There !s dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify~
" The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ...
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. JCC, 219 U . S. 498, 515
(1911) . See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. U3, 125 (1973). In similar cases
we have noted. that the continuation of the action will depend " 'especially [upon] the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade
review.H• Swisher v . Brady, 438 U . S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosoo ' v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitations are
i):1consistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness and the redefinition of
uper~:~onal stake" adopted today.
10 The individual claims of the original named plaintilfs had been settled
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
1 1 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the· Court
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
issue itself. Since the present respondent's claim long since has "expired,"
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class whOBe'
/
tlaim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations.
__/
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs .... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 ( 1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion 'in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasouing adopted today in Roper. In
~ the Court holds that the named plaintiff's. who have
refused to accept proffered individual settlements, retain a
personal stake in sharing anticipated litigation costs with the
class. Ante, at (slip op., at 7 n. 6. 10) . Finding that
Art. III is satisfied by this alleged economic interest, Roper
reasons that the rules of federal" practice governing appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural
rulings that are collateral" to a generally favorable judgment.
See id. , at 7. 9- 10. The Court concludes that the denial of
class certification falls within this category, as long as the
named plaintiffs "assert a continuing stake in the outcome of
the appeal." !d., at 10.
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to support the decision in this case. Ii1deed; the opinion by THE ·
CHIEF JusTICE in Roper reaffirms the obliga.tion of a federal
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. IIL Ibid.
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs,
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake
or personal interest in the outcome of ~ is appeal. See p. 6,
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper
is absent in this case. 011e at analysis can disagree with
yet conclude that Roper affords
ourt's
ruling here.

B
The cases cited by the Court as "less flexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
,.
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wei~
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stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa-:
dena City Board of Education v. Spang"ler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But
the cases are recent and. carefully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high schooi regulations. The Disttict Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Ruie 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had grad:
uated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court.'; 420 U. S., a.t 130. 12
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate le~al status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
r.eached precisely the same conclusion in Spangier, an actiot;t
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
thir.d party. 427 U. S., a.t 430-431. See also Baxter v. Palmig.iano, 425 U.S. 308, :no, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court /
The vitality of the Jacobs resul t is underscored by the repeated
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness
onoe the named plaintiff)s claim becomes moot. East 'l'exas Motor Freight
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977) ; Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756 ; see K1'emens v.
Bartley , 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977) ; R ichardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (1974) . Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification . Krem ens v. Bartley, supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J ., diEsenting) ; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, 403; see
B ell v. Wolfish, U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. R edhail, 434
12

v. s. :3?4, ·3 ~,

0

0

n : 9 (1978l.

'
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held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spangler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/ respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
·Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Under1ying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for thir~ parties, thr.ough the mechanism of class certification or otherwise. 1 3 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of "flexible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. 'The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate "claims" : (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class
een certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the
rits
IS moot.
. But respondent is said to }have a

/

1 3 In some circumst ances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of
t hird parties in support of their claims. E . g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U. S. 106, 113 (1976) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-256 (1953) .
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concret e, individual
injur~ suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid. ; seen. 2, supra, and accom- ~

p• nymg text.

/
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personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his lack of a
stake in· the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question. 14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake"
·is said to derive from two fa:ctors having nothing to do
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
·to have a Class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested /
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15. 1G /
ln a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states:
"This respondent sufi'er<'d actual, concrete injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalistic
personal st<lke requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U. S., at 495-500."
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual , concrete injury our
cases httve required. Yet, again, the Court fails to identify the injury.
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no
damag<':>-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for
respondent frankly conceded that his client. "can obtain absolutely no
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court
seriously is c!n.iming concrete injury "at all stag!'~'< of review," see p, 3,
supm, it would bf• helpful for it to identify specifically thi~ injury that
was not a.ppar<'nt to respondPnt's counsel. Ab~t>nt such identification, the
claim of injury i~ imked an empty one.
5
1 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow
~
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at ~ · and n. {. by
t
asserting that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis
of "practicalities and prudential con.;iderations." Ante, at 1~[-1~ >
Court long has recognized a difference between the prudentwl and constiutional aspects of the standing and mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra.
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged these considerations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement. of a per-·
14

L

I
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The Court's reliance on some new "right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which "shall not be construed to extend ...
~he jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the "private a.ttorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S., at 737-738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the. jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite tes.t of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in " 'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.' " Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co.,, 424 U. S., aJ, 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
~
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
16
I am aware of none.
Indeed, each of these characteristics is/ "
sonal stuke in the litigation . The Court cites no prior case for this view.
Moreover, tlw Court. expounds no limiting principle of any kincl . Advel'l:;e
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot ju:stify
today's holding ns none whatever would flow from a finding of mootnes::; .
ee n .
, infra. Nor doe:; the Court's reliance upon a :fiation back]
principle, ' ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analy::;is. Although thi!:i fiction
may provide a shorthand label for the Court':; concluKion, it i:s l~ardly a
priuciple and certainly not a limiting one.
16 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute"
aion'e is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E. g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 4i8

[, (,.
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sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizen. 17 Although we
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
~
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a~
false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per
curiam).

The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generalized interest of a "priva.te attorney general" who might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
18 The Court'~ view logically cannot be confined to moot cases.
If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a class action
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III matter, there can be no difference.
Even on ru
tial rounds, there is little difference between this action
an one filed promptlY. wpga Peleaee. In the present case, this Court
has ruled on neither the merits nor the propriety of the class action. At
the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in
turn reversed the judgment of the District Court. No determination on
any issue is left standing. For every practical purpose, the action must
begin anew-this tjme without a plaintiff. The prudential considerations
in favor of a fi11ding of mootness could scarcely be more compelling.
17

'
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are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
( 1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different "'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.' "
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act) , quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like t~~
class action may be a relevant prudential consideratio/
19 I do not imply that the result reached today is nece:;sa ry in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
the practical impact of ~ mootness in this case would be slight indeed.
ee note , supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
nnder Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers
off" each intervening plain tiff. Cf. De osit Guamnt Nat.
t at " ·
Bank v. Rope!', ante, at (slip op., at
) . Nor will substitute'

/
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But it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before the
Court, for we are powerless to assume jurisdiction in violation
of Art. III. 20

IV
In short, this is a case in which the putative class representative-respondent here-no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before the Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class
under Rule 23 (b)(3).
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing
to consider tJw possibility of subclasses sua sponte. Nevertheless, respondent-or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by
appropriate objectjon in the trial court. The Court intimates that the
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus
u not ung m
making n motion for subclas~es a "futile act." Ante, at 1 .
the record suggests that the District Court would not; have entertained
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only
1--"""'--"'
a~
vo~'d mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the
merits
· subclass proposal to the
District Court, t.I-I'IV8U fhP:
21 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court, of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the
case was brought to this Court by the United States.
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Respondent filed this suit as a class action while he was
serving time in a federal prison. He sought to represent a
class composed of "all federal prisoners who are or who will
become eligible for release on parole." App., at 17. The
District Court denied class certification and granted summary
judgment for petitioners. Respondent appealed, but before
briefs were filed, he was unconditionally released from prison.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion, reversed the judgment
of the District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Conceding that respondent's personal claim was
moot, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that re'spondent properly could appeal the denial of class certification. The Court today agrees with this conclusion.
The Court's analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it says
that mootness is a "flexible" doctrine which may be adapted
as we see fit to "nontraditional" forms of litigation. Ante, at
8-12. Second, the Court holds that the named plaintiff has
a right "analogous to the private attorney general concept"
to appeal the denial of class certification even when his personal claim for relief is moot. Ante, at 12-16. Both steps
are significant departures from settled law that rationally cannot be confined to the narrow issue presented in this case.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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I
As the Court obs~rves, this case involves the "personal
stake" aspect of the mootness doctrine. Ante, at 7. There
is undoubtedly a "live" issue which an appropriate plaintiff
could present for judicial resolution. The question is whether
respondent, who has no further interest in this action, nevertheless may-through counsel-continue to litigate it.
Recent decisions of this Court have considered the personal
stake requirement with some care. When the issue is presented at the outset of litigation as a question of standing to
sue, we have held that the personal stake requirement has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it derives from Art. III
limitations on the power of the federal courts. On the other,
it embodies additional, self-imposed restraints on the exercise
of judicial power. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). The
prudential aspect of standing. aptly is described as a doctrine
of uncertain contours. Ante, at 12. But the constitutional
minimum has been given definite content: "In order to satisfy
Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant.' 1 Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 1 Although
noneconomic injuries can confer standing, the Court has rejected all attempts to substitute abstract concern with a subject-or with the rights of third parties-for "the concrete
'1

S"ee, e. g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
lnc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. M etropolitan Housing
1>ev. Corp. 429 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 499 (1975); Linda R . S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973) .
Each of these cases rejects the view, once expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan
and now apparently espoused by the Court, that the personal stake
requirement lacks constitutional significance. Ante, at 16, n. 11; Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J ., dissenting) ; see also United
States v. R ichardson, 418 U. S. 166, 180 (1974) (PowELL, J ., concurring) .
Until today, however, that v-iew never had commanded a majority.
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injury required by Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976). 2
As the Court notes today, the same threshold requirement
must be satisfied throughout the action. Ante, at 8; s~'e
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). Pruderiti~l'con
siderations not present at the outset may suppor~ cotitinuation
of an action in which the parties have invested sUbstantial
resources and generated a factual record. 3 But an actual
case or controversy in the constitutional sense " 'must be extant at all stages of review.' " Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S.
395, 401 (1975), quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 b. S.
452, 459, n. 10 (1974). Cases that no longer "'touc[h] the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests' " are
moot because "federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
case before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244,
246 (1971) (per curiam), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The limitation
flows directly from Art. III. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S.
312, 316 (1974) (per curiam).'
Since the question is one of power, the practical importance
of review cannot control. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 401,
2 See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227
(1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Jrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-167 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U. S. 727, 736-738 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44, 46 (1943)
(per curiam). The rule is the same when the question is mootness and a
litigant can assert no more than emotional involvement in what remains
of the case. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per

curiam).
3 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 265 ( 1975) ; Nate, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373,376-377 (1974).
'See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975); SEC
v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496, n. 7 (1969); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375
U. S. 301, 306, n. 3 (1964}.
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n. 9 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974);
United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253 U. S. 113, 116 (1920).
Nor can public interest in the resolution of an issue replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome. See DeFunis v. ·
Odegaard, supra, at 316. Collateral consequences of the original wrong may supply the individual interest in some circumstances. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-58 (1968). So,
too, may the prospect of repeated future injury so inherently
transitory that it is unlikely to outlast the normal course of
litigation. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S.
115 (1974); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S.
498, 515 (1911). The essential and irreducible constitutional
requirement is simply a nonfrivolous showing of continuing or
threatened injury at the hands of the adversary.
These cases demonstrate, contrary to the Court's view today, that the core requirement of a personal stake in the
outcome is not "flexible." Indeed, the rule barring litigation
by those who have no interest of their own at stake is applied
so rigorously that it has been termed the "one major proposition" in the law of standing "to which the federal courts have
consistently adhered ... without exception." Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 617
(1968). 5 We have insisted upon the personal stake requirement in mootness and standing cases because it is embedded in the case or controversy limitation imposed by the
5 The Court staJes tlmt "the ermdon of the strict, formnli stic perreption
of Art. III was begun well before today's decision," and that the Art. III
personal stake requirrment is "riddl<>d wit.h exceptions." Ante, at. 16-17,
n. 11. It fails, howrver, to cite a singl e Court opinion in support of either
statement.. To the extent that the decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83
(1968), supports the position ascribed to it in the dissent, id., at 117-120,
it does not survive . the long line of express holdings that began with
Warth v. Seldin,
U. S. 49o (1975), and were reaffirmed only last
Term. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99
(1979) . See nn. 1 & 2, sup,ra. Even before Warth, Professor Davis
.~bs~rved t?at the pe~~onal stake reqtlrement had l'llo exceptions. Daviis,
s~ra, at 616, 617 (1968)'.
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Constitution, "founded in con~rn about the proper-and...
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). In this way we
have, until today, "prevent[ ed] the judicial process from '
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973); see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 60 (BRENNAN, J., con;curring in the judgment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S.
727, 740 (1974).

II
The foregoing decisions establish principles that the Court
has applied consistently. These principles were developed
outside the class action context. But Art. III contains no
exception for class actions. Thus, we have held that a putative class representative who alleges no individual injury "maY,
not seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of
the class." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).
Only after a class has been certified in accordance with Rule'
23 can it "acquir[e] a legal status separate from the interestS'
asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at
399 (1975). "Given a properly certified class," the live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply the personal stake required by Art. III when the named
plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755-756 (1976);
Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 402.
This case presents a fundamentally different situation. No
class has been certified, and the lone plaintiff no longer has any
personal stake in the litigation. 6 In the words of his own
No one suggests that respondent could be affected personally by any
ruling on the class certification question that is remanded today. In fact,
the Court apparently concedes that respondent has no personal stake-"in
the traditional sense"-in obtaining certification. Ante, at 14.
Several prisoners now in federal custody have filed a motion to inter6
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lawyer, respondent "can obtain absolutely no additional per~
sonal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 25. Even the
lawyer has evinced no interest in continuing to represent
respondent as named plaintiff, as distinguished from other
In these circumpersons presently incarcerated. I~id.
stances, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require
dismissal. But the Court views the case differently, and constructs new doctrine to breathe life into a lawsuit that has
no plaintiff.
The Court announces today for the first time-and without
atempting to reconcile the many cases to the contrary-that
there are two categories of "the Art. III mootness doctrine":
"flexible" and "less flexible." Ante, at 12, and n. 7. The
Court then relies on cases said to demonstrate the application
of "flexible" mootness to class action litigation. The cases
principally relied upon are Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,
110-111, n. 11 (1975), United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U.S. 385 (1977), and today's decision in Deposit Guaranty
Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. - . Each case is said to show
that a class action is not mooted by the loss of the class representative's personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, even
though no class has been certified. Ante, at 11. Sosna itself
is cited for the proposition that the requirements of Art. III
7

vene as parties respondent in this Court. Although the Court does not
rule on that motion, I note that the motion was received well over a
year after respondent was released from prison. In the interim, respondent obtained a ruling from the Court of Appeals and filed his
petition for certiorari in this Court. Such untimely intervention comes
too late to save the actien under United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432
u. s. 385 (1977) .
7 Respondent's lawyer opened his argument by saying that "[t]he
mootness question in this case is, from a practical standpoint, not very
significant." If the action is dismi.-sed as moot he plans simply to "file a
new case" on behalf of prisoners serving longer terms. Tr. of Oral Arg., at
25. On the basis of this representation by counsel, there is reason to believe that members of the putative class at issue ultimately will be included
in a class action that will not moot out.
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may be met 11 through means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal stake in the outcome.' " Ante, at 15. In
my view, the Court misreads these precedents.
A

In Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class
certification gives legal recognition to additional adverse parties. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240
(1937). 8 And in Gerstein, the Court applied a rule long
established, outside the class action context, by cases that
never have been thought to erode the requirement of a personal stake in the outcome. Gerstein held that a class action
challenging the constitutionality of pretrial detention procedures could continue after the named plaintiffs' convictions
had brought their detentions to an end. The Court did not
suggest that a personal stake in the outcome on the merits
Certification is no mere formality. It represents a judicial finding
that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist. It also provides
a definition by which they can be identified. Certification identifies and
sharpens the interests of unnamed class members in the outcome; only
thereafter will they be bound by the outcome. After certification,
class members can be certain that the action will not be settled or
dismissed without appropriate notice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c); 3 H.
Newberg Class Actions § 5050 (1977); cf. Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class
Actions at the Precertification State: Is Notice Required?, 56 N. C. L.
Rev. 303 (1978). Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a duty adequately to represent the entire
class. If the named plaintiff's own claim becomes moot after certification,
the court can re-examine his ability to represent the interests of class
members. Should it be found wanting, the Court may seek a substitute
representative or even decertify the class. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c) (1),
23 (d); see 1 H. Newberg, supra, § 2192; Comment, Continuation and
Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 589-590, 602-603. After certification, the
case is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions
involving, for example, a single party who cannot participate himself
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an appointed fiduciary.
8
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was unnecessary. The action continued only because of the
transitory nature of pretrial detention, which placed the
claim within "that narrow class of cases" that are "distinctly
1
capable of repetition,. yet evading· review.' " 420 U. S., at
110, n. lV
McDonald and Roper sanction some appeals from the denial
of class certification notwithstanding satisfaction of the class
representative's claim on the merits. But neither case holds
that Art. III may be satisfied in the absence of a personal
stake in the outcome. In McDonald, a putative class member
intervened within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling. 432 U.S., at 390. 10 Because the Court found
that her claim was not time-barred, the intervenor in McDonald
possessed the stake necessary to pursue the action. Indeed,
the Court devoted its entire opinion to showing that the
intervenor's claim for relief had not expired. 11 At most,
McDonald holds only that an action which is kept alive by
interested parties within prescribed periods of limitations does
not "die" in an Art. III sense.
There is dictum in McDonald that the "refusal to certify
9 The Court's Gerstein analysis, which emphasized that "[p]retrial de·tention is by nature temporary" and that "[t]he individual could ...
suffer repeated deprivations" with no access to redress, falls squarely
within the rule of Southern Pac. Terminal v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515
'(1911). 'See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973). In similar cases
·we 'have noted that the continuation of the action will depend " 'especially [upon] the reality of the cla.im that otherwise the issue would evade
·review.' '" SwiSher v. Braay, 438 U. S. 204, 213, n. 11 (1978), quoting
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 1J. S. 393, 402, n. 11 (1975). These limitatjons are
inconsistent with the concept of "flexible" mootness a:nd the redefinition of
''personal stake" adopted today.
10 The individual clarms of the <1riginal named plaintiffs had been settled
after judgment on the question of liability. 432 U. S., at 389, 393, n. 14.
11 This extensive inquiry would have been unnecessary if, as the Court
holds today, the intervenor had a personal stake in the class certification
issue itself. Since the present respondent's cla.im long since has "expired,"
he stands in the same position as a member of the putative class whose ,,
claim has "expired" by reason of the statute of limitations.
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was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs,. ... " 432 U. S., at 393. That
gratuitous sentence, repeated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978), apparently is elevated
by the Court's opinion in this case to the status of new doctrine. There is serious tension between this new doctrine and
the much narrower reasoning adopted today in Roper. In
Roper the Court holds that the named plaintiffs, who have
refused to accept proffered individual settlements, retain a
personal stake in sharing anticipated litigation costs with the
class. Ante, at (slip op., at 7 n. 6, 10). Finding that
Art. III is satisfied by this alleged economic interest, Roper
reasons that the rules of federal practice governing appealability permit a party to obtain review of certain procedural
rulings that are collateral to a generally favorable judgment.
See id. , at 7, 9-10. The Court concludes that the denial of
class certification falls within this category, as long as the
named plaintiffs "assert a continuing stake in the outcome of
the appeal." !d., at 10.
It is far from apparent how Roper can be thought to support the decision in this case. Indeed, the opinion by THE
CHIEF JusTICE in Roper reaffirms the obligation of a federal
court to dismiss an appeal when the parties no longer retain
the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. Ibid.
Here, there is not even a speculative interest in sharing costs,
and respondent affirmatively denies that he retains any stake
or personal interest in the outcome of his appeal. See p. 6,
supra. Thus, a fact that was critical to the analysis in Roper
is absent in this case. One ·can disa.gree with that analysis
yet conclude that Roper affords no support for the Court's
ruling here.
B
The cases cited by the Court as ttless flexible"-and therefore less authoritative-apply established Art. III doctrine in
cases closely analogous to this one. Indianapolis School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam); Wein-
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>Stein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Pasa•
dena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976). As they are about to become second class precedents,
these cases are relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 12, n. 7. But
the cases are recent and carefully considered decisions of this
Court. They applied long settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. And no Justice who participated in them suggested
the distinction drawn today. The Court's backhanded treatment of these "less flexible" cases ignores their controlling
relevance to the issue presented here.
In Jacobs, six named plaintiffs brought a class action to
challenge certain high school regulations. The District Court
stated on the record that class treatment was appropriate and
that the plaintiffs were proper representatives, but the court
failed to comply with Rule 23. After this Court granted
review, we were informed that the named plaintiffs had graduated. We held that the action was entirely moot because
the "class action was never properly certified nor the class
properly identified by the District Court." 420 U.S., at 130. 12
Since the faulty certification prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status, Art. III required a dismissal. We
reached precisely the same conclusion in Spangler, an action
saved from mootness only by the timely intervention of a
third party. 427 U.S., at 430-431. See also Ba:xter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,310, n. 1 (1976). And in Bradford, where
the District Court had denied certification outright, the Court
12 The vitality of the Jacobs result is underscored by the repeated
dictum that a properly certified class is necessary to supply adverseness
:<moo the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot. East Texas Motor Freight
v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 406, n. 12 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, 424 U. S., at 754, n. 6, 755-756; see Kremens v.
Bartley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-120 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24, 39 (1974). Conversely, we have often stated that the named plaintiff's individual claim must be a live one both at the time the action is
filed and at the time of certification. Kremens v. Bartley, supra, at 143,
n. 6 (BRENNAN, J., di~senting); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., at 402, 403; see
11eit v. Wolfish,- U. S. - , - , n. 5 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
t1. s. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978).
. ·~.
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held that the named plaintiff's release from prison required the
dismissal of his complaint about parole release procedures.
423 U.S., at 149. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978).
The Court suggests that Jacobs and Spangler may be distinguished because the plaintiffs there were not appealing the
denial of class certification. The Court overlooks the fact that
in each case the class representatives were defending a judgment on the merits from which the defendants had appealed.
The plaintiffs/respondents continued vigorously to assert the
claims of the class. They did not take the procedural route
of appealing a denial of certification only because the District
Court had granted-albeit defectively-class status. We chose
not to remand for correction of the oral certification order in
Jacobs because we recognized that the putative class representative had suffered no injury that could be redressed by
adequate certification. Underlying Jacobs, and Bradford as
well, is the elementary principle that no one has a personal
stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise.13 The Court rejects
that principle today.

III
While the Court's new concept of u~exible" mootness is
unprecedented, the content given that concept is even more
disturbing. The Court splits the class aspects of this action
into two separate uclaims": (i) that the action may be maintained by respondent on behalf of a class, and (ii) that the
class is entitled to relief on the merits. Since no class has
been certified, the Court concedes that the claim on the merits
is moot. Ante, at 15-16, 19-20. But respondent is said to
13 In some circumstances, litigants are permitted to argue the rights of
third parties in support of their claims. E. g., Singleton v. Wulff 428
U.S. 106, 113 (1976); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,255-256 (1953).
In each such case, however, the Court has identified a concrete, individual
injury suffered by the litigant himself. Ibid.; see n. 2, supra, and accompanying text.
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have a personal stake in his "procedural claim" despite his
lack of a stake in the merits.
The Court makes no effort to identify any injury to
respondent that may be redressed by, or any benefit to respondent that may accrue from, a favorable ruling on the
certification question. 14 Instead, respondent's "personal stake"
is said to derive from two factors having nothing to do
with concrete injury or stake in the outcome. First, the
Court finds that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create
a' "right," "analogous to the private attorney general concept,"
to have a class certified. Second, the Court thinks that the
case retains the "imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution," which are identified as (i) a sharply presented
issue, (ii) a concrete factual setting, and (iii) a self-interested
party actually contesting the case. Ante, at 14-15.15
14 In a footnote, ante, at 18, n. 11, the Court states:
"This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalistic
personal stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S., at 491>-500."
This appears to be a categorical claim of the actual, concrete injury our
cases have required. Yet, again, the Court fails to identify the injury.
The reference to damages is irrelevant here, as respondent sought no
damages-only injunctive and declaratory relief. Moreover, counsel for
respondent frankly conceded that his client "can obtain absolutely no
additional personal relief" in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. If the Court
seriously is claiming concrete injury "at all stages of review," see p. 3,
supra, it would be helpful for it to identify specifically this injury that
was not apparent to respondent's counsel. Absent such identification, the
claim of injury is indeed an empty one.
15 The Court attempts to limit the sweeping consequences that could flow
from the application of these criteria, see infra, at 13-14, and n. 18, by
asserting that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts" on the basis
of "practicalities and prudential con~derat.ions." Ante, at 17-18, n. 11.
The Court long has recognized a difference between the pmdential and constitut.ional aspects of the standing nnd mootness doctrines. See p. 2, supra.
I am not aware that the Court, until today, ever has merged these consid- ,
erations for the purpose of eliminating the Art. III requirement of a per• ·
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The Court's reliance on some new 11right" inherent in Rule
23 is misplaced. We have held that even Congress may not
confer federal court jurisdiction when Art. III does not.
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100;
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 494, and n. 2; see Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 175-177 (1803). Far less so may a
rule of procedure which 11shall not be construed to extend . . .
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 82. Moreover, the 11private attorney general concept" cannot supply the personal stake necessary to
satisfy Art. III. It serves only to permit litigation by a
party who has a stake of his own but otherwise might be
barred by prudential standing rules. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U. S., at 501; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 737- 738.
Since neither Rule 23 nor the private attorney general
concept can fill the jurisdictional gap, the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements must rest entirely on its
tripartite test of concrete adverseness. Although the components of the test are no strangers to our Art. III jurisprudence, they operate only in 11 'cases confessedly within [the
Court's] jurisdiction.'" Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S., at 755-756, and n. 8, quoting Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). The Court cites no decision that
has premised jurisdiction upon the bare existence of a sharply
presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case, and
I am aware of none. 16 Indeed, each of these characteristics is
sonal stake in the litigation. The Court cites no prior case for this view.
Moreover, the Court expounds no limiting principle of any kind. Adverse
practical consequences, even if relevant to Art. III analysis, cannot justify
today's holding as none whatever would flow from a finding of mootness.
See n. 18, inf ra. Nor does the Court's reliance upon a "'relation back'
principle," ante, at 18, n. 11, further the analysis. Although this fiction
may provide a shorthand label for the Court's conclusion, it is hardly a
principle and certainly not a limiting one.
1 6 The Court often has rejected the contention that a "spirited dispute"
alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. E . g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418

78-572-DISSENT
14

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

sure to be present in the typical "private attorney general"
action brought by a public spirited citizen. 17 Although we
have refused steadfastly to countenance the "public action,"
the Court's redefinition of the personal stake requirement
leaves no principled basis for that practice.18
The Court reasons that its departure from precedent is
compelled by the difficulty of identifying a personal stake in
a "procedural claim," particularly in "nontraditional forms
of litigation." Ante, at 13, 14. But the Court has created a
U. S. 24, 35-36 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (per
curiam).

The Courts assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that respondent has any interest whatever
in his new-found "right to have a class certified." Ante, at 15. In fact,
the record shows that respondent's interest in the merits was the sole motivation for his attempt to represent a class. The class claims were added
to his complaint only because his lawyer feared that mootness might
terminate the action. App., at 17; Brief for Repondent 23, 33. The
record does not reveal whether respondent-as distinguished from his
lawyer-now wishes to continue with the case. If he does, it is clear that
his interest has nothing to do with the procedural protections described
by the Court as the "primary benefits of class suits." Ante, at 14. It is
neither surprising nor improper that respondent should be concerned with
parole procedures. But respondent's actual interest is indistinguishable
from the generalized interest of a "private attorney general" who might
bring a "public action" to improve the operation of a parole system.
18 The Court's view logically cannot be confined to moot cases. If a
plaintiff who is released from prison the day after filing a cla8S action
challenging parole guidelines may seek certification of the class, why should
a plaintiff who is released the day before filing the suit be barred? As an
Art. III matter, there can be no difference.
Even on prudential grounds, there is little difference between this action
and one filed promptly after the named plaintiff's release from prison.
In the present case, this Court has ruled on neither the merits nor the
propriety of the class action. At the same time, it has vacated a judgment by the Court of Appeals that in turn reversed the judgment of the
District Court. No determination on any issue is left, standing. For
every practical purpose, the action must begin anew-this time without a
plaintiff. The prudential considerations in favor of a finding of mootness
could scarcely be more compelling.
17

78-572-DISSENT
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMM'N v. GERAGHTY

15

false dilemma. As noted in Roper, class certification issues
are "ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at (slip op., at 6). Any attempt to identify a personal
stake in such ancillary "claims" often must end in frustration,
for they are not claims in any ordinary sense of the word.
A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties or to try the case before a jury instead of a
judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a particular
context. Such procedural devices generally have no value
apart from their capacity to facilitate a favorable resolution
of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the moving party is
neither expected nor required to assert an interest in them
independent of his interest in the merits.
Class actions may advance significantly the administration
of justice in appropriate cases. Indeed, the class action is
scarcely a new idea. Rule 23 codifies, and was intended to
clarify, procedures for dealing with a form of action long
known in equity. See 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions § 1004
(1977). That federal jurisdiction can attach to the class aspect of litigation involving individual claims has never been
questioned. But even when we deal with truly new procedural devices, our freedom to "adapt" Art. III is limited to
the recognition of different 11 'means for presenting a case or
controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.'"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 240 (1937)
(Declaratory Judgment Act), quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (emphasis added).
The effect of mootness on the vitality of a device like the
class action may be a relevant prudential consideration.19
19 I do not imply that the result reached today is necessary in any
way to the continued vitality of the class-action device. On the contrary,
the practical impact of moot.ness in this case would be slight indeed.
See note 18, supra. And this may well be typical of class actions brought
under Rule 23 (b) ( 1) or (2) to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. Such
actions are not subject to frustration through sequential settlement offers
that "buy off" each intervening plaintiff. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat.
Bank v. Roper, ante, at (slip op., at 12-13). Nor will substitute
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lJut it cannot provide a plaintiff when none is before th~
Court, for we arb powerless'Jt-o.assume jurisdiction in violation
'
'
~f Art. IIV0

•

lV

In short, this is a c~ in which the putative class representative-respondent, here-no longer has the slightest interest in the injuries alleged in his complaint. No member
of the class is before th~ Court; indeed, none has been identified. The case therefore lacks a plaintiff with the minimal
personal stake that is a constitutional prerequisite to the jurisdiction of an Art. III court. In any realistic sense, the only
persons before this Court who appear to have an interest are
the defendants and a lawyer who no longer has a client. 21
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the action as moot.
plaintiffs be deterred by the notice costs that attend certification of a class
under Rule 23 (b) (3).
20 The Court's efforts to "save" this action from mootness lead it to
depart strikingly from the normal role of a reviewing court. The Court
fails to identify how, if at all, the District Court has erred. Nothing
is said about the District Court's ruling on the merits or its refusal to
certify the broad class sought by respondent. Nor does the Court adopt
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the District Court erred in failing
to consider the possibility of subclasses Bua Bponte. Nevertheless, respondent--or his lawyer-is given the opportunity to raise the subclass
question on remand. That result cannot be squared with the rule that a
litigant may not raise on appeal those issues he has failed to preserve by
appropriate objection in the trial court. The Court intimates that the
District Court waited too long to deny the class certification motion, thus
making a motion for subclasses a "futile act." Ante, at 19. But nothing in
the record suggests that the District Court would not have entertained
such a motion. Since respondent sought certification in the first place only
to avoid mootness on appeal, the entry of an order against him on the
merits provides no excuse for his subsequent failure to present a subclass
proposal to the District Court.
21 I imply no criticism of counsel in this case. The Court of Appeals
agreed with counsel that the certification issue was appealable, and the
case was brought to this Court by the United States.

